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India first demonstrated its nuclear capability when it conducted a "peaceful nuclear experiment" in May 1974. Twenty-four years later, India has conducted its second series of tests today. Included in this series, according to Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee, were a "fission device, a low-yield device, and a thermo-nuclear device." This breaks an international moratorium on nuclear tests; China conducted its last test in 1996. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, banning all tests everywhere, has been signed by 149 nations and ratified by 13 of the required 44 nations. World Nuclear Tests
Below is a summary of the Indian nuclear program, current capabilities, and delivery options, derived from Tracking Nuclear Proliferation 1998, forthcoming from the Carnegie Endowment.
Nuclear Weapons Capability After years of building larger-scale plutonium production reactors, and facilities to separate the material for weapons use, India is estimated to have approximately 400 kg of weapons-usable plutonium today. Given that it takes about 6 kg of plutonium to construct a basic plutonium bomb, this amount would be sufficient for 65 bombs. With more sophisticated designs, it is possible that this estimate could go as high as 90 bombs.
Delivery Options India has two potential delivery options. First, India posses several different aircraft capable of nuclear delivery, including the Jaguar, Mirage 2000, MiG-27 and MiG-29. Second, would be to mount the weapon as a warhead on a ballistic missile. It is thought that India has developed warheads for this purpose, but it is not known to have tested such a warhead. India has two missile systems potentially capable of delivering a nuclear weapon: Prithvi, which can carry a 1000 kg payload to approximately 150 km, or a 500 kg payload to 250 km; and Agni, a two-stage medium-range missile, which can conceivably carry a 1000 kg payload to as far 1500 - 2000 km. Reports in 1997 indicated that India had possibly deployed, or at least was storing, conventionally armed Prithvi missiles in Punjab, very near the Pakistani border.
Non-Proliferation Regime India had not been a party to any aspect of the international non-proliferation regime until 1997, when it signed the Chemical Weapons Convention. Among the significant treaties it has not signed are the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and India has a very limited safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency that does not cover any of its nuclear research facilities. In this sense, there is no multilateral mechanism through which to sanction India for its recent nuclear tests. However, the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act, passed by the U.S. Congress in 1994 with the leadership of Senator John Glenn (D-Ohio), imposes automatic and severe sanctions. These provision, codified as section 102(b) of the Arms Export Control Act, are detailed below: Sanctions Under the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994 (sec. 826 (a)) Sanctions For Nuclear Detonations or Transfers of Nuclear Explosive Devices * If ..." the President determines that any country, [after 4/30/94] (A) transfers to a non-nuclear-weapon state a nuclear explosive device, (B) is a non-nuclear weapon state and either -- (i) receives a nuclear explosive device, or (ii) detonates a nuclear explosive device," * Then... "the President shall forthwith impose the following sanctions: (A) The United States Government shall terminate assistance to that country under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, except for humanitarian assistance or food of other agricultural commodities. (B) The United State Government shall terminate--(i) sales to that country under this Act of any defense articles, defense services, or design and construction services, and (ii) licenses for the export to that country of any item on the United States Munitions List. (C) The United States Government shall terminate all foreign military financing for that country under this Act. (D) The United States Government shell deny to that country and credit, credit guarantees, or other financial assistance by any department, agency, or instrumentality of the United States Government, except that the sanction of this subparagraph shall not apply--(i) to any transaction subject to the reporting requirements of title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (relating to congressional oversight of intelligence activities), or (ii) to humanitarian assistance. (E) The United States Government shall oppose, in accordance with section 701 of the International Financial Institutions Act (22 U.S.C. 262d), the extension of any loan or financial or technical assistance to that country by any international financial institution. (F) The United States Government shall prohibit any United States bank from making any loan or providing any credit to the government of that country, except for loans or credits for the purpose of purchasing food or other agricultural commodities. (G) The authorities of section 6 of the Export Administration Act of 1979 shall be used to prohibit exports to that country of specific goods and technology (excluding food and other agricultural commodities), except that such prohibition shall not apply to any transaction subject to the reporting requirements of title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (relating to congressional oversight of intelligence activities)." Waiver: [None]. The President may delay the sanction for 30 days. For more information on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, see: The
Politics and Prospects of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, by Joseph
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