

**PIVOT, PUPPET or PERIPHERY:
THE COLD WAR AND SOUTH AFRICA**

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DRAFT ONLY. Not for circulation**PIVOT, PUPPET or PERIPHERY:
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"South Africa is unequivocally the symbol of anti-Communism in Africa. Although often abused, we are also still a bastion in Africa for Christianity and the Western world".

Hendrik Verwoerd

Peter Vale⁺

Apartheid South Africa was a cause-celebe in the life and times of the Cold War. Consider these examples: A divided country ruled by a minority where near feudal politics were cast by a racial fault line which almost perfectly paralleled the Cold War divide; a rich white minority seemed to enjoy the support of the West while an impoverished black majority looked upon Soviet Union and its allies as a source of intellectual and financial support. From the America's point of view, these may not have been the core concerns, though: more anxious, perhaps, was the issue of whether the minority regime had access to nuclear weapons.

Although South Africa's racial divide has ended, certainly formally and constitutionally, the Cold War lingers in the country's politics and its daily life. South Africa's ruling party, the African National Congress, remains in an alliance with a Communist Party; aspects of security legislation still bear the stamp of apartheid's strain of anti-communism; and school textbooks, especially in history, remain written in the Cold War register. Then, the trope "cold war" resurfaces again and again - recently, for instance, some Right-wingers used the theme "Cold War against Afrikaners" on their website. Less immediate Cold War ideas often reappear: the notion of a "Marshall Plan" for Southern Africa is a recurring theme in public discourse over the economy, for example.

The residue of Cold War also seems to touch the lives of individuals in quite perverse ways. Take Carl Niehaus, Afrikaner anti-apartheid activist, long-time political prisoner and a post-apartheid Ambassador to the Netherlands (for which services, he was knighted by the Dutch Queen). Despite these impeccable credentials he cannot visit the United States. Why? Convicted by an apartheid court under a slew of charges, including "furthering the aims of Communism", Niehaus refuses to sign the indemnity form required to get a US Visa.

At some places, the cloud left by Cold War thinking still confuses crucial understandings of the past. For example, did the CIA "shop" Nelson Mandela in August 1962¹? And does this explain why the central motif in the trial that followed, and which led to his conviction and twenty-seven year long imprisonment, was the threat that communism and revolution pose to "western values" in South Africa? Other troubling

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¹ See "The Mandela File" at
<http://www.africa2000.com/BNDX/BAO110.htm>

issues have been resolved, however. The minority did have nuclear weapons; they manufactured seven fission gun-type devices. Happily, these were never used, and South Africa signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty on 10 July 1991.

This essay explores some themes of a story that remains largely untold. In my weeks at ICAS, I have thought more about writing a longer study to fill this gap than in pursuing my ICAS proposal, the Cold War security discourse in South Africa. By drawing upon critical security studies, and Cold War Studies, it should be possible to describe a Cold War experience at the periphery and understand the interlacing of race and discrimination within the unfolding idea of the Cold War. My interest then is the Cold War as global, national and everyday experience in South Africa.

One further introductory comment is not only in order but essential. Those who know the history and politics of South Africa, even casually, will realise that the account on offer in these pages is largely silent on one half of the story: the Cold War experience of South Africa's majority. Let me plead *mea culpa* and offer a brief, but wholly inadequate, explanation.

Diplomatic historians rely on a canon that expresses one side of a complex story. So, the political community imagined by successive European minorities² in South Africa remains the master narrative upon which new events, like the ending of apartheid and the presidency of Nelson Mandela, have seamlessly unfolded. In earlier work I have tried drawn attention to this; first by using a crude typology to distinguish the international relations of the majority from that of the minority³, and later by pointing towards the location of archival sources in order to draw the same the distinction⁴. Deeper questions need to be asked of this other half of the story, however. What role did the Cold War play in the development of social and political movements in South and southern Africa⁵? And what was the role of other Communist countries, like the German Democratic Republic, in the training of South Africa's liberation movements?

These questions suggest that much critical work remains to be done in understanding and explaining South Africa, especially the history of

² As an example see Davenport, Rodney. *South Africa: A Modern History* (Fourth Edition). London: Macmillan, 1991. There are a few departures from this norm see Leonard Thompson, *A History of South Africa*, Yale University Press, 2000 and William Beinart, *Twentieth-Century South Africa*, Oxford University Press, 1994. There is an interesting account of the relations between the ANC and the Soviet Union by Vladimir Shubin. *ANC: A View from Moscow*. Bellville, South Africa: Mayibuye Books, 1999.

³ See Peter Vale. 'Understanding the Upstairs and the Downstairs: Prospects for a post-apartheid Foreign Policy' 1997 in Andrew Cooper (ed.) *Niche Diplomacy: Middle Powers after the Cold War*. London. Macmillan Studies in Diplomacy, pp. 197-214.

⁴ This is to be found at <http://www.le.ac.uk/csd/dsp/publications/news4/dipsa.html>

⁵ On this issue see Vladimir Shubin. *ANC: A View from Moscow*. Bellville, South Africa: Mayibuye Books, 1999.

both resistance and struggle at home and abroad⁶. However, this may be a race against time. The silencing power of new metanarratives - the market, globalisation and democracy are the most important - threaten to erase the stories of popular struggles, especially international ones, to end apartheid. My hope is that a book on the Cold War and South Africa that is written in critical mode will counter this tendency towards closure.

In July 1986 four white women activists were arrested under the second of two States of Emergency. While they were not formally charged under any law, their case did come to enjoy the attention of the courts even though the arrests took place during a bleak moment of apartheid repression. How? Why? Under administrative procedure, it was possible to bring an appeal for the release of "emergency detainees" if bad faith or personal animus could be shown. On some such occasions, high court judges did order their release. From the judge's point of view, the most taxing part of the case at hand was the claim that the man from the "Branch" (as the security police were colloquially called) had been spurned in love affair by one of the claimants, and the claimants wish to show that this arrest, like the others, was a act of vindictiveness. The documents that served before the court on this occasion offer an interesting insight into the mind of apartheid a crucial moment in the country's history. For the purpose of this essay, I want to analyze one of these documents to illustrate some points about the Cold War, and I will suggest that it this offers an insight into the worldview of those charged with maintaining apartheid's security.

In their statement to the court, the police reveal a world structured round the simple binaries represented by good and evil. Pure, clean, and decisive, the South African government represents progress and order on a chaotic continent. Its opponents are confused rabble, conspiratorial in their social goals and intent on perpetuating a regime of violence⁷. This is the most familiar of all Cold War techniques with the accompanying assumptions of the superiority of one world over the other. The polarity providing, as Raymond Williams once suggested, "coherence in the face of threatened social disorganisation". In apartheid's case however there was not one, but two, divides - the black/white and the east/west - were superimposed one upon the other.

