pdf version of cv | To Debraj
Ray's homepage (if you followed a different link to get here)Selected Professional Activities
Name: Debraj Ray
Date of Birth: September 3, 1957.
Address: Department of Economics, New York University, 19 West 4th Street Room 608, New York, NY 10003.
Telephone: 212-998-8906 (fax) 212-995-4186
Email: debraj.ray@nyu.edu
Ph.D. in Economics, Cornell University, January 1983.
M.A. in Economics,Cornell University, 1981.
B.A. in Economics, Presidency College,
University of Calcutta, 1977.
Current Position:
Julius Silver Professor of Economics and Director of Graduate Studies, New York University.
Other Positions:
British Petroleum Visiting Professor, London School of Economics, 2004--2005.
Professor of Economics, Boston University, 1991--1999 and Director, Institute for Economic Development, Boston University, 1991--1996.
Visting Professor, Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Spring 1998.
Oskar Morgenstern Visiting Professor of Economics, New York University, Fall 1997.
Research Affiliate, Instituto de Análisis Económico (CSIC), Barcelona (current)
Director, Institute for Economic Development, Boston University, 1991--1996.
Visiting Professor, Department of Economics, Harvard University, Fall 1993.
Professor, Indian Statistical Institute, 1989--1992
Visiting Professor, Instituto de Análisis Económico (CSIC), Barcelona, 05/1990--12/1990
Visiting Professor, Instituto de Matemática Pura e Aplicada, Rio de Janeiro, 12/1989--04/1990
Visiting Professor, Kuwait Institute for Scientific Research, 06/1989
Visiting Professor, The People's University of China, Beijing, 06/1987
Associate Professor, Indian Statistical Institute, 1986--1989
Assistant Professor of Economics, Stanford University, 1982--1986.
Selected Professional Activities
Editorial Board, AEJ Microeconomics.
Foreign Editor, Review of Economic Studies.
Editorial Board, Theoretical Economics.
Editorial Board, Journal of Economic Theory.
Editorial Board, Games and Economic Behavior.
Editorial Board, Journal of Development Economics.
Editorial Board, Economic Theory (1997--2004).
Editorial Board, Journal of Economic Growth.
Editorial Board, Review of Development Economics.
Editorial Board, Japanese Economic Review.
Editorial Board, Journal of Economic Inequality.
Editorial Board, Economics Bulletin.
Editorial Board, Arthaniti .
Editorial Board, Econometrica, 1989--1992.
Program Chair, Society for Economic Design Conference, New York, 2002.
Member, Program Committee for the 2003 Summer Meeting of the Econometric Society, Evanston, IL.
Member, Program Committee for the 2001 Summer Meeting of the Econometric Society, Baltimore, MD.
Member, Program Committee for the 1997 New Orleans Meeting of the Econometric Society.
Member, Program Committee for the 1993 Summer Meeting of the Econometric Society.
Co-Organizer, Conferences on Economic Theory and Related Mathematical Methods, Indian Statistical Institute, 1985--1989.
Organizer, NorthEast Universities Development
Consortium Conference, Boston University, 1992 and 1996.
Teaching and Research
Research Interests: Microeconomic theory, Game Theory, Development economics.
Teaching Experience:
Development Economics at both the undergraduate and doctoral levels,
since 1982 (at Stanford, the Indian Statistical Institute (ISI), Boston University
(BU), Harvard,
and New York University (NYU)), Economic Dynamics (at Stanford, the ISI, and
BU),
Game Theory (at NYU, MIT and the ISI) Industrial Organization, Real Analysis
(at the ISI),
Intermediate Microeconomics (Stanford, NYU).
Selected Honors and Awards
R.C. Dutt Memorial Lectures, Calcutta (2005).
Arijit Mukherjee Memorial Lecture, Indian Institute of Management, Calcutta (2005).
British Petroleum Lecture, London School of Economics (2005).
Lipsey Lectures, University of Essex (2004).
Silver Professorship, New York University, 2002--.
Department-wide Speaker, Economics Department, Northwestern University (2002).
John Simon Guggenheim Fellow, 1997--98.
Gittner Teaching Award, Department of Economics, Boston University, 1996.
Fellow of the Econometric Society, 1993.
Mahalanobis Memorial Medal of the Indian Econometric Society, 1989
Medal of the Indian National Science Academy for Outstanding Young Scientists (subarea: mathematics), 1988
Dean's Award for Distinguished Teaching, Stanford University, 1985.
Details of NSF awards and other grants available
on request.
Publications
"On the Salience of Ethnic Conflict" (with J. Esteban), February 2006, revised March 2008, forthcoming, American Economic Review. Appendix to the paper.
"Informal Insurance in Social Networks" (with F. Bloch and G. Genicot), January 2005, revised April 2007, forthcoming, Journal of Economic Theory.
