Reviews:

Musical Representations, Subjects, and Objects: The Construction of Musical Thought in Zarlino, Descartes, Rameau, and Weber. By Jairo Moreno. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004, 236 + viii pp.

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Moreno begins his book with what appears to be the relatively simple task of making explicit the largely implicit role(s) of the "listening subject" in several pivotal historical moments of music theory, through close readings of four crucial figures (Zarlino, Descartes, Rameau, and Weber). This modest and insightful goal quickly becomes, however, a much wider and more profound inquiry, for Moreno is not simply sketching a "history of listening," updating the earlier work of Heinrich Besseler (1959), interesting though such a project might be. Instead, he prefers to orient his readings to the notion of "subject" rather than "listener" or "ideal listener," in order to account for how music theories conceive of the comprehensive and generalized acts of sensation, perception, and cognition—in short, how theories of aural experience and understanding can make claims to knowledge. Thus, he is taking music theory as a specific type of knowledge and exploring the role of the (generalized) "subject" in constructing it within a much deeper epistemological context: "this book attempts to establish the grounds of knowledge on which . . . a theory (not a theorist) can think its objects, represent them, and designate a cognitive figure as the arbiter for the value and usefulness of those represented objects" (2). Moreno's project, in other words, is less about structures of music than about structures of consciousness and knowledge—or, more precisely, he aims to show us the extent to which they are interdependent, how the object and the subject shape each other in the process of theoretical representation. Further, in his exploring the implicit (even unconscious) reliance of music theories on the figure of the subject, it becomes apparent that the emergence of the subject itself in Western thought has also conversely relied on music and musical knowledge in significant ways. In other words, Moreno begins to reveal to us how involved music may have been in the historical construction of the subject and, he also suggests, in the emergence of modernity.[1] Over the course of his four "close readings" (1), he convincingly demonstrates how musical knowledge has been intertwined in significant ways with the emergence of the subject (through the concepts of intellectual self-regulation, objective knowledge, and transcendental subjectivity) and modernity (through substantive reason and instrumental rationality).[2] His book becomes, therefore, ambitious in its intellectual coverage and bold in its conclusions.

The ambitious aims and scope of this book are crucial for readers to understand at the outset, because I believe we would be mistaken to take it as a mere application of contemporary philosophy and critical theory to the history of theory. This is, in fact, what the back cover of the dust jacket reads: "A provocative application of Foucault's ideas to music theory." While this statement is not untrue, it understates Moreno's scope and accomplishment, for it suggests that the author has borrowed critical tools and adapted them from their original purposes, while still locating his project safely within the history of theory. Rather, Moreno

1 Similar to Moreno's project in placing musical knowledge within a larger intellectual discourse are Thomas 1995 and Barry 1987, who respectively trace the central role music played within the Enlightenment and Romantic discourses on the nature of language.

2 One of the more fascinating studies of this history, and one on which Moreno has relied, is Taylor 1989.

has approached his inquiry without recognizing disciplinary boundaries, believing that theory always has been (and should remain) part of a wider learned discourse. This is clearly true of the theorists he reads here, but such an approach also relies on the position of the author in relation to intellectual tradition, and it seems that Moreno is impressively fluent in the philosophical and critical language he speaks (which is not always the case in recent scholarship in music). All of this simply means that the book's conclusions are likely to be most provocative in a wider intellectual arena. Indeed, some practically minded theorists may not take the time to work through, for example, the dense passages that explore theories of temporality and the imagination. Yet this would be truly unfortunate, because his findings are so very basic to our experiences of music that they would seem relevant to any close and meaningful engagement with it, whether analytical, historical, critical, or personal. Everyone listens. In this sense, Moreno uncovers the intellectual complexities of something that is so basic as to seem almost universal; in his words, "my readings of the subject in music theory have come dangerously close to asserting a sort of postmodern critical transcendentality" (166). But that is not consistent with Moreno's method, which always treats listening as bound up with broader issues. One of the important recurring issues in Moreno's book, for instance, is temporality, arising from the basic question of how the listening subject is able to conceptualize music within the unceasing passage of time, how it is possible to conceive of the whole when we only hear one part at a time. This question is central in Moreno's project in part because it is one of the ways in which music participated most directly in philosophers' quest to answer basic questions about human consciousness, modes of perception/conception, issues of time/space, and even the notion of causality. As early as Descartes and as recently as Husserl, the simple example of comprehending a melody has figured into discussions of how human consciousness handles temporality (Bernet, Kern, and Marbach 1993, 101–14).