⁶ There is quite an interesting account of the history of the relationship between the South Africa Communist Party and the Soviet Union in "The South African Government's Vision for the African Renaissance and African Unity: Contextualising the Policy" by the South African Minister of Public Enterprises at <http://www.sacp.org.za/docs/speeches/2001/sp1002.html>

⁷ This is a technique in much political rhetoric and has been used to embellish the narrative of white power. The images on the friezes of the Afrikaner shrine, Voortrekker Monument reflect the same images. The "Voortrekkers..[are presented]..as pioneers of civilization; the Christian nation; imaging community; the unified nation; and the authentic nation. In contrast, the natives (sic) are consistently presented as a warring barbarous rabble. While Voortrekker soldiers stand in straight and ordered lines, natives (sic) are chaotic, undisciplined and unordered.." Crampton, Andrew. "The Voortrekker Monument, the Birth of Apartheid, and Beyond," *Political Geography*, 20, 2001. pp, 228-229.

And at times, especially in the 1980s, it is difficult to isolate which of these was dominant.

Was the intention of the police in detaining these women to sustain the policy of racial domination? Or was their objective to save South Africa from the "scourge of Communism"? The answer is not all together clear.

For the police, the detainees are dupes of "the world outside", who have misled a black community that can itself exercise no political or social agency: in a technique all too familiar in South African history, this sets out to suggest that Blacks have no politics. As Allen Hunter reminded me when we recently discussed this point: in oppressive politics, state functionaries, like the power they serve, seldom believe that victims have an interest in politics.

The police go on to suggest that "the ... detentions and arrests were absolutely necessary in order to maintain public order and safety and for the termination of the state of emergency". But closer inspection reveals that this conclusion is rooted in stylised interpretations both of the behaviour of the prisoners and the institutions that carry their professional lives. So, an adult educator has a strategy for "socialising the youth and adults for the structuring of a so-called alternative society..[her].. teaching is aimed at the dismantling and rejection of the present system of education by revolutionary means and revolutionary educational teaching". It goes on this "alternative education, also known as "People's education"...is the left wing answer to the Government Education System". And the tactic of building conspiracy upon fragmentary evidence and the reaching of conclusions continues throughout the statement. As another example of this tactic, an annexure is a copy of pamphlet that was "distributed" at a meeting in the city of Johannesburg, this "shows how the so-called Democrats intend.. to recruit the masses and organise the take-over of power".

As they address the work of another organization, one aimed at ending the conscription, the police reach directly into the Cold War. The "prime objective of this organisation is to break down the military system in the country.. [this]..will make it easier for the ANC to take over, especially in regard to the townships". They continue, the End Conscription Campaign "is viewed by politicians as potentially the most dangerous political movement to emerge in the current crisis...It is heavily foreign-financed and has in recent months established overt personal links with the Helsinki-based War Resisters International, an identified adjunct to the vast Soviet "Active Measures" apparatus (sic). Having drawn upon one Superpowers, the police are compelled to turn to the other and make the appeal through the power of the personal. "[S]ources in America inform ..[us].. that one of the applicants had sent anti-South African propaganda to the United States of America, New Zealand and the United Kingdom. She also sent information on the state of emergency in South Africa to these countries"⁸.

As in many political conspiracies, the role played by individual third parties is important in this unfolding. Nelson Mandela - then, in prison for twenty-four years - appears in this version of South Africa in the mid-1980s but he is more foil than direct participant. The essence of evil is reserved for Joe Slovo, General Secretary of the South African Communist Party and leader member of Umkhonto we Sizwe ('Spear of the Nation'), the ANC's military wing, who was then in exile

⁸ All these quotations are taken from "Louise Vale and others" versus The Honourable The Minister of Law and Order and the Commissioner of Police etc" Case heard in the Supreme Court of South Africa (Eastern Cape Division). September, 1986.

in Zambia. In this (and other state constructions of the 1980s), Slovo is a svengali-type figure intent of manipulating the foolish "masses" for nefarious ends.

Absurd, conspiratorial and plainly stupefying though these views may appear to be, they offer an insight into the mind of the apartheid state. They are no different from the thinking -- again, absurd, conspiratorial and plainly stupefying -- that emerged from the country's leadership. South Africa's then president, for instance, constantly argued that the country faced a "Total Onslaught" from the Soviet Union and its allies, and that the Kremlin/Soviet Union/The Russians (the terms were often simply substituted one for the other) was intent on overthrowing white, Christian rule. In response, his "good government" was compelled to embark on a "total national strategy" which would prevent "chaos and a government controlled by the communist-dominated ANC". Too loosely, perhaps, some writers (I cannot think which for the moment) have likened this moment in South Africa to the McCarthy era in the US)

How was this kind of thinking possible in a distant corner of Africa?

A series of disciplinary myths helped to embellish Security Studies as a fixed point of knowledge in international relations, and the Cold War played not an unimportant role in this process. Work presented by others in Critical Security Studies locate the origins of National Security in the US National Security Act of 1947 -- legislation which aimed to provide integrated policies and procedures for departments, agencies and functions of the U.S. Government relating to national security. This interpretation is confirmed by a collection edited by Norman Graebner which collected the proceedings of a conference organized at West Point in April 1982 which focused on the "efforts of the Truman and Eisenhower administrations to come to terms with the consequences of the Allied defeat of the Axis powers and the ensuing failure of the victors to disentangle their interests in a militarily and politically divided world".⁹

Fixed by knowledge routines and the managerial and policy processes that they sanction, state security takes on a life of its own; a life which is largely unencumbered by the contestations of public politics. In apartheid South Africa of course all discussions on state security, critical or other, were silenced by legislation and the threat of incarceration.

But how did the Cold War come to play this crucial role in the politics and the everyday life play of South Africa?

This question must be set within wider theoretical concerns. Is it inevitable that the metropole frames and authorises development and behavior on the periphery? Why is it that states on the global periphery always act in terms of the power of the centre? Can states on the periphery, like South Africa, ever define themselves outside of a frame authorized by a metropolitan center?

For two centuries South Africa's center of political universe was Britain -- through the administrative codes successively of empire, colony and dominion. After the Second World War, this focus was replaced by the United States with the Cold War providing the organisational code. The crude genealogy that now follows enables us to think systematically about theoretical issues, and simultaneously set a frame for a deeper argument.

⁹ Graebner ed, *The National Security*, p. v.

Notwithstanding obvious parallels between the early frontier and other experiences of white settlement in the United States and South Africa, until the mid-Twentieth Century, there were few direct links. As a British colony (and later a Dominion), South Africa was linked to the world through London, and the US saw southern Africa as a British sphere of influence.¹⁰ This changed after 1948, though, the year the National Party came to power and the point from which legalised apartheid commenced.