"Polarization, Fractionalization and Conflict" (with J. Esteban), Journal of Peace Research 45, 163--182.
"Introduction to Development Theory," Journal of Economic Theory 137, 1--10 (2007).
A Game-Theoretic Perspective on Coalition Formation, Oxford University Press, 2007.
Development Economics, March 2007, forthcoming in the New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, edited by Lawrence Blume and Steven Durlauf.
"Coalition Formation with Binding Agreements" (with K. Hyndman), Review of Economic Studies 74 (2007), 1125--1147. For supplementary notes, click here.
"Reciprocity in Groups and the Limits to Social Capital," (with F. Bloch and G. Genicot), American Economic Review 97 (Papers and Proceedings), 65--69 (2007).
"Inequality and Inefficiency in Joint Projects," (with J-M. Baland and O. Dagnelie), Economic Journal 117, 922--935 (2007).
"Extensions of a Measure of Polarization; with an Application to the Income Distribution of Five OECD Countries" (with J. Esteban and C. Gradin), Journal of Economic Inequality 5, 1--19 (2007).
"Group Decision-Making in the Shadow of Disagreement," (with K. Eliaz and R. Razin), Journal of Economic Theory 132, 236--273 (2007).
"A Decision-Theoretic Basis for Choice Shifts in Groups," (with K. Eliaz and R. Razin), American Economic Review 96, 1321--1332 (2006).
"Inequality, Lobbying and Resource Allocation" (with J. Esteban), American Economic Review 96, 257--279 (2006).
"Contracts and Externalities: How Things Fall Apart," (with G. Genicot), Journal of Economic Theory 131, 71--100 (2006).
"Bargaining Power and Enforcement in Credit Markets" (with G. Genicot), Journal of Development Economics 79, 398--412 (2006).
"Satisficing and Selection in Electoral Competition," (with J. Bendor and D. Mookherjee), Quarterly Journal of Political Science 1, 171--200 (2006).
"On the Dynamics of Inequality," Economic Theory 29, 291--306 (2006). These are based on unpublished notes from 1990. For the original version of the notes (which contains a different proof of the main result), click here.
"Aspirations, Poverty and Economic Change," in A. Banerjee, R. Bénabou and D. Mookherjee (eds), What Have We Learnt About Poverty, Oxford University Press (2006). This essay is originally based on my comments as discussant on A. Appadurai's paper, World Bank Conference on Culture and Public Action, 2002. Appadurai's paper is published in V. Rao and M. Walton (eds), Culture and Public Action.
"Polarization: Concepts, Measurement, Estimation," (with J-Y. Duclos and J. Esteban), Econometrica 72, 1737--1772 (2004) . This somewhat expanded version is published in C. Barrett (ed), The Social Economics of Poverty: Identities, Groups, Communities and Networks, London: Routledge (2005).
"On the Dynamics of Inequality," forthcoming, Economic Theory. These are based on unpublished notes from 1990. For the original version of the notes (which contains a different proof of the main result), click here.
"Farsighted Network Formation," (with B. Dutta and S. Ghosal), forthcoming, Journal of Economic Theory.
"Robert W. Rosenthal," (with R. Radner), Journal of Economic Theory 112, 365--368.
"Group Formation in Risk-Sharing Arrangements," (with G. Genicot), Review of Economic Studies 70, 87--113 (2003).
"Persistent Inequality," (with D. Mookherjee), Review of Economic Studies 70, 369--393 (2003).
"Coalition Formation as a Dynamic Process," (with H. Konishi), Journal of Economic Theory 110, 1--41 (2003).
Is Equality Stable? (with D. Mookherjee), American Economic Review 92 (Papers and Proceedings), 253--259 (2002).
Contractual Structure and Wealth Accumulation, (with D. Mookherjee), American Economic Review 92, 818--849 (2002). Note: this paper contains an appendix with details omitted. For a detailed version of the appendix, click here.
Strategy for Economic Reform in West Bengal, (with A. Banerjee, P. Bardhan, K. Basu, M. Datta Chaudhuri, M. Ghatak, A. Guha, M. Majumdar and D. Mookherjee), Economic and Political Weekly, Oct. 12, 2002.
Coalitional Power and Public Goods, (with R. Vohra), Journal of Political Economy 109, 1355--1384 (2001). For proofs of two assertions in the main paper, click here.
The Time Structure of Self-Enforcing Agreements, Econometrica 70, 547--582 (2002).
Collective Action and the Group Size Paradox (with J. Esteban), American Political Science Review 95, 663--672 (2001).
Inequality, Control Rights and Efficiency: A Study of Sugar Cooperatives in Western Maharashtra, (with A. Banerjee, D. Mookherjee and K. Munshi), Journal of Political Economy 109, 138--190 (2001).
