

Are Muslim Immigrants Different in terms of Cultural Integration?*

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Abstract

Using the UK Fourth National Survey of Ethnic Minorities, we explore the determinants of religious identity for Muslims and non-Muslims. We find that Muslims integrate less and more slowly than non-Muslims. In terms of estimated probability of having a strong religious identity, a Muslim born in the UK and having spent there more than 30 years is comparable with a non-Muslim just arrived in the country. We also find no evidence that segregated neighborhoods breed intense religious and cultural identities for ethnic minorities, especially for Muslims. This result casts doubts on the foundations of the integration policies in Europe.

Key words: religious identity, assimilation, Muslims.

JEL Classification: A14, J15

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1 Introduction

An intense political and intellectual debate is taking place in Europe on migration issues. Rather than being centered on the economic costs and benefits of such inflows, the debate has instead focused on the perceived costs and benefits of cultural diversity.

This debate has been particularly intense with respect to Muslim immigrants. The recent (November 2005) riots in Paris' suburbs, the terrorist attacks in Madrid (March 2004) and London (July 2005), the riots in many Muslim communities after the publications of vignettes representing the prophet Mohammed in a Danish newspaper (February 2006), all are sparking doubts and worries about the ability and the willingness of Muslim immigrants to assimilate into Western societies.

Using the UK Fourth National Survey of Ethnic Minorities (FNSEM), we attempt a first empirical analysis of religious identity. We especially examine whether there are quantitative and qualitative differences in the process of cultural integration between Muslims and other UK minorities (e.g., Carribeans, Chinese, non-Muslim Indians).

We find a stronger *intensity of religious identity* on the part of the Muslims. Muslim and non-Muslim immigrants however differ in terms of several demographic and socio-economic characteristics, like e.g., age of arrival in the UK, education, income, which could in principle explain their different observed attitudes towards *religious identity* and integration. We therefore attempt at identifying the relative contribution of the different demographic and socio-economic characteristics in shaping the integration process of Muslims and non-Muslims. Our analysis reveals that the integration pattern adopted by Muslim immigrants in the UK contains in fact several important specific aspects. In particular, Muslims do not seem to assimilate with the time spent in the UK, or at least they seem to do so at a much slower rate than non-Muslims. Also, education does not seem to have any effect on the attenuation of their identity, and job qualification as well as living in neighborhoods with low unemployment rates seem to accentuate rather than moderate identity formation for Muslims.

Moreover, for Muslims more than for non-Muslims, there is no evidence that segregated neighborhoods breed intense religious and cultural identities. Finally, discrimination, which turns out to be more frequent in less segregated neighborhoods, does consistently generate intense identity, more so for Muslims. We interpret these last results as casting some doubts on integration policies, which favor the formation of geographical integration and mixed neighborhoods.

2 Description of the data

The Fourth National Survey of Ethnic Minorities (FNSEM) was collected in 1993/94 in the UK by the Policy Studies Institute. The FNSEM over-samples ethnic minority groups (see Modood et al., 1997, for details) and provides extensive information about respondents' identification with their own ethnic and religious group. The ethnic population is composed of six groups (Caribbean, Indian, Pakistani, African-Asian, Bangladeshi, and Chinese),¹ several of which having a significant Muslim component; notably Pakistanis and Bangladeshis are predominantly Muslim, while Indians and African-Asians have substantial Muslim minorities. The data are merged with the 1991 Census in order to get valuable information of each individual's residential ward.²

The FNSEM contains a number of questions providing information on different dimensions of identity, in particular (*i*) importance of religion, (*ii*) attitudes towards inter-marriage and (*iii*) the relevance of ethnicity in influencing the kind of school families want for their children. We use the answers to these questions to measure the *intensity* of each individual's *religious identity*. Each answer is coded as a dichotomous variable. The first (*i*) takes value one if the individual considers very important the role of religion in his/her life and zero otherwise; the second (*ii*) takes value one if the individual would mind very much if a close relative were to marry a white person; the third (*iii*) takes value one if the reported (desired) proportion of one's ethnic group in the children's school is more than a half and zero otherwise. These three alternative indicators of religious identity are used in our analysis in turn. We obtain a final sample of 5,963 individuals, divided between 3,594 non-Muslims and 2,369 Muslims (roughly 40% of the total).