To achieve his ambitious goal, Moreno enlists the conceptual assistance of some of the twentieth century's most illustrious thinkers. Most explicit is Michel Foucault, whose approach to the history of Western thought, which Foucault himself calls the "archaeology of knowledge," provides an appealing alternative to naive or organicist approaches to intellectual history, deftly bypassing the pitfalls of these traditional approaches (Foucault 1966/1994 and 1969/1972). Yet Moreno is not afraid to modify Foucault's schemes to fit the complex experience of the aural (as opposed to the visual, which has been the fundamental metaphor in Western thought since Descartes). Additionally, while Foucault's archaeology certainly provides an underlying set of assumptions and method, it is important also to recognize the significant impact of other thinkers on his project, some of whom can be sensed on many pages even when their names are not mentioned. These include Hayden White, Roland Barthes, Theodor Adorno, Paul Ricoeur, Paul Feyerabend, Julia Kristeva, Umberto Eco, Jacques Derrida, Paul de Man, Barbara H. Smith, Wolfgang Iser, Northrop Frye, Kenneth Burke, and M.H. Abrams.

Readers will notice, additionally, that Moreno's findings tend to be general in nature, not as specific and/or detailed as many of us are used to seeing in theoretical studies (e.g., voice-leading sketches). Indeed, he tends to see his project more as an inquiry into musical thought than into music theory *per se*; or better, his project reads music theory as musical *thought* in a wider intellectual arena. But his findings are no less significant for that: as insights that can affect something as fundamental as how we approach theory and analysis, that can shape the basic questions we ask and how we go about asking them, they would seem to be crucial considerations for all theoretical knowledge of music. In this sense, I find it to be a profound book. It therefore follows in the footsteps of several other recent books of wide-ranging intellectual scope and deep (even provocative) insights (including Chua 1999 and Korsyn 2003).

Instead of summarizing Moreno's complete project here, I will attempt to provide some background information and emphasize certain important points, both of which will locate it more concretely within a larger critical discourse and should assist readers in appreciating its insights; thus I will try to reveal what I see as the wider implications of his project. It would not be an exaggeration to say that Moreno is investigating not theories themselves but rather *how* theories make claims to knowledge and *how* we come to know music through these theories. Thus, the book can easily be read as an overview of the changing history of method in music theory, understood in the broadest of senses, and the various forces that have guided it. It is in the area of method that we all have much to learn from Moreno's project. Not only does he offer us new and insightful ways of reading historical texts; he also heightens our awareness of what is involved in hearing and knowing music, how our own subjectivities have been shaped by this experience.

A fundamental part of this book is the recognition that the answers to basic questions about music—What is music? How does it rely on a listening subject? What are the capacities, faculties, and modes of listening for this subject? What is the relationship between the listening subject and musical objects? How does the language of music theory regulate and mediate this relationship?—must be answered *historically* if we are seeking complete understanding. In other words, Moreno takes music-theoretical knowledge as historically contingent, as music and knowledge have both been reshaped through new compositional practices, new aesthetic aims, and new epistemological paradigms. Accordingly, he builds on some important prior knowledge, such as the historical differentiation of modes of listening (Besseler 1959), the historical succession of epistemological structures (Foucault 1966/1994), and the historical refashioning of the subject as "contested locus of knowledge" in Descartes, Kant, and Husserl (10).

Significantly, this need to historicize also applies to language. Instead of taking language as a repository or transparent medium of theoretical propositions, Moreno (following Foucault) contextualizes utterances within historically conditioned "semiotic protocols" (6); in other words, language is one form of signification, and signification itself has changed rather dramatically over the course of Western history. This becomes important in Moreno's project at moments when the subject-object dialectic changes the modality of perception and/or cognition in such a way as to alter the very process of signification (typically, from ternary to binary sign structure or the reverse). It is one of Foucault's signal contributions to explain how signification has changed in relation to knowledge and modes of knowing. This realization means that when we take up certain semiotic tools for analysis (e.g., paradigm charts), we are already making important decisions about what music is, how we are to listen to it, and what kind of knowledge it is.