On the Allied side, South Africa had taken part in the Second World War. The country's international standing at its ending however, derived less from its contribution to the war effort, than from the status of its then leader, the seventy-five year old, Jan Christian Smuts. A Boer War hero and twice Prime Minister, Smuts had recently been made an Honorary Field Marshal by the British monarch, King George VI. Like the American Civil War, the Boer (now called South African) War was the defining moment in the creation of the South African state. It was to dwell in the mind of the country's politics for more than a century. But its effect on Britain (where some suggest it was the Empire's Vietnam) was also profound. The reflected glory of the appointment of a former enemy to high office in the British military establishment positioned white South Africans not only within the celebration of Allied success in war, but firmly placed them on one side of a world that would soon come to be divided by Cold War. This account leaves aside the reconciliatory gesture that the British may have felt in the appointment of this old foe to their highest council. (It ruined, incidentally, Smuts' political career and certainly speeded the coming to power of the National Party that championed apartheid.)

South African pilots participated in the Berlin air-bridge of 1948-49, and later a squadron (made up of F-51D Mustangs and later F-86F Sabre jets) flew ground attack and interdiction missions as part of the USAF's 18th Fighter Bomber Wing in the Korean War. (This is the closest the US and South Africa came to have a formal combat cooperation.) As these actions showed a commitment to accept western interests as would their own, South African defence and security thinkers turned their attention towards reinforcing their strategic importance to the global metropole; not surprisingly, the Cold War provided the frame.

When the British withdrew east of the Suez Canal, for instance, an emotionally charged debate arose in defence circles in Britain and South Africa over the strategic significance of the naval facilities at the Simonstown, near Cape Town. The sea route around the Cape (of Good Hope) had been valued by the Royal Navy since 1806, but in the late-1960s Britain's Labour government was under increased pressure to abrogate these responsibilities because they sustained a link to South Africa. In response, the South Africans were determined to show that they were capable of "filling the void" (to use the language of the debate), but to do so they needed to purchase ships and aircraft. This led to a discussion, mainly in Britain, about arms sales to South Africa. In the event, Britain wavered, it sold some weapons, but not others. However, apartheid South Africa did acquire submarines and other defence equipment from the French.

What finally ended any maritime role for South Africa in the Cold War was a visit by the USS Franklin Delano Roosevelt to Cape Town in the February 1967; its multiracial crew were not allowed ashore because the ship's command refused to comply with South Africa's policy of racial segregation. The price to be paid for continued access to apartheid's strategic facilities was simply too high, whatever possible Cold War

¹⁰ There is a brief account of this by Timothy Sisk in the Encyclopedia of U.S. Foreign Relations. Oxford University Press, 1997, p. 96-101

security argument could be made. For South Africa's minority, this was a clear case when racial ideology trumped Cold War calculations.

The Cape Sea Route issue was almost always tied to a discussion around access to South Africa's strategic minerals - vanadium, platinum, cobalt etc - where the Soviet Union was the only alternative source of supply. Here the argument, like many arguments at the time, was a simple either/or trade-off: either we get them from South Africa or the Soviet Union will deny access to the West and so bring its economy and defense preparedness to its knees.

Infinitely more important than this residue of Britain's maritime glory (or strategic minerals, for that matter), was the idea that white minorities represented a bulwark against the advance of communism on the African continent - while the idea had some following in the US, it was more attractive in anti-decolonisation circles in the United Kingdom, France and Belgium¹¹. In response to these, South Africa's first Nationalist Prime Minister Dr D.F. Malan had proposed a form of co-operation between the colonial powers and South Africa.¹² He called this proposal, the Africa Charter. While the immediate resonance with the Atlantic Charter is obvious, Malan's purpose was entirely in the opposite political direction - the African Charter was intended to become the "bridgehead of Western civilisation in Africa", "defending the continent against communism" (and "Indian influence"), and keeping Africa non-militarised.¹³ Pursuant of this goal, South Africa's military took part at several conferences that brought together the colonial powers to discuss the issue of 'African Defence'.¹⁴ At a conference held in Dakar, Senegal, in 1954, South Africa's Minister of Defence indicated that the country's participation in any defense of Africa would be to provide manpower.¹⁵ It is difficult not to see the coincidence between racial prejudice and this particular strain of anti-Communism - both strong themes, incidentally, in the unfolding of race relations in every corner of the world. But in South Africa where race was everything, this perspective had an obvious appeal. It also made apartheid South Africa a ready target for every conservative crackpot, conspiracy theorist and con-artist in the world. And this moment brings a "Counter Enlightenment" luminary (to use Corey Robin's term) back to the ICAS proceedings.

¹¹ I've purloined some of what follows in this paragraph, including the comprehensive footnoting, from my doctoral student, Roger Pfister.

¹² Berridge, Geoff R. 1992. *South Africa, the Colonial Powers and "African Defence": The Rise and Fall of the White Entente, 1948-60*. London: Macmillan; New York: St. Martin's Press. 1989. South Africa and Black Africa, *Africa Insight* 19, 3: 125; Nöthling. 1998. South Africa and Africa, pp.29-33.

¹³ Barber and Barratt. 1990. *South Africa's Foreign Policy*, pp.35ff.; Barratt, John. 1975. The Department of Foreign Affairs, in Denis Worrall, ed. *South Africa: Government and Politics*. Pretoria: J.L. van Schaik: 332-347; Berridge, Geoff R. 1991. The Diplomacy of the Veld: Charles te Water and the 'Organic Approach' to South African Foreign Policy, *International Relations* 10, 1: 73-86; Nolutshungu, Sam Clement. 1975. *South Africa in Africa: A Study of Ideology and Foreign Policy*. New York, NY: Africana Publishing; Manchester: Manchester University Press: 39-59; Olivier, Gerrit Cornelius. 1973. *Die grondslae van Suid-Afrika se buitelandse beleid*. PhD, University of Pretoria: 213-219; Olivier, Gerrit Cornelius. 1977. *Suid-Afrika se buitelandse beleid*. Pretoria: Academica: 126-133; Olivier. 1982. South Africa's Relations with Africa, pp.269-285.

¹⁴ DoD, Group 5, KG/GPW/2/5/1, Vol. 341; KG/GPW/2/5/2, Vols. 1-4, Vol. 342, KG/GPW/2/5/3, Vol. 342.

¹⁵ 'African Defense Perplexes Malan: Continental Parley at Dakar Poses Issue of Native Army in Face of Racial Policy, *New York Times* 13 March 1954' (DoD, Group 1, M.V/200, Vol. 149).