Table 1 displays the descriptive statistics of our variables, differentiating between Muslims and non-Muslims. The average Muslim individual clearly appears to be more attached to his/her culture of origin. Indeed, regardless of the dimension of identity considered, the percentage of Muslims having an intense religious identity is roughly twice as much as that of a non-Muslim. A greater resistance to cultural integration is also signaled by the percentage of Muslims speaking English at home or with friends, always significantly lower than for non-Muslims. Finally, Muslims have almost twice the probability of having a marriage arranged by their parents

¹For historical reasons Black Africans were not included. Furthermore, the survey only covers England and Wales.

²A UK Census ward contains on average 3,000-4,000 residents.

than non-Muslims, also a sign of attachment to cultural and religious traditions. Importantly, the stronger resistance to integration for Muslims can hardly be explained by differences in the time spent in the UK since it is (on average) not statistically different between Muslims and non-Muslims. However, on average, Muslims are less educated than non-Muslims, with a lower household income, and with more than a double probability to be unemployed. Muslims also live in more ethnic segregated areas, which have higher unemployment rates.

[Insert Table 1 here]

3 What determines a strong religious identity?

We estimate a probit model in which the outcome variable is the *intensity of religious identity*. Our three indicators of identity are used as three alternative dependent variables. The estimation results for these three different specifications are reported in Table 2, for Muslims and non-Muslims separately. In addition to an extensive set of individuals' observable characteristics, we gradually introduce variables aiming at capturing the influence of the social environment (family, friends, neighbors) and workplace, using the language typically spoken in the family, with friends and at the workplace. Differences in income and wealth across individuals are accounted for by the inclusion of household income. We also include the ward percentage of own ethnic group residents and the ward unemployment rate. Finally, we include a measure of the average discrimination suffered by individuals in the sample for each ethnic group. We report in Table 2 the estimation results for the model specifications that include the more extensive set of explanatory variables.

We find that the responsiveness to the different variables varies largely between Muslims and non-Muslims. For the latter, a high level of education (being highly educated in Britain) and a high qualification (being a manager) are among the most important factors that reduce their sense of identity. For Muslims, instead, education does not seem to have any effect on the attenuation of their identity and, on the contrary, being a manager as well as having a high income seem to strengthen their religious faith. Also, Muslims living in areas with a lower unemployment rate seem to display a higher sense of identity. Having in mind Table 1, the picture that emerges is that, although Muslims are poorer and less likely to become managers than non-Muslims, those who succeed show a stronger religious

faith.

[Insert Table 2 here]

Most importantly, even after conditioning on the various individual and contextual demographic and socio-economic characteristics discussed above, the speed of cultural integration is lower for Muslims than for non-Muslims. While for non-Muslims, the longer the time spent in the UK, the more attenuate is the attachment to their culture of origin, for Muslims the number of years since arrival does not have any effect on their inclination to assimilate. Being born in the UK decreases the intensity of religious identity also for Muslims, but this impact is more than twice as high for non-Muslims than for Muslims. Furthermore, keeping constant the time spent in the UK, the effect of the age at arrival, although being not statistically significant, is negative for the Muslims and positive for the non-Muslims. This possibly indicates that a strong identity is picked up by the Muslims in the UK, rather than being carried over from personal experiences or memories from the country of origin. This also appears as a specificity of the Muslims' integration pattern.