Another one of the important things readers need to understand about Moreno's project is that it investigates theoretical claims to knowledge not merely through individual theorists or as an explicit discipline, but additionally—and particularly—at the level of unconscious presuppositions about music, knowledge, and the world. This distinction originates with Foucault's archaeological method, in which he actually uses two different words for knowledge, "*savior*" and "*connaisance*"; the former denotes the unconscious structures that inform all knowledge of a given era, while the latter covers conscious, disciplinary knowledge and method. While Moreno investigates both of these (as a dialectic), his attention is primarily on the former. *Savoir* exists prior to the thought of any individual; indeed, Moreno stresses, even in his readings of specific theorists, that his focus is not on their utterances as unique authors but rather on articulations of deeper structures of knowledge. This unconscious level Foucault calls the "conditions of possibility" (1994, xxii) for the knowledge of a particular epoch, which conveniently matches some of the concerns of traditional epistemology (from Descartes to Kant to Foucault) and the question of under what conditions is knowledge possible. The primary

structure comprising the "conditions of possibility" for the theories that Moreno is reading (following Foucault) is *representation*, how knowledge is accounted for in language and other systems of signification; as a signifying practice, representation operates much like language but at a stage previous to or underneath its conscious use. As Moreno writes: "Representation encompasses the historically contingent organizing principles and semiotic protocols governing the production of music-theoretical discourse that allow music theories to construct their objects and make them cognitively, experientially, and perceptually available to a subject. Representation constitutes the link between the expressible and the audible" (6).

The differentiation between levels of knowledge is an important consideration for those of us who read theoretical treatises and think carefully about issues of interpretation, for Foucault's archaeological method would appear to differ markedly from a reading strategy that places emphasis on reconstructing a theorist's voice and attending to the text in such a way as to afford a glimpse at the author's original intentions. Even though I am much persuaded by Foucault's archaeological method (enough to use many of his assumptions as a foundation for my dissertation [1997]), I also recognize the need to read texts as articulations of an individual's unique voice within the context of an ongoing discourse and as part of a dialogue (following Gadamer 1996, 388), with us as historically removed interpreters. As Gadamer claims, this distance can be a productive tension leading to a deeper understanding. Unless we engage with theorists as individual authors, I believe that we might risk losing the personal touch or human dimension of reading. I applaud Moreno, therefore, for embedding Foucault's archaeology within a dialectic that also includes more traditional attention to the author's unique voice.

We have already encountered several theoretical points described in dialectical terms. In fact, Moreno's approach is thoroughly dialectical: almost never does he recognize a binary opposition without viewing the categories as dialectically interrelated, that is, that their interaction and mutual construction of each other contributes to the production of knowledge (which we know as theories). This is the case between theories and their conditions of possibility (*savoir* and *connaissance*), as well as among subjects, representations, and the objects shaped by the representations. (Moreno actually introduces this dialectic in two stages, which is simply a way of gradually easing the reader into his method; this is probably a wise strategy, given the tendency of Anglo-American scholars to be less conversant with Continental methods.) He explains that "It is in the course of articulating its object that the subject itself comes into being as such, that is, as a cognitive position conditioned by the musical object. Subjects, representations, and objects equally participate in a triangular system of mutually determining elements" (11). Why the emphasis on subjects and objects? According to Moreno, "It is a basic tenet of this book that music theory since the early seventeenth century had been profoundly, if not decisively, marked by the subject-object division as a fundamental determination of the structure of musical relationships" (8). The main philosophical thread of subject/object relationships can be traced, Moreno tells us, from Descartes to Kant (and we might add their successors, Husserl and Adorno); and it is no accident that Descartes looms large in the project, for he also provides a fascinating hinge between music and philosophy (or, better, as emphasized above, Descartes demonstrates the artificiality of trying to separate learned inquiry and claims to knowledge into exclusive disciplines). In other words, Descartes proposes a new structure for perception and knowledge—subject/object—and sets in motion two centuries of intellectual labor that tries to theorize music (the aural); the problem is not even solved with Weber, who comes closest to an aesthetic reconciliation of the subject and object.[3]

3 On the dialectic of subject/object and various attempts to reconcile them, see Eagleton 1990.

Moreno's preference for dialectical, rather than deductive and/or empirical, reasoning follows Foucault's archaeological approach to the history of knowledge; he consciously avoids the traditional explanatory strategies in the writing of history (such as development, evolution, influence, tradition), because they all presume causal relationships where none exist (properly speaking). We can believe that a certain historical event caused another, or that a series of events leads logically to a point of culmination, but these amount to interpretations of the collection of historical 'facts.'[4] Moreno (along with Foucault) is exercising here a healthy suspicion of the logic of causality.[5]