In 1965, the South African government-supporting publishing house, Nasionale Boekhandel, published a book by the American writer, Anthony Harrigan, who was then Director of the Foreign Policy Research Institute in South Carolina. Ordinarily this book, like many on the country's security and politics which were published at that time, should have stayed in well-deserved obscurity, but in excavating it I want to show how its message to South Africans, especially the country's ruling Afrikaner community, a peculiar and attractive interpretation of thinking around the idea of national security. There are four further reasons for reappraising the book nearly four decades later. First it was issued in the year that the then Rhodesia's white minority made a Unilateral Declaration of Independence: a moment of some anxiety for the white community throughout Southern Africa. Second, it was issued in the English language by a publisher whose list, at that time, was mainly aimed at promoting South Africa's then other official language, Afrikaans - this suggests that its message was intended for wider international dissemination which, undoubtedly, would have included free distribution abroad to make a propaganda case for minority rule in South Africa, a common practice during the Cold War¹⁶. Third, the book suggests how deeply the Cold War and its cultural representations spread from the United States and how effectively these had been taken up in other parts of the world, especially in minority-ruled South Africa¹⁷ and in other residues of colonialism in Africa. Finally, the book's title "Defence against Total Attack", captured an idea which, with the passing of the years -- but especially in the late-1970s and the 1980s, strongly resonated both within South Africa's security circles and in the everyday life of the country. This especially followed the proclamation of the Total Strategy -- the political doctrine, which we have already seen, guided official South Africa's security thinking during the leadership of P.W.Botha (Prime Minister 1978-1983; President 1983-1989) and which shaped South Africa's policy of destabilization of its Southern Africa neighbours.¹⁸

The spirit of the Harrigan book, and the messianic response of South Africa's growing security establishment to its message (and others of the same ilk), is caught in a single sentence which reads: "There is a world-wide significance to the struggle of the South African people to escape engulfment by barbarism, which has been the fate of most Europeans who have made their home in Africa".¹⁹ To arrive at this conclusion the author begins with the immediacy of the 1961 Congo Crisis and, thereafter, rehearses a set of routines and well-worn impressions on the nature of man, contemporary society and plain pessimism. These are drawn closer to the holding idea of security in a line that reads: "A nation's security... is never permanently won because the world is permanently in convulsion".²⁰ The narrative pays passing deference to the work of the existential philosopher Karl Jaspers, but the political and propaganda point is carried forward by some familiar intellectual devices used in Realism -- the timelessness represented by the Melian dialogue from Thucydides, for instance, and credential support -- mainly in the form of disjointed quotations - from International Relations scholars like James D. Dougherty and Harvard's Thomas C. Schelling.

¹⁶ Professor Marius J. Swart a leading Afrikaner public intellectual recommended this to the publisher's in a review of the book. See letter from Marcus de Jong to Mr Herman Steyler of Nasionale Boekhandel dated 11 January 1966.

¹⁷ On this see Jon Bacon, *Flannery O'Connor and Cold War Culture*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.

¹⁹ Anthony Harrigan. *Defence against Total Attack*. Cape Town: Nasionale Boekhandel, 1965.p. 89.

²⁰ Harrigan, *Defence against Total Attack*, p. 29.

These genuflections to academe aside, the text is redolent with crude racism and vulgar anti-Communism which, at that particular time, characterized contributions to a variety of establishment defense journals²¹ in which, as Harrigan notes, earlier versions of the book had appeared. These include *NATO's Fifteen Nations*, *The Australian Army Journal*, *Proceedings of the U.S. Naval Institute*, *Quarterly Review* (London), *Europa-Archiv* and *The Royal United Service Institution Journal*. Reading the Cold War (especially its military culture) through these quite respected publications will prove important in understanding the ideas that carried the Cold War and their understandings of the importance of South Africa. Not the everyday, to be sure, but certainly the everyday world of military - and other security - professionals.

Looking back across the four decades which separate that writing from this, it is still quite easy to judge Harrigan's work: although drawing upon the academy, it is patently not an academic text; its pseudo-scientific setting has offered the patina of intellectual respectability to an immediate political text, and a wider project which aimed to shore up the case for minority rule in South Africa by employing the legitimacy offered by the engineered body of knowledge which (all too-recently) was called Strategic Studies and which, in time, would shade into Security Studies.

The license afforded by the emergence of the latter and its role as a means to the politics of state security for the white minority in South Africa becomes plain in his final chapter which draws together the issue areas represented by eugenics, the idea of state and the narrative of Cold War struggle in advancing the cause of modernity. Particular significance is registered in the country's "skyscrapers and modern highways"²² and these are drawn backwards towards the foundational myths of Afrikaner ideology and identity -- in particular the "[Great] Trek that was a march toward the fulfillment of South Africa's destiny for greatness".²³ In his effort to provide political opportunities for Afrikaner ideology at an increasingly embattled time, Anthony Harrigan contrasts the momentum offered by South Africa's quest for modernity against the "lesser breeds"²⁴ represented in Africa and in Southern Africa. Harrigan's work, like most of the writing on security at the time, establishes three things: a bridge to history, a sense of place and the permanence of threat.

It may seem unfair to single out this work by an American publicist, instead of focusing on the work of South African writers who may, at the same time, have produced interpretations that were, perhaps, less ideologically-directed.²⁵ Nevertheless, Harrigan's book is

²¹ It seems clear that these journals offer a compelling insight both into the ways of the Cold War but also into the ways of today's strategic culture. South Africa equivalent magazines, called *Paratus* and *Militaria*, remain to be tapped.

²² Harrigan, *Defence against Total Attack*, p. 92.

²³ Harrigan, *Defence against Total Attack*, p. 92.

²⁴ Harrigan, *Defence against Total Attack*, p. 95.

²⁵ There are various South African examples that I might have chosen. Beginning, perhaps, with the massive doctoral thesis of Lukas Daniël Barnard, once a professor of Political Studies at the University of the Orange Free State who was to become South Africa's spy master during the final years of apartheid and who continues to occupy a position of authority in the new South Africa as the chief bureaucracy of the Cape Province. See Lukas Daniël Barnard. "Die Magsfaktor in Internasionale Verhoudinge," Band 1 & 1 (The Power Factor in International Relations, Vol. 1 and Vol 11). Unpublished PhD Thesis in the Faculty of Arts and Philosophy, The University of the Orange Free State, 1975..Also see the work of Dirk Kunert once the Jan Smuts

emblematic of the knowledge represented both by embryonic Security Studies and, indeed, International Relations within apartheid South Africa. Not surprisingly, then, the book was glowingly received in the country. The daily propaganda broadcast, *Current Affairs*, described the book as a "timely reminder that we live on a world of hard realities"²⁶. In order to overcome a difficulty in classifying this genre of anti-communism, I will refer to my own earlier judgment of the work which Harrigan inspired in South Africa which I have described as "boldly sectarian and crudely simplistic" where the cumulative impression is one of "archaic reasoning, unsubstantiated impressions and arcane deductions"; where scholarship was characterized by its "vulgar anti-Communist message" which demonstrates the missionary nature of [much mainstream] scholarship in South Africa".²⁷