Interesting (and perhaps surprising) results are obtained also with regard to the dependence of identity on the neighborhood composition. We find that living in a more integrated neighborhood (i.e. with a lower percentage of own ethnic/religious minority group) and speaking English at work, which signals a mixed working environment, are both associated with a higher sense of identity. This integration pattern is common to both Muslims and non-Muslims, but it appears to be more marked for Muslims.³ It suggests that intense forms of identities appear to be formed in social contexts in which the minority ethnic/religious trait is more exposed to the interaction with the majority norm of behavior. It should be noted that episodes of harassment and discrimination tend to have relatively higher frequency in less segregated neighborhoods.⁴ Consistently, the (average)

³If ethnic minorities congregate in specific neighborhoods because of some unobservable characteristics that affect their religious identity, our analysis of the relationship between neighborhood segregation and identity would be invalid and the estimates biased. More specifically, to invalidate our analysis, it would be required that immigrants with stronger preferences for religious identity endogenously choose to reside in less segregated neighborhoods. While this appears counter-intuitive, we formally and directly address this issue in Bisin et al. (2007) by showing that results are qualitatively unchanged when we restrict the sample to a subset of respondents who are arguably "constrained" on where they live.

⁴In our data, the frequency of serious episodes of racial harassment (like e.g., attacks) is more than double in mixed than in segregated neighborhoods (19% and 9% respectively).

discrimination of own ethnicity experienced by individuals in the sample has a positive effect on identity, and such effect is stronger for Muslims than for non-Muslims.

4 Discussion of results and policy implications

Muslims in our data integrate less and more slowly than non-Muslims, even after conditioning on a rich set of individual and contextual demographic and socio-economic characteristics. As an illustration, we show in Figure 1 the integration patterns over time for first and second generation immigrants, for Muslims and non-Muslims separately.⁵




Figure 1. Integration patterns over time

Within each group, second generation immigrants have a lower probability of showing a high attachment to their culture of origin over time, but

⁵These results are obtained from the estimation of a specification of our model where interaction terms between the dummy “born in the UK” and “time spent in the UK” (that is equal to “age” if born in the UK and to “years since arrival” otherwise) and its square have been added. We plot the marginal effects (i.e. the changes in the average probability of having a strong religious identity following a one-year increase) for each point in time that are obtained when using “importance of religion” as dependent variable. The graphs remain qualitatively unchanged when using our alternative measures of religious identity.

this reduction is more marked for non-Muslims than for Muslims. More interestingly, the years spent in the UK decrease the level of religious identity of non-Muslims, whereas they have virtually no effect for Muslims. The marginal effects (i.e. changes in the probability of having a strong religious identity following a one-year increase in the time spent in the UK) decline for both Muslims and non-Muslims, but the average effect over time is less than 1% for Muslims and more than 3% for non-Muslims. Figure 1 also shows that, when the effects of our large set of individual and contextual characteristics have been accounted for, a Muslim born in the UK and having spent there more than 50 years has on average the same probability of having a strong religious identity as a first generation non-Muslim who has been in the UK for less than 20 years. Second generation Muslims never achieve the (lower) level of probability of having a strong religious identity of second generation non-Muslims at any point in time.

These results are at odds with that of Manning and Roy (2007) who, using the UK Labour Force Survey in 2001, find “no evidence of a culture clash in general, and one connected with Muslims in particular.” More specifically, Manning and Roy (2007) adopt a measure of integration constructed from answers to the question: “What do you consider your national identity to be? Please choose as many or as few as apply.” Using this measure they document that a large fraction of those individual in the sample who are born in Britain actually report a British *national identity* and that such fraction is larger for third than for second generation immigrants. The measure of integration adopted in our paper is however conceptually distinct, as it is constructed from questions regarding *importance of religion*, *attitude towards inter-marriage*, and *importance of racial composition in schools*. It is very well possible that integration in terms of national identity follows a very different pattern than the integration in terms of attitudes towards religion, marriage, and schooling. Consistently with this explanation, Constant et al. (2006) adopt a definition of integration that accounts for several cultural and religious factors, including social interactions, and find significantly different integration patterns for Muslims and Christians in Germany.