Interestingly, Moreno is confident enough in his close readings to modify Foucault's archaeological approach by attending to the role(s) of the subject in the acquisition of knowledge; as a result he revises the historical placement of epistemes. While it is seemingly insignificant, I take this to be a rather bold move, yet one in which the payoff is well worth the risk—in attending to the role of listening (and the "aural" dimension of knowledge), he significantly enhances Foucault's insights, for example, in recognizing how temporality informs knowledge and experience at different historical moments. Moreno's cautious inquiries into the possibilities of a specifically aural epistemology motivate this exploration. It strikes me that this could only have been accomplished by a musician who knows aural knowledge from experience, from the inside. Indeed, Moreno is a highly talented musician whose recordings as a bassist (with Ray Barretto) have received five Grammy nominations. And he illustrates rather amusingly how he conveys this knowledge in the classroom; we can imagine the puzzled expressions on students' faces when he tells them that "the moment two musical objects come into contact, neither one leaves that encounter unscathed . . . we realize that we are one of the parties involved" (12). All of this attention to the aural as knowledge and its rather hidden role in Western thought suggests that he is also therefore engaging the aural and the visual in a dialectic as alternate bases of knowledge.

An important question of method emerges around this dialectical reading of history: if subjects and objects are dialectically intertwined, if they move within the same conditions of possibility, then what prompts a paradigm shift, what instigates an alteration of epistemological structure—in short, how are we to transcend structuralism? The answer to this is crucial because, aside from escaping the "prison house" of structuralism (Jameson 1972), it reveals how musical thought is creatively productive, how theoretical contradictions and excesses reveal a fundamental gap, shortcoming, or blind-spot in the process of representation—a problem with signification—and how new space opens up within the conditions of possibility to the extent that new musical configurations become possible, even necessary. Among other things, I find this an essential corrective to the old and tired notion that theory lags behind practice. Yes, it often seems so, but Moreno provides ample evidence (although he does not state it in these words) that theory and practice inform and construct each other in a dialectical relationship, and that theoretical conditions can work towards compositional creativity just as often as compositional trail-blazing can prompt cognitive paradigm shifts.

A brief sketch of how this (post-)structural dialectic works would be useful. Within the Renaissance world of comprehensive and cosmic interconnectedness, Moreno senses the outlines of our first problem with signification: "A concession to sense, Zarlino's *soggetto* subject intrudes in the number-oriented space of *musica scientia* and implicitly demands an ideal space where number might accommodate sense" (13). This leads to a new paradigm in the hands of Descartes, for whom "the object of music is sound" (14), and

4 Hayden White has been a central figure in raising our awareness of how historians prefigure their narratives by (unconsciously) selecting certain explanatory paradigms.

5 In his epilogue, Moreno also includes a striking critical assessment of the inflated and ideological use of the notion of evidence in traditional approaches to history.

for whom the parameters of this object are determined by the process of analysis (measurement and order), which is wholly the responsibility of the perceiving subject. The subject-object divide, which Moreno takes to be perhaps the most decisive event in Western history for musical thought, thus shifts the fundamental ordering of sound to the domains of perception and cognition, which have also been relocated from the cosmic order to the virtual space of the faculties of mind.

But this promise of certain knowledge, constructed exclusively through (rational) analysis and representation, asks too much of the subject and representation, therefore resulting in a second problem with signification, namely "how, in Hayden White's words, 'the fundamental 'Unbehagen der Kultur' is not . . . language itself; it is the task of representation, which ascribes to language a degree of transparency that it could never achieve'" (14). Descartes becomes, therefore, trapped between paradigms: "Descartes's modernity will be shown to inhabit an interstitial space between diverging modalities of knowledge . . .," between the *mathesis universalis* and the "old ideal of the interconnectedness of the world" (15). Classical representation ultimately fails to deliver on its promise of objective certainty; a purely analytic language proves to be incommensurate with the knowledge of the world inherited by the Renaissance. This shortcoming, Moreno suggests, invites some kind of "supplement" to fill the gap between subject and object, which Rameau attempts to do with the faculty of the imagination and the notion of implied tones, which asks the listening subject to construct its musical object more actively than before by hearing (imagining) harmonic progression as the goal-directed motion of specific voice-leading motions.

However, as the skeptical reception of Rameau's implied tones suggests, this becomes itself an untenable model and reveals a third problem with signification: Rameau's "implied dissonances demand further clarification of the relationship between theoretical axioms and the activities of listening and performing. That is, if the acoustical datum in a composition and/or in its performance is in a way deemed insufficient for our adequate comprehension of it, then the very ontology of sound within the theoretical category 'harmony' . . . is open to question, and the epistemological stakes placed on listening rise" (15). The heightened role of the listening subject Rameau assigns to the *imagination*, and Moreno demonstrates how the workings of this faculty inevitably lead to "a loosening of Foucault's analysis of the classical sign" (16). (Moreno also shows how the intrusion of the imagination takes place in other domains of knowledge, at roughly the same historical moment.)