Reinforcement Learning in Repeated Interaction Games, (with J. Bendor and D. Mookherjee), BE Press Journals in Theoretical Economics, Advances in Economic Theory 1, Issue 1, Article 3. [Link via journal.]
Aspiration-Based Reinforcement Learning in Repeated Games: An Overview (with J. Bendor and D. Mookherjee), International Game Theory Review 3, 159--174 (2001).
Contemporary Macroeconomics, (co-edited with A. Bose and A. Sarkar), Oxford University Press (2001).
Economic Development: Comment on Hoff and Stiglitz, in G. Meier and J. Stiglitz (eds), Frontiers of Development Economics, World Bank and Oxford University Press, 478--485 (2001).
What's New In Development Economics?, The American Economist 44, 3--16 (2000).
Social Decision Rules are Not Immune to Conflict (with J. Esteban), Economics of Governance 2, 59--67 (2001).
Wealth Constraints, Lobbying and the Efficiency of Public Allocation (with J. Esteban), European Economic Review 44, 694--705 (2000).
A Reader in Development Economics, with a comprehensive introduction, (with D. Mookherjee), London: Blackwell (2000).
Credit Rationing in Developing Countries: An Overview of the Theory, Chapter 11 in Readings in the Theory of Economic Development, edited by D. Mookherjee and D. Ray, London: Blackwell, 2000, pages 383--301.
Conflict and Distribution, (with J. Esteban), Journal of Economic Theory 87, 379--415 (1999)
History and Coordination Failure (with A. Adsera), Journal of Economic Growth 3, 267--276 (1998).
A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structure (with R. Vohra), Games and Economic Behavior 26, 286--336 (1999).
Development Economics, Princeton University Press, 1998.
Evolving Aspirations and Cooperation (with R. Karandikar, D. Mookherjee and F. Vega-Redondo), Journal of Economic Theory 80, 292--331 (1998).
Game-Theoretical Applications to Economics and Operations Research (edited with B. Dutta, J. Potters, T. Parthasarathy, T. Raghavan, and A. Sen), Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997.
Vertical Linkages between Formal and Informal Financial Institutions (with M. Floro), Review of Development Economics (1997).
Equilibrium Binding Agreements (with R. Vohra), Journal of Economic Theory 73, 30--78 (1997).
Cooperation in Community Interaction without Information Flows [JSTOR Link] (with P. Ghosh), Review of Economic Studies 63, 491--519 (1996).
Egalitarianism and Incentives (with K.Ueda), Journal of Economic Theory 71 (2), 324--348 (1996).
Labor Tying (with A. Mukherjee), Journal of Development Economics 47, 207--239 (1995).
Efficient Monetary Equilibrium in the Overlapping Generations Model (1994) (with J. Esteban and T. Mitra), Journal of Economic Theory 64, 372--389.
On the Measurement of Polarization [JSTOR Link](with J. Esteban), Econometrica 62(4), 819--851 (1994).
Internally-Negotiation-Proof Equilibrium Sets: Limit Behavior for Low Discounting (1994), Games and Economic Behavior 6, 162--177.
Monetary Equilibrium in the Overlapping Generations Model With Productive Capital (with A. Bose), Economic Theory 3, 697--716 (1993)
Nutrition, Adaptation and Labor Markets (1993), in P.Bardhan, M. Datta-Chaudhuri and T.N. Krishnan (eds), Essays in Honour of K.N. Raj, Oxford University Press.
A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining [JSTOR Link] (with K. Chatterjee, B. Dutta and K. Sengupta), Review of Economic Studies (1993).
Dynamic Equilibria With Unemployment Due to Undernourishment (1993) (with P. Streufert), Economic Theory.
Quantity Controls, 1993, in B. Dutta (ed.), Welfare Economics and India, Oxford University Press (with A. Sen).
Theoretical Issues in Economic Development, 1993, Oxford University Press (edited with B. Dutta, S. Gangopadhyay and D. Mookherjee).
Game Theory and Economic Applications, Proceedings, New Delhi (edited with B. Dutta, D. Mookherjee, T. Parthasarathy, T. Raghavan, S. Tijs), Springer Verlag (1992).
Contracts, Wage Differentials and Involuntary Unemployment, 1992, forthcoming in M.K. Rakshit (ed.), Themes in Economic History and Development: Essays Dedicated to Nabendu Sen.
Profitability and Concentration, 1992 in B. Dutta et al (eds.), Theoretical Issues in Economic Development, Oxford University Press (with B. Dutta, S. Gangopadhyay and K. Sengupta).
On Decentralization Under Increasing Returns (1992) in M. Majumdar (ed.), Decentralization and Economic Growth, Westview Press (with T. Mitra).
