We are concerned with the relation between morphological tense and semantic tense in conditionals like (1) and (2): (1) If Al Gore were really righteously green he wouldn’t fly around in airplanes. (Internet) (2) If Gore had won his "home" state of Tennessee, he would have won the election, Florida notwithstanding. (Internet) We claim that the counterfactual relation holding between antecedent and consequent is asserted of the utterance time. Assuming Lewis’ (73) semantics for counterfactuals, the analysis of (1) and (2) is something like this: (1’) Al Gore is green pres--> he doesn’t fly. (2’) Al Gore have won Tennessee pres--> he have won the election. Our analysis builds on Lewis (1979). The structures show that we are assuming to levels of tense, the deictic tense locating the modal would and relative tenses inside the modal: nothing in (1’), the Perfect in (2’). The talk takes up Ippolito’s (2003) observation on presuppositions: (3) Jack quit smoking a year ago. a. #If Jack quit smoking next summer, he would lose the marathon. b. If Jack had quit smoking next summer, he would have lost the marathon. (3a) exhibits a presupposition failure, but (3b) doesn’t. Our account will make use of a theory of temporal agreement in terms of interpreted/uninterpreted features. The syntax and semantics of conditionals will be introduced precisely enough to calculate the truth-conditions and presuppositions in question. We test our theory against counterfactuals in a number of languages (German, Norwegian, Finnish, French, Russian). Finally we compare our proposal with previous accounts in the literature.