This shift leads to Weber's intensified use of analytic narrative, which goes hand in hand with increased attention to the problem of temporality in music as constructed in the subject's experience. Temporality is, however, problematic for the "interpretive subject" (17) and embodies a fourth problem with signification: the "exhaustive, note-by-note account" of Mozart's famous adagio opening (to his "Dissonance" quartet, K. 465) reflects a "major shift in musical thought" which "dramatically encapsulates the simultaneously constructive and disruptive role of temporality in the formation of subjectivity during the encounter between an individual listener and the individual work," which is also "decisively shaped by interpretive self-doubt and suspicion" (17). Weber's notion of multiple harmonic meaning (*Mehrdeutigkeit*), Moreno argues, "reflects an epistemic shift away from the order of things dictated from without"; in other words, the interpretive subject has been assigned nearly complete control over the interpretation of its musical objects "independent of first principles such as Descartes's *mathesis universalis* or Rameau's appeal to the authority of nature" (17). Weber thus establishes a "new modality of musical thought" (17).

Weber is by no means a final stage of such historical gaps in representation (signification) and new paradigms of musical thought, for Moreno makes plainly clear that there is still much unsettled in Weber's account of the interpretive subject's encounter with harmony. Weber, like the "early

Romantics (Novalis and Friedrich von Schlegel) . . ." found his theory "suspended between the possibility of representation of experience by language and the impossibility of ever reaching closure in and through any form of representation," with his Roman numeral notation suspended between "the rigorous order it designates and the arbitrariness of its status as sign" (18). Weber therefore functions merely as a practical ending point to Moreno's project, not a theoretical one. For treatment of this issue in Riemann and Schenker, he directs readers to several well-known studies.

Readers will recall how Moreno's subject-object dialectic works: in asserting how musical entities are ordered (theoretical propositions), the subjects construct objects; but understanding these musical relationships asks—requires—the listening subjects to learn new modalities of hearing, which often reshapes faculties of mind such as the imagination; the objects thus construct the perceptive and/or cognitive structures of the listening subjects. These new ways of hearing make possible new musical entities and relationships between them, which, in turn, require new modalities of listening and understanding from the subjects. And, as sketched above, the dialectic is pushed forward (thus escaping structuralist paralysis in the synchronic moment) through epistemological solutions to problems of signification or representation. Towards the end of the book, Moreno reflects on this continuous refashioning of the subject and suggests that what helps to drive the dialectic forward is the fundamental (philosophical) problem of representing the subject with any degree of objectivity, when the representations themselves are constructed by that very subject. How, in other words, can the subject know itself (represent itself as object) and yet remain the origin of those representations? (Foucault brilliantly illustrated this problem in his now famous analysis of Velazquez's painting "Las Meninas," in Foucault 1966/1994.) This circularity, Moreno claims, is a central force in the continuous process of negotiating and re-negotiating the specific extent and kind of the subject's cognitive reach and the structures of representation. While we might find Moreno's model to be excessively complicated, it offers what seems to my mind to be deeper explorations into the history of musical thought than otherwise available through many of our familiar traditional approaches.

One additional consequence of the thoroughly dialectical method is that there is no final ground on which theory rests, no original principles or premises from which all else can be derived; rather, within the web of multiple dialectics, the identities of all things are interdependent. In addition to serving his project as a whole, this method also offers a new interpretation of Rameau's theoretical reasoning, playing off Moreno's own use of dialectical, as opposed to deductive, reasoning. In a nutshell, Moreno argues that Rameau, contrary to his proclaimed deductive method (in the *Traité*), actually arrives at his concept of the fundamental bass through "counterinduction" (to borrow a term from Feyerabend 1993), in which an aspect of practice (the perfect cadence) is generalized to the level of a theory and then re-applied to the same practice to explain it (harmonic progression according to the principled motion of the fundamental bass).

While all four of his close readings offer significant contributions to our collective understanding of musical thought, the reading of Weber's Mozart analysis reveals, in my mind, Moreno at his best. His reading strategies are creative and bold in using the critical notions of narrative, trope, temporality, and subjectivity to rethink Weber's well-known harmonic theory and use of Roman numerals. The chapter on Weber is also important in that it illustrates the listener now fully self-aware—the "interpretive subject" (17)—the culmination of the emergence of the listening subject, which Moreno is careful to point out as not being the *telos* of a linear historical development. (In the earlier version of this material published in this journal, he acknowledges Kevin Korsyn as the original source for the idea of reading irony in Weber's analytic narrative.)