On the Economic Theory of Quantity Controls, 1992 in K. Basu and P. Nayak (eds.), Economic Theory and Development, Oxford University Press (with A. Sen).
Learning-by-Doing and Industrial Competition, 1992, in B. Dutta et al. (eds.), Theoretical in Economic Development, Oxford University Press, Spanish version published in El Trimestre Económico, 1991 (with D. Mookherjee).
Involuntary Unemployment in a Village Economy During the Slack Season, 1992, Journal of Development Economics, (with A. Mukherjee).
La Consistencia de la Financiación Autonómica en el Periodo 1986--1989, Fundación Fondo para la Investigación Económica y Social, Documentos de Trabajo 90/1992, 1992 (with J. Marqués and E. Ventura).
Excess Capacity and Entry Deterrence, Revista Española de Economfa, 1991, (with S. Gangopadhyay and K. Sengupta).
Constrained Egalitarian Allocations, 1991, Games and Economic Behavior, (with B. Dutta).
On the Competitive Pressure Induced by the Diffusion of Innovations, Journal of Economic Theory, 1991 (with D. Mookherjee).
Collusive Market Structure Under Learning-by-Doing and Increasing Returns, Review of Economic Studies, 1991 (with D. Mookherjee).
Adapting to Undernourishment: The Biological Evidence and Its Implications, in J. Dreze and A.K. Sen (eds.), The Political Economy of Hunger, 1991, Clarendon Press, Oxford (with P. Dasgupta).
The Economics of Orchards: An Exercise in Point Input Flow Output Capital Theory, Journal of Economic Theory, 1991 (with T. Mitra and R. Roy).
Why Does Asset Inequality Affect Unemployment? A Study of the Demand Composition Problem, Journal of Development Economics, 1991 (with J-M. Baland).
Increasing Returns, Economic Growth and Decentralization, in B. Dutta et al. (eds.), Economic Theory and Policy: Essays in Honour of Dipak Banerji, Oxford University Press (1990) (with M. Majumdar).
Economic Theory and Policy: Essays in Honour of Dipak Banerji, Oxford University Press (1990), (edited with B. Dutta, S. Gangopadhyay and D. Mookherjee).
Markov-Perfect Equilibrium in Altruistic Growth Economies With Production Uncertainty, Journal of Economic Theory, 1989 (with D. Bernheim).
A Consistent Bargaining Set, Journal of Economic Theory, 1989 (with B. Dutta, K. Sengupta and R. Vohra).
Credible Coalitions and the Core, International Journal of Game Theory, 1989.
A Concept of Egalitarianism Under Participation Contraints, Econometrica, 1989 (with B. Dutta).
Repeated Principal-Agent Games with Eviction, in P. Bardhan (ed.), The Economic Theory of Agrarian Institutions, Clarendon Press, Oxford (1989) (with B. Dutta and K. Sengupta).
Interlinkages and the Pattern of Competition, in P. Bardhan (ed.) The Economic Theory of Agrarian Institutions, Clarendon Press, Oxford (1989) (with K. Sengupta).
Collective Dynamic Consistency in Repeated Games, Games and Economic Behavior, 1989 (with D. Bernheim).
Economic Growth With Intergenerational Altruism, Review of Economic Studies, 1987 (with D. Bernheim).
Nonpaternalistic Intergenerational Altruism, Journal of Economic Theory, 1987.
Inequality as a Determinant of Malnutrition and Unemployment, II. Policy, Economic Journal, 1987 (with P. Dasgupta).
Inequality as a Determinant of Malnutrition and Unemployment, I. Theory, Economic Journal, 1986 (with P. Dasgupta).
An Economic Theory of Malnutrition, In I.S. Gulati and M. Shroff (eds.), Economic Theory and Underdevelopment: Essays in Honour of I.G. Patel, 1986 (with P.Dasgupta).
On the Existence of Markov-Consistent Plans Under Uncertainty, Review of Economic Studies, 1986 (with D. Bernheim).
Survival, Growth and Technical Progress in a Small Resource-Importing Economy [JSTOR], International Economic Review, 1984.
Intertemporal Borrowing to Sustain Exogenous Consumption Standards Under Uncertainty, Journal of Economic Theory, 1984.
Dynamic Optimization on a Nonconvex Feasible Set: Some General Results for NonSmooth Technologies, Zeitschrift fur Nationalokonomie, 1984 (with T. Mitra).
Efficient and Optimal Programs When Investment is Irreversible: A Duality Theory, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1983 (with T. Mitra).
Feasible Alternatives Under Deteriorating Terms of Trade, Journal of International Economics, 1982 (with M. Majumdar and T. Mitra).
Note: Book Reviews and Work in Progress available on request.
pdf version of cv | To Debraj
Ray's homepage (if you followed a different link to get here)