This material has been published in Journal of Economic Theory 73, 30--78, the only definitive repository of the content that has been certified and accepted after peer review. Copyright and all rights therein are retained by Academic Press. This material may not be copied or reposted without explicit permission. (Copyright (C) 1979 by Academic Press, Inc.).

Academic Press publishes electronically in IDEAL (International Digital Electronic Access Library) at

http://www.idealibrary.com and http://www.europe.idealibrary.com .

Open or Download Equilibrium Binding Agreements in pdf format

Debraj Ray and Rajiv Vohra

We study equilibrium binding agreements, the coalition structures that form under such agreements, and the efficiency of the outcomes that result. We analyze such agreements in a context where the payoff to each player depends on the actions of all other players. Thus a game in strategic form is a natural starting point. Unlike the device of a characteristic function, explicit attention is paid to the behavior of the complementary set of players when a coalition blocks a proposed agreement. A solution concept and its applications are discussed. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C70, C71.

Journal of Economic Theory 73, 30--78. Copyright © 1997 Academic Press