He begins his reading of Weber by observing two remarkably different ways of experiencing (being in) time, namely, that of the Mozart introduction heard in real time

and that of the analytic explanation, the latter taking strikingly more time than the actual events. Next, invoking Paul Ricoeur's "hermeneutics of suspicion" (Ricoeur 1970), Moreno calls our attention to Weber's lack of insistence on harmonic certainty, allowing certain chord connections simply to be unexplainable by systematic theory. He explains *Mehrdeutigkeit*, then, as a grid of possible harmonic relationships (a structured harmonic space) *and* the necessity of the "interpretive subject" to make decisions about the music's location and motion within that grid (where the interpretation also resides in a *temporal* space). He emphasizes here that harmonic theory had never been this dependent upon the interpretation of the subject (in Rameau, for example, nature also providing a significant foundation) and had also never tolerated or recognized the existence of ambiguity in discerning harmonic relationships. He also notes that because of this ambiguity and the necessary involvement of the subject, temporality emerges as a crucial domain for mediation, in that some kind of analytic narrative is needed to make harmonic sense of the music—in essence, one kind of temporality (the analytic narrative) *tropes* another (the immediate experience of the music). Moreno points out, however, that this also means that temporality as a fundamental aspect of the subject's consciousness is affected by this analytic trope, in part because the narrative is a representation of the listening experience of the subject itself (the subject becoming its own object) and constructs (through theoretical representation) the temporal experience of the subject according to its contours. For Weber, "cognition is temporal and temporality is cognitive" (143); cognition must occur within a temporal process, in this case the analytic narrative of harmonic sense-making, and temporality itself, as a basic structure of human consciousness, in turn must itself be constituted by and in thought, by cognitive acts of consciousness. If this all sounds exceedingly phenomenological, then the reader is right on the mark, for it is in this chapter on Weber that Moreno's phenomenological underpinnings come to the fore, in the sense that phenomenology foregrounds temporality and intentionality as structures of consciousness, as well as the various mediations between knowing and being. Not surprisingly, Husserl's thought looms large (though often unnamed) in many passages here.

In another innovative interpretive move, Moreno argues that Weber does this "troping" of temporality with no ordinary metaphor but rather with the highly charged tropes of irony and allegory, both in an expanded sense, not simply as a rhetorical figure (e.g., that irony "asserts by negating and negates by asserting" 145) but also as a cognitive act, an attitude (Romantic irony). This would appear to be an insightful way of characterizing Weber's resistance to commit to harmonic certainty, his recognition of analytic ambiguity; as Moreno writes: "Irony would have legitimized the representation of phenomena in terms of possibilities rather than fixed objects" (146). Now the fact that the subject becomes caught up in a circular process of self-representation and hence self-definition, that it deploys language and discourse as a way of writing its own experience and identity (*how* the subject will listen and *what* the subject will experience), implicitly challenges the presumed unity of the subject itself; the identity of the subject has been permeated by a language which is other than itself, which exists independently of the subject's empirical self. In "ironic consciousness" (148) the subject becomes a divided self, consisting of an "empirical subject" and a "narrated" or "symbolic" self, where "by means of language, the subject is enabled to act upon itself" (149). Further, in reference to Abrams's well-known summary of the metaphors underlying the emergence of literary romanticism, "in the form of self-commentary, linguistic discourse becomes in turn the mirror for the lamp (or another lamp itself)" (149). Finally, then, these discursive "acts of self-reflection" (154) of an ironically divided subject become allegorical representations of subjective experience, in the sense that it "foregrounds the disparity between the totality of the time told . . . and the time of the telling" (155).

Moreno then unfolds how these acts of troping and figuration—which contribute to cognitive sense-making and

self-reflection—occur on several different levels. First, he defines *postfiguration*, in which "events experienced are given figural form in narrative a posteriori" and are thus actively constructed "through the intervention of 'technical theory'" (155). Second, he also suggests that the analytic discourse (and its specific temporality) also *prefigures* all subsequent hearings of the given passage.[6] He concludes that "[t]he peculiar mode of representation in Weber's analysis provides a mediating linguistic structure that begins as representation of that consciousness and turns into a critical production of it" (156). The underlying irony of this realization, moreover, has wide-ranging implications, for he contends that in Weber's narrated self is signified a sort of "ironic hero" (in the sense of Northrop Frye [1957]) in whom "we can recognize perhaps the story of anyone who has ever felt the tension between an imaginary theoretical reality and some other reality of musical experience. For Weber, as for anyone who analyzes a piece of music, discourse becomes the only possible habitation for the burden of the consciousness of our own listening practices" (157). This begins to articulate an important role that analytic discourse can play in reconciling (but not eliminating) subject-object separation and the divided self: "the matter of multiple and simultaneous subject positions forms part of a productive strategy . . . to provide an alternative to the discontinuity of the subject in time" (157). And finally, "whatever its ambiguities and inadequacies, Weber's thought had the merit of placing the debate of interpretation into an arena where experiential tensions could coexist" (159).