Harrigan's book was crucial in transporting the post-World War II discovery and production of security knowledge from the United States to South Africa where it was used to assuage the fears of the country's ruling white minority. Its impact on regional politics in Southern Africa was devastating -- for South Africa's minority, the idea of security came to be the one - perhaps, the only -- acceptable form of social organization. By locating the Cold War at the center of political discourse, all alternative efforts to explain and expand understandings of international relations, especially in security, were silenced by the power of Cold War interpretations. Within the authorization that this offered, the country's policy agenda was set; and within the same coda, "research and knowledge falling outside ..[this].. agenda was dismissed as 'unscientific' and not really as security knowing".²⁸

Very little has been said this far about economics and the role that the Cold War played in building white South Africa's comparative wealth and power. Eleven days before the then Prime Minister, Hendrik Verwoerd, was knifed to death on the floor of South Africa's parliament, *Time Magazine* (26 August, 1966), glowingly wrote: The country is in "the midst of a massive boom. Attracted by cheap labor, a gold-back currency, and high profits, investors from all over the world have ploughed money into the country, and the new industries they have started have sent production. Consumption - and the demand for labor - soaring. Such are the proportions of prosperity." However, a debate about whether or not it was possible to reform apartheid through economic growth was cast in a binary which would be familiar to those who followed Cold War economics.

Here follows a synopsis of a variant that focused on the "relationship between capitalism and apartheid."²⁹ The O'Dowd thesis (as one side of the debate was called) held that "apartheid would eventually be brought down by the simple functional logic of the market - as the contradiction between the free market and the racist limitations on this

Professor of International Relations at the University of the Witwatersrand. A homage to Kunert and his work (including a sample of his writing) is to be found in Colin Vale and Irene van den Ende eds. *The Loss of Innocence: International Relations Essays in Honour of Dirk Kunert*. Pretoria: HSRC Publishers, 1994. For a policy-oriented sample of this kind of work see C. J. Maritz, C.J. "Pretoria's Reaction to the Role of Moscow and Peking in Southern Africa," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 25, 2, 1987.pp. 321-344.

²⁶ Book Discussion: "Defence against Total Attack" by Anthony Harrigan, *SABC Survey, Current Affairs*, 28 January 1966, 7.15pm English Service.

²⁷ Peter Vale. "Whose World is it Anyway?" in Dyer and Mangasarian eds, *The Study of International Relations* p. 208.

²⁸ Rosenau et al., *Global Voices*, p. 13.

²⁹ O'Meara, *Forty Lost Years*, p. 423.

market grew, the former would replace the latter".³⁰ Although this was embraced as a counter to the idea of national liberation and socialism (and, through these, communism), O'Dowd's position was shown to be less thesis than heuristic device: general and vague and ethnocentric, it paid little attention to the situation on the ground. If anything, O'Dowd's perspective was a South African version of Walt Rostow's classic anti-communist manifesto *Stages of Economic Growth*³¹ - especially the famous "take-off" phase with its removal of structural constraints and emergence of an entrepreneurial class. Old-style Nationalist politicians, still wedded to the national social origins of their party, initially viewed the O'Dowd position with some suspicion. But by the early-1980s, an alliance had developed between the business community and the minority-ruled government.

The construction of a Total Onslaught against the Republic of South Africa as a security discourse and its role in setting the agendas for both racial inclusion and exclusion, were so politically-satisfying and so rich with the possibilities offered by positivist social science that pronouncing upon it were for many in South Africa³² (and in the metropolises of academic legitimacy) politically satisfying, intellectually engaging and career-advancing. The latter observation owes its place in this essay - eventually in the book -- to the power exerted on construction of security - Cold War and other -- by the power of credentialed expertise and influence of epistemic communities.

In South Africa both during apartheid and in this, the post-apartheid period, the holding power of credential authority has played an astonishingly influential role in efforts to explain and manage social relations. In this process, the place occupied by expertise that was located at the metropolises of learning - the UK initially but from the 1970s onwards, the US - was central. In part this explains the ease in which the quite bizarre interpretations of the world, like those offered by Anthony Harrigan (and others of his ilk), came to enjoy wide acceptance in white South Africa circles. As an aside, I can't tell you how many times I sat through the talks and seminars given by "experts" on international relations, the Soviet Union and US foreign policy - Henry Kissinger, Edward Luttwak, Richard Haass: to pick one from each of three generations of American Cold War knowing. Each built on the accepted bipolar script, tip-toeing round the issue of race in South Africa bringing little more to the local than the same old message dressed in the security and strategic-speak of their favorite policy journal.

Local determination to advance this narrow, but apparently academically respectable, position that linked apartheid, through security to the Cold War were drawn together in 1977 in the creation at the University of Pretoria of the Institute for Strategic Studies. In a search for an 'operational universe', a symposium launching the institute suggested that the "central concept in the modern study of interstate relations is national security, an inclusive concept which, apart from traditional 'defense policy', also includes the non-military actions of a state to ensure its total capacity to survive as a political entity in order to exert influence and to carry out its internal and international objectives".³³

Two conceptual points are important: first, rather than follow the American route to naming the epistemological project National Security, South Africa drew from the British roots of their educational system and

³⁰ O'Meara, *Forty Lost Years*, p. 424.

³¹ Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth*.

³² There are many examples of this, but let this single one stand for others, Clifford-Vaughan, *Force and Peace*.

³³ Louw ed, *National Security*.

called it Strategic Studies. Secondly, the chief security referent was with states and so it fostered and secured their needs³⁴. The gathering in Pretoria was however, not an endpoint in the making of security knowledge in South Africa; it marked, rather, a moment in the development of a public institution that further stabilized the master concepts around the idea of the Cold War and integrated these into the politics of race and minority power. The book of the conference proceedings, "National Security: a modern approach", was well received in South Africa: Fredrick Clifford-Vaughan of the University of Natal -- a retired military officer -- called it "a necessary and interesting book" and described the formation of a think-tank on "National Security" to be a "worthwhile project"³⁵.

But the power of knowledge generated in the metropolises, had a paradoxical affect on local endeavors to know the world. It weakened the possibility that South Africans, especially the minority, could develop an independent capacity to interpret international politics, or even to make an independent "threat analysis" in it. Let this second anecdotal story carry this point. At a conference - cut off from the prying eyes and ears of the press - organized in a magnificent Tudor-style hotel above the city of Pietermaritzburg in the early 1980s, I asked the senior bureaucrat in the South African government's ministry of foreign affairs, how many people in his department read or spoke Russian. "Not one", was his unashamed answer!