In many ways, Moreno's four close readings elaborate a common theoretical problem of how parts relate to whole, a subject explored in fascinating ways by recent thinking on narrative and trope, particularly the work of Hayden White, whose name seems to be the one that implicitly informs Moreno's book almost as much as Foucault's does explicitly.

Hayden White's (1973 and 1978) extensive work in historiographical writing has led to the concept of tropology, which in its complete version has two distinct aspects. First, through close readings of classic historical texts, he noticed the recurrence of certain emplotments, explanatory strategies, and ideological commitments, as well as certain patterns (which I like to think of as affinities) in their combinations. Further, he noticed that these combinations represented a deeper pattern of ordering knowledge that could be described as modes of consciousness, which he symbolized through the respective actions embodied in the four most basic tropes, metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, and irony; here, those tropes are understood in a broader sense, following Kenneth Burke (1969, 503–17), as perspective, reduction, representation, and dialectic.[7] Thus, these (expanded) tropes as modes of consciousness could be seen to prefigure the knowledge articulated at the conscious level of learned writing.[8] It is in this sense that White's tropes coincide with Foucault's epistemological structures: both have fundamental roles in defining the conditions of possibility for the knowledge of a given age, and both operate below the level of consciousness (and with or before the involvement of language itself). In fact, White's essay on Foucault, "Foucault Decoded" (in White 1973), which reinterprets the conditions of possibility underlying the fundamental epistemes of Western knowledge as tropological modes of consciousness, is one of the most important prior texts of Moreno's study (and should probably be considered required reading for any serious reading of Moreno's book).

6 We have come to understand prefiguration in this sense as the "performative" role of analysis (Cook 2002).

7 See also Kellner 1989. Note the alignment of irony with dialectic, both of which characterize Moreno's project as a whole. From this perspective, the book stands within the final of the four stages and thus could have only been written within the conditions of possibility we know as twentieth-century thought.

8 Abrams 1971 demonstrated how metaphors such as the mirror and the lamp could prefigure poetic discourse; it is therefore not necessarily a new idea but rather one with insightful extensions in the work of White.

Also, and perhaps more importantly, these tropes can be seen to have a logical progression of their own. Following in the footsteps of Giambatista Vico, who first linked tropes with historical stages of civilizations, White has been able to weave a convincing thread through the four tropes as four distinct stages of knowledge within Western thought, in which the gaps or blind-spots in the structure of one trope (problems of signification or representation) lead in a quasi-logical manner to the next one, which in turn opens up a new mode of consciousness, and so forth. While such an idea might seem far-fetched in a short summary, White's exhaustive research persuades us to accept, even if provisionally, a strikingly insightful succession of historical periods: metaphor, or the articulation of similarities and differences, becomes the guiding trope of Renaissance knowledge; metonymy recasts knowledge through analysis into parts and assertions of causality; synecdoche synthesizes parts into ideal and symbolic wholes; and irony introduces self-awareness and acceptance of the arbitrariness or contingent nature of knowledge.

It should be immediately obvious how this historical succession has likely informed Moreno's project: the four theorists exemplify the modes of consciousness and structures of knowledge as embodied in White's four tropes, not simply as stages but as a *succession*. In Moreno's case, we might articulate the stages as, respectively, no subject, active-and-analytic listening subject, imagining subject, and self-aware interpretive subject. He writes, "*Departing* from a time when no discrete allocation is given [by Zarlino] to a cognitive figure of hearing or listening, that figure *emerges* out of the logical and categorical distinction between object and subject made most sharply by Descartes. Descartes's 'early modern' subject *gives way* to the 'modern listener,' the ideal cognitive agency in the process of comprehending the dynamics of harmonic successions articulated in Rameau. *Supplanting* the 'modern listener' is the 'listening subject,' [in Weber] a self-reflexive figure for whom interpretation of music is both a trace of its consciousness and the mark of its incapacity to fully grasp that consciousness" (4, emphasis added).

Striking also is the alignment of Moreno's four stages with Besseler's (1959) four stages in the changing history of "listening," namely the direct perception of word/tone in the "Prosamelodik" of the 16th century, the new and active combining of proportional units (rhythm, meter, figuration) during the 17th century, the complete synthesis of thematic units into a unified form as well as of form and content in the 18th century, and the turn to a passive and mystical communion with a musical work symbolized in the unity of outer form and inner being (during the 19th century).

Now, if White's ideas form such an important part of Moreno's book, a reader might well wonder why his name does not appear more often. The reason, I suspect, is that an explicit treatment of White's tropology would heighten a tension already lurking in the margins between a larger historical narrative governed in part by a logical succession of tropes (and those modes of discourse harboring certain affinities with each trope) and Moreno's resistance (following Foucault) to such developmental narratives.

It is in this respect that Moreno could possibly be accused of writing a hidden teleology, which strives toward the fully formed and self-aware subject exemplified in Weber's analysis of Mozart. Teleological narratives, however, are more common than we would like to think, and Moreno is certainly aware of the impossibility of writing a historical narrative completely free of causal links and tacit trajectories. In the end, a writer may resist narrative ideologies, teleologies, and implicit causalities but must also accept that it is simply not possible to achieve such a purified representation of history. Further, one of the insights of literary theory and deconstruction is the recognition that the words of an author are in a sense out of their control once they are placed on the page—the meanings of discourse, in other words, are the result of negotiations (dialectical and/or dialogical) among author, reader, language, and culture, and they are open-ended, continually being reshaped by subsequent readings. All of this is to say that Moreno must not be faulted for writing an implicit narrative of the

emergence of the self-aware listening subject, even though he explicitly resists the idea in his stated method, presumably because of his deep respect for the ideals of Foucault's archaeology. Besides, the emergence of the interpretive, creative listener in Western music theory *is* a compelling (hi)story.

The emergence of the fully formed, fully self-aware subject as a historical narrative is connected to the related notions of imagination and freedom. It relates to imagination through language and figurative knowledge, since imagination is the creative faculty most directly mediating between subjects and objects; and it relates to freedom as the symbolic autonomy of the subject in its creative appropriation of the aural through music. On the latter, Moreno writes, "it is a central argument of this book that the movement from activity to creativity in listening unfolds historically around the dialectic of subjects and representations" (8). While freedom figures as a central notion in Foucault's work, particularly his later work on the subject, power, and discipline, it is to Roland Barthes that Moreno turns at this point, particularly the idea that the aural might be a surprisingly direct mode for the exchange of meaning and the shaping of identity, raising the stakes for the "freedom of listening" on par with the freedom of speech (Barthes 1991, 258–60). His final sentence of the book calls us to "listen way back" to the "recesses of history where the subject, the object, and the complex of representation that enabled them came to exercise the most daring of rights: the freedom to imagine how music may sound" (167).

This is not a lightweight, read-once book, which is, in my mind, a high complement; it will offer the intelligent reader rewarding readings and re-readings, and it will afford some profound insights not easily forgotten in the flurry of scholarly ideas. Its true impact may take some time to be felt. Additionally, the substantial reliance on prior research, on a wider intellectual discourse, should not be a deterrent for hesitant or skeptical readers; while it might seem that he is asking us to accept too much as given in order to follow faithfully his fascinating arguments, he could not do otherwise. In order to arrive at any insightful conclusions in this sort of wide-ranging inquiry, such a project *must* rely on prior knowledge; but this inevitably asks readers to go beyond their explicit disciplinary training (and perhaps their intellectual comfort zone). In this case, the bottom line will probably be the extent to which readers accept Foucault's basic premises about knowledge and discourse. I happen to think that the payoff is well worth the work (or, for the uninitiated, the leap of faith), especially in carefully thought out projects such as this one.

One of the potentially most important implications of Moreno's book is the implicit questioning of the notion of discipline in music (theory). He is not naive about the production and disciplining of the field through institutions, ideologies, and social conditioning, or about the practical value of distinguishing faculty roles; but rather, at the level of knowledge—in this case, the knowledge that is articulated by Zarlino, Descartes, Rameau, and Weber—disciplinary separation can become a superficial obstacle to the discovery of historical and musical meanings. Surely the four "theorists" explored in this book would find our current disciplinary separation (and occasional entrenchment) to be rather absurd. It only makes sense to read them in the context of a wider discourse on human knowledge and experience, and thus to theorize within a wider context. It is on this level that I find Moreno's book to be particularly successful and rewarding. In my highest hopes, it will encourage us to rethink our basic notions of listening, our understanding of the roles of the subject in the dialectical theorizing of musical objects, our interpretive strategies for reading and analyzing, and our arbitrary disciplinary boundaries. At the very least, Moreno has enlightened us about the role music has played in the emergence of modernity in Western culture, and he has given us an opportunity to read with a new understanding some of our most treasured historical texts, in his words, "in the splendor of their cognitive and historical complexity" (23).

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