This makes it easy to explain why it was that American and South African interests so readily coincided over the war that both preceded and followed the independence of Angola, and which was the theme of the stimulating paper delivered at this table by Piero Gleijesis some weeks ago. It also explains the absolute conviction in South African military circles that Washington had abandoned them in Angola; that it had left them to face their common enemy alone. For this, listen to the recent view of a former SADF General, Chris Thirion: "I was told by two gentlemen from the CIA, and they were working alongside national intelligence. They came to me one day and they said, 'We want you to know that we know that the military are involved in certain activities inside this country (ie Angola), which - if it had to come out in the open - would be very detrimental to the (US) government as a whole'.³⁶" This also explains why the same military insisted that the politicians and their own bureaucratic rivals in the intelligence community, certainly at the time of the Angolan affair, were the stooges of the CIA.

This is an interesting, although not entirely new idea. Its recognition, however, does suggest how a Cold War optic might help to reinterpret the international relations of apartheid South Africa. To succeed these must look beyond the accepted narrative that endlessly juxtaposes apartheid's unacceptable racial policy against a world increasing intent on supporting, certainly rhetorically, non-racialism. This move may also build towards revisionist understandings of US approaches to Third World issues in general. In a compelling recent essay, the Ugandan citizen and Columbia academic Mahmood Mamdani uses the Southern Africa case to illustrate how it was that the US "harness[ed], ...even ...cultivate[d], terrorism in the struggle against regimes it considered pro-Soviet"³⁷. In Mamdani's view, the Nixon

³⁵ Louw ed, *National Security*.

³⁵ Book Reviews, *International Affairs Bulletin*, Vol. 2, no. 1, 1978, p. 49.

³⁶ <http://www.mnet.co.za/CarteBlanche/Display/Display.asp?Id=1768>

³⁷ Mamdani, Mahmood. "Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: A Political Perspective on Culture and Terrorism" in Eric Hershberg and Kevin W.

Doctrine³⁸, with its emphasis on local responsibility for deterrence in localized wars, was the turning point in US policy towards the South.

But his is not the only view: for these immediate purposes consider this complimentary spin on the same moment. In the interests of American power, the Nixon Doctrine - once again chained the periphery to the political goals of the center - especially in security studies, where geopolitics counts for everything and local centers of power are determine the course of immediate inter-state politics.

This revived an understanding that South African military should help to anchor the status quo in a distant corner of the world. South Africa had long experienced this (shall we say) political sub-contracting and would do so again. As a Dominion (to use the formal name), South Africa had helped to secure the British Empire, and (at the end of the Cold War and apartheid) it would be promoted as a possible "pivotal state", and would be encouraged to help secure George Bush I's "new world order". Although separated by nearly sixty years, these proposed roles relied on the ready compliance of ideologically-sympathetic states in distant places to protect the interests of the powerful and, simultaneously, to help project their power.

For Henry Kissinger, the notion of South Africa as "dominion" or as "pivot" was a key to the world he hoped to restore. In his National Security Memorandum [NSSM] 39 document, correctly dubbed "Tar Baby" by his opponents, he looked towards the maintenance of white power in southern Africa. "The whites are here to stay and the only way that constructive change can come about is through them," was the core conclusion. This view sanctioned significant forms of clandestine cooperation -- military, intelligence, economic and even the exchange of spies. All of these gave apartheid South Africa the status of a reliable (even if sometimes embarrassing) Cold War ally.³⁹

The cinematic vistas that "Cold War intellectuals" like Kissinger brought to surrogate states were seamlessly transmitted deeper into the periphery. If Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) was one: the other was the state we now call Namibia - then known as South West Africa; a territory that has been mandated to Dominion South Africa at the end of the First World War. A war of national liberation, itself cast in a Cold War binary, had commenced in that country in 1962 and would continue for thirty years. Still another war of liberation was fought in neighboring Mozambique on the east: here the language of freedom was forcefully cast in the language of decolonization (this time from Portugal) with strong overtones of European Marxism. But it was the torrent of war on the otherside of the sub-continent, in Angola, which was to absorb increasing resources from South Africa and which was, on the arrival of the Cubans in 1974, to assure them, albeit momentarily, that they were lynchpin (a word much loved by local security buffs) in global anti-Communism.

Ironically, it had taken a major political event in the metropole, the April 1974 coup in Lisbon, to shift the political and ideological

Moore eds, *Critical Views of September 11. Analyses from around the world*. New York. The New Press, 2002, p. 49.

³⁸ The central thesis of the doctrine was that, although the United States will participate in the development of security for friends and allies, the major effort must be made by the governments and peoples of these states.

³⁹ Adopted from [South Africa Volume 2, Number 22](http://www.foreignpolicy-infocus.org/briefs/vol2/v2n22saf_body.html) January 1997
http://www.foreignpolicy-infocus.org/briefs/vol2/v2n22saf_body.html

map in the periphery. This was a moment of great import to Kissinger, even though initially he failed to grasp its significance for the world beyond the global core. As Piero Gleijeses reminded us, Kissinger was far more concerned about Portugal. Why? Portuguese re-fuelling facilities on the Azores archipelago had proved crucial to US efforts to equip Israel during the Six Day War of 1967. But as Gleijeses' book shows, even the latter-day disciples of Metternich and Castlereagh eventually have to turn their attention southwards. This recognition certainly amplified the importance that South Africa's government felt within the organizing frame offered by the Cold War and their domestic conversation became littered with its rhetorical forms.

Kissinger would visit South Africa twice. In an effort to settle the decolonial (and essentially constitutional) problem in the neighboring country of Rhodesia, in September, 1976, he arrived with an entourage which would have made the Rolling Stones Global Tour retinue seem modest. The tilt towards the white South was no more; a victim, as Piero Gleijeses reminded us, of the events in Angola in 1976. A meeting at a rugby match, three white men -- South Africa's Prime Minister, John Vorster, Rhodesia's Ian Smith, and Kissinger -- cobbled an agreement together for the future of a sub-continent in which the majority of the inhabitants were both black and women. The wily Smith welched on the deal, and continued to pursue his own version of an anti-Communist war (in the guise of the white man's burden) for another decade. Kissinger was to return to South Africa when he was out of office in 1981: this time he didn't bring an entourage, but brought Nancy, and billeted with Harry Oppenheimer, the country's richest man. At a paper delivered to the establishment South African Institute of International Affairs, he almost raised questions about the durability of race-based politics in South Africa, but mainly beat the familiar Cold War drum.

After the doctrine he crafted for Nixon had run its course, the right of surrogates to roll back Communism was reinforced by the Reagan Doctrine. More than any other Cold War development, this doctrine helped to spill Southern Africa's deepening insecurity into the region and legitimized a two-decade silent war by South Africa on its neighbors: a strategic doctrine that unabashedly mimicked US policy in Central America. By this time, however South Africa's people had taken to the streets, and the popular struggles were redolent with revolutionary and Marxist rhetoric. As was the many, many symbols of popular insurrection - the-shirts, posters, graffiti. Not one, however, was as visually powerful as the photograph that appeared on the front-page of the mass circulation, Sunday Times, in July 1985. This showed the Soviet flag being carried high at the funeral of four slain anti-apartheid activists in the small Eastern Cape town of Cradock. Events like these brought the Cold War into the everyday lives of South Africa's people, but this was on one side of the Cold War divide.

In compulsive, even obsessional, ways the Cold War and race was written and re-written on the psyche of the other side, too. Take the so-called "Veld Schools": these school outings were a rite of passage for white youth who were taken to nature camps in which the importance of environmentalism, a romantic love of nature were drawn towards the security threat that the Soviets/the Communists/Black people/African states were said to present to the white state. And in the literature of Afrikaans, a number of books - bildungsroman, really -- drew on themes that Anthony Harrigan would have approved by presenting black South Africans as puppets in the hands of a masterplan orchestrated by the Kremlin. Invariably, the plot was carried by Christian heroes and communist villains but the stakes of the contest were desperately high - the very survival of western civilization in an alien and hostile continent.

If this was one mode of social compulsion, another was the universal conscription of young white South African males - the only form of discrimination they faced! As the 1980s lengthened, conscriptees faced stints of combat on a "border" (read: in Angola). As the vocabulary of combat grew, South Africa was known as "The States" and the country now called Namibia, which was used as the staging post for the occupation of southern Angola, was known as "Nam". The appropriation of these powerful, even evocative, terms from another anti-Communist war, in a distant corner of Africa, seems more symbolic than anything we have encountered this far. But this projection of Cold War as culture (or is it the other way around?) had commenced far, far earlier. In early 1966, for instance, the *Ballad of the Green Berets*⁴⁰, with its vivid opening lines "Fighting soldiers from the sky, fearless men who jump and die" topped the South Africa music charts for weeks.

While the distance between this remnant of Cold War culture and the events on the ground may seem, especially to structuralists, vague and entirely inconsequential, it is worth pointing out that the training of South African Staff Officers at American facilities continued until the late-1960s. Magnus Malan, destined to become successively Head of the South African Army, the South African Defense Force and Minister of Defense when the Total Onslaught paranoia was at its height, attended Fort Bragg where (it has often been said) he was the only foreign student introduced to John F. Kennedy during the latter's visit to the facility.

We have strayed from the everyday. So what was it that allowed apartheid to survive for so long? Reason? Race? Reaction? In apartheid South Africa, security knowledge as racial knowing and Cold War -- irrespective of whether its target was local, regional and or international - was created and invariably reinforced by the psychology of maintenance. The kind of quotient routine that makes for the very stuff of politics; where the daily grind determines life and death; where security police make decisions not on knowing, but on conspiracy. This move turns away from the grim details of state of emergency politics and the meta-narratives of Cold War towards the everyday. "This was the ...habit that made prejudice a standard mode of perception...It ..flourished in its crude aspects among members of the white, mainly Afrikaner, working class, for whom jobs were reserved in the police force, the army railways and harbors, the civil service, and small-scale farming. Ruling elites, in both the political and industrial sectors, satisfied that they had bought the compliance of the white electorate, gave a blank cheque to the military and law-enforcement establishments"⁴¹

The acceptance of the Cold War as the international was reinforced by the power of a medium, television, which was only introduced into the country in the mid-1970s. The development of the film industry also helped. A number of state subsidized number of films, such as *Kaptein Caprivi* (1972) dealt with South Africa's anti-communist war⁴². As we all know, counter-culture is the inevitable bed-fellow of all state propaganda even in the most reactionary places and at the bleakest moments. So, the idea of a heroic border-war was to return to haunt the protagonists of the Total Onslaught in the mid- and late-1980s. The rise

⁴⁰ I remembered this when I recently paged through *The Vietnam War. A history in Documents* by Marilyn B. Young, John J. Fitzgerald and A. Tom Grunfeld. Published in 2002 by Oxford University Press.

⁴¹ Njabulo Ndebele, *Memory, Metaphor and the Triumph of Narrative*, in Nuttall and Coetzee eds, *Negotiating the Past*, p. 23.

⁴² There is a neat history of the South Africa film history by Keyan Tomaselli at www://und.ac.za/ccms/publications/articles/cinemas.htm

and flourishing of an anti-war campaign, drew literature⁴³ and music together in the very language, Afrikaans, which had been used to enunciate its importance. The literature was known by the term 'grensliteratuur' (border literature). One short-story title, *My Kubaan* (*A Cuban of my very own*), perhaps more than any other, caught the ambiguity of the country's relationship with the threat on the border. This move more entirely revitalized this language and helped to secure, in my view, its lasting future for an apartheid-free South Africa.

Certainly, these thoughts have rambled far and wide, and they are too busy in this form to be of any possibly didactic use. But my aim has been to show that the Cold War provides an absorbing "take" on the construction of contemporary South Africa because it offers, I believe, a compelling account of the robust contest for a state on the global periphery. Sadly, the tussle reinforced the idea that South Africa as state, as place, even as nation, can only define itself through a metropolitan center. It does however offers an account of the way in which the binary of race and the binary of the Cold War both inter-twinned and conflicted on the global periphery.

One core question remains: why did apartheid end? Many writers have fingered the impact of the ending of the Cold War on change in South Africa. Indeed, one of the core explanations for the ending of apartheid - its almost an article of faith -- turns on the idea that ending of the Cold War compelled South Africa's embattled minority government to recognize that the great game was up. Here is the argument:

While the white minority's power had prevailed, its long-term prospects for survival, notwithstanding rhetoric, were poor. In crucial areas, changing technology had left South Africa's military further and further behind; as a result, the capacity to sustain a war, even (or especially) an African one, was faltering as the Battle of Cuito-Cuanavale in Angola showed, and influential circles raised serious question about the wisdom of continuing a war on the country's borders. So, the important newspaper of the powerful Dutch Reformed Church (Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk (NGK)), *Die Kerkbode*, published an editorial on 8 July 1988 that raised questions about the present and future role of South African troops in neighbouring Angola⁴⁴. More seriously, almost, the struggle for South Africa had delivered what the state's Cold War strategists feared most: it had come home. Increasingly the battle for the future was fought on the streets of the country's dusty townships, rather than through the gun-turrets of those weapons that the minority, despite an arms embargo, was able to export. This was one side of the dumb-bell - to use a code word from Cold War strategic studies -- however; the other side of the great South African faced a mirrored set of imponderables. There was no hope that the majority could prevail by force of arms. New forms of surveillance and global relations had overtaken the idea of wars of national liberation, with their roots in the romance of the Cuban experience. Then, old allies - the Soviets more important than anyone else - faced changing priorities. If there had been doubts about the direction of Perestroika, it was Glasnost with its near water-tight agreement over the division of the world into spheres of interest - especially after the 1986 Reykjavik Summit - which confirmed that things could never be quite the same again. As the bipolar world ended therefore, it was inevitable that peripheral conflicts, like the one over apartheid, would also draw to a close.

⁴³ Coetsee, Ampie. *Letterkunde en die Krisis*. Johannesburg: Tauris, 1990.

⁴⁴ "Troep in Angola", *Die Kerkbode*, Cape Town, 8 July 1988.

This foreclosing explanation offers a range of conceptual and political worries, as we can readily appreciate. And it almost entirely misses how deeply the Cold War was engrained -- and certainly, why it still lurks - in the routine life South Africans, in their new state and in the world they have created. The opening of archives, in South Africa but elsewhere too, will enable to see some of this past, this will ease the research. But my worry is that the dull business of diplomatic history hurriedly written will hide the wrong of using people in the periphery as a pummel-horse for the great and the good in the metropolises of learning and political power.

* * *

The book project, for that is what I hope these fragmentary ideas will become, will look to answer a range of conceptual questions⁴⁵. What was the Cold War context within which, and the reasons for, the creation of Apartheid as the official ideology and practice of the South African regime after 1948? How was Apartheid South Africa integrated into the Western alliance during a period of decolonization and official opposition to (de jure) racism in most states of the world? How, and why did, the apartheid regime end when it did? In the transition from Apartheid to post-apartheid (and rule by the ANC which led the anti-apartheid struggle) what are the significant continuities as well as significant changes in the political economy, racial hierarchies, daily life for different people(s) in South Africa, and the location of South Africa in southern Africa and the international system?

These questions will have been addressed by paying attention to race and racism, class and racial dynamics, the specificities of the South African economy and mutual determinations between its economy and social, cultural and political practices and ideologies, and no doubt other critical features that were at play in the decades since WW II. Apartheid as a whole and these and other aspects of it have been studied via the politically motivated analyses of central players such as the South African government, the pro- and anti-Apartheid political parties and forces that were legal within South Africa, the ANC, the South African Communist Party, and other agents of change and stability. They have been quite well studied through the disciplinary lens of economics and political economy, history, sociology and political science and political theory, anthropology (both physical and cultural), and the cultural sciences. Apartheid and its elements and significations have been illuminated through literature, drama, art, music, cultural preservation and the creation of cultural heritages.

In these literatures some attention - often quite incidental and often entirely unconsciously -- has been accorded to the Cold War and the roles of the U.S. and the USSR, the role of the Communist Party and its affiliations with the Soviet Union and other states in its orbit, the role of anti-communist ideology as a frame for placing South Africa in the inter-state system divided into blocs (albeit with non-aligned nations and movements partially counter-balancing the bloc system), the specific role of nuclear weapons and strategies during (and since) the Cold War, the effects on daily lives of different people(s) of anti-communism. Highlighting these specific topics draws attention to a lacunae in scholarship about South Africa. What has been missing--to only slightly overstate the case--are the contributions that International Relations theories and critical IR studies could bring to answering and/or reformulating questions such as those raised in the first paragraph of this section. This is that task to which I am now turning, and it increasingly seems to me that dealing with this task

⁴⁵ I'm grateful to Allen Hunter for helping me to think through the section that now follows.

adequately will entail writing a rather different book than I had originally intended. I'd planned to write more specifically about the role that security studies, especially as forged in the United States, as exported to South Africa, imported into South Africa, adopted and adapted as an academic discipline and as a contribution to legitimating the continued existence of apartheid. Part of that work was to illuminate the role that Anthony Harrigan's small book (portions of which was part of the reading packet for the first discussion this fall) played in those processes. Harrigan's work will likely play some role in my work as I am now reconceptualizing it; but it is clear that its place of and its import in my new project need to be rethought.

So far I can state certain important themes and some specific perspectives that will have to be included. For example: the Cold War was a powerful influence in and over South African politics after WW II; anti-communism as ideology and practice as well as belief in communism were similarly important in South African politics and in the global politics that South Africa existed in and partially contributed to creating; Cold War politics, including communism and anti-communism, was constructed and experienced in several domains: governmental, political party and social movement politics and military struggles, official and competing ideologies, and daily life. In stating these themes it becomes clear that much remains to be explained including: how the end of the Cold War, the global retreat of the USSR, the exhaustion of communist ideology and the rise of neo-liberal ideology contributed to creating the conditions under which apartheid was officially ended; how the SACP continues to have some legitimacy in SA even though communist ideology no longer holds much, if any, sway in the party; how anti-communist ideologies and practices are still used since the end of apartheid; how the mediations between the Cold War and anti-communist politics and in daily life have been modified during and since the transition from apartheid.

It is possible to indicate some of the theories and methods and existing findings that can be employed in the new project, and how using these theories and methods to study a peripheral country like South Africa demands that they be modified. More specifically, whether approached within South Africa, globally or in other specific contexts, it is evident that, as we have been discussing this semester at ICAS, that international relations cannot be fully understood without attention to racial dynamics within and between nation-states and within specific political ideologies and practices. Among the reasons, for instance, that Harrigan remains of interest in this more ambitious project is that his is an extreme, but perhaps not a sui generis expression of racial and civilizational anxieties, that were encoded in Cold War realpolitik and anti-communism. It is not, in other words, first a conflict between super powers and then a civilizational clash, as Huntington would argue, but civilizational worries—more expressed via racial ideologies and North-South dynamics than civilizational conflict as embodied in competing world religions—are evident in the Cold War as well. Thus, International Relations theory can shed some light on South African history, as can existing critical IR and security studies, but it is evident that attention to race needs to be incorporated into these if they are to realize their promise of providing a compelling critique of and explanations alternative to those of the mainstream.

As always in the early phase of a project, the problem how to best organize these materials, what kind of narrative structure to provide (hence the discussion of the police officer and three women as a potential theme to be woven into different parts of the book), whether there is a core question around which all these concerns can be organized, or whether it makes sense to crystallize questions, substantive issues and analytic approaches into a coherent book

subdivided into chapters or a series of articles that may (or may not) be collected in the same volume.