Another result of our analysis is that we find no evidence that segregated neighborhoods breed intense religious and cultural identities. While this result might appear surprising, it is consistent with other documented evidence of identity formation. Notably, Fryer and Torelli (2005) find that “acting white” behavioral norms among blacks in the US (i.e., associating academic success to lack of identity) are more developed in racially mixed schools. Putnam (2007) also documents a negative effect of ethnic het-

erogeneity at the neighborhood level on social capital in the US . Finally, Bisin et al. (2004) show that religious socialization across US states is more intense when a religion is in minority.

We should be very careful before drawing policy implications from our analysis. First of all we only have data for the mid-90's. Most importantly, we are simply documenting differences in behavior across groups rather than causal relationships. Nonetheless the lack of evidence that segregated neighborhoods breed intense religious and cultural identities is important since it stands in contrast with the intellectual foundation of most immigration policies in Europe, which advocate social mixing in order to assimilate and/or integrate ethnic minorities. The recent ethnic and racial riots mentioned in the introduction are certainly an indication that the different European integration policies have not been very successful. Our empirical results suggest that the intense and oppositional identities that give rise to such social conflicts are not directly favored by the segregation of the neighborhood in which ethnic and racial minorities tend to live.

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Table 1: Description of data¹

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Explanation of the variable</i>	<i>Muslim</i>		<i>Non-Muslim</i>	
		<i>n.obs: 2,369</i>	<i>n.obs: 3,594</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>St.dev.</i>
Importance of religion***	In the text	79.15	13.32	42.05	16.66
Attitude towards inter-marriage***	In the text	70.10	10.42	36.91	12.43
Importance of racial composition in schools***	In the text	64.65	21.34	33.45	15.35
Age at arrival*	Respondent's age in years at arrival in the UK	39.18	12.68	42.57	13.20
Female	Dummy variable taking value one if the respondent is female.	0.47	0.50	0.48	0.50
Born in the UK***	Dummy variable taking value one if the respondent is born in the UK	0.21	0.24	0.28	0.30
Arranged Marriage***	Dummy variable taking value one if the husband/wife of the respondent has been chosen by the parents.	0.22	0.16	0.12	0.11
Discrimination	Dummy variable taking value one if the respondent had been refused a job at least once or had been treated unfairly at work with regard to promotion or a move to a better position or has been attacked or insulted in the last year for reasons to do with race or colour, or religious or cultural background.	0.17	0.22	0.19	0.27
Children**	Number of respondent's children.	2.17	1.24	1.68	0.75
Years since arrival	Number of years since respondent's arrival in UK.	26.43	10.27	27.08	10.03
No British education**	Dummy variable taking value one if the respondent has no UK qualification	0.81	0.37	0.52	0.50
British basic education**	Dummy variable taking value one if the respondent has a UK basic level of education.	0.06	0.24	0.13	0.36
British high education**	Dummy variable taking value one if the respondent has a UK A-level (or equivalent) or above qualification.	0.08	0.17	0.16	0.46
Foreign education	Dummy variable taking value one if the respondent has a qualification achieved abroad.	0.25	0.43	0.29	0.46
Unemployed**	Dummy variable taking value one if the respondent is unemployed.	0.19	0.39	0.08	0.27
Self-employed**	Dummy variable taking value one if the respondent is self-employed.	0.09	0.29	0.14	0.34
Manager**	Dummy variable taking value one if the respondent is a manager.	0.02	0.11	0.04	0.20
Employee***	Dummy variable taking value one if the respondent is an (unskilled) employee	0.38	0.49	0.59	0.49
No parents**	Dummy variable taking value one if both respondent's parents are dead or if both live away from respondent.	0.34	0.47	0.32	0.47
Parents' physical contacts**	Number of times the respondent has seen the parents in the last four weeks.	3.05	7.01	3.87	7.06
Parents' telephone calls***	Number of times the respondent has spoken to the parents on the telephone in the last four weeks.	3.38	7.05	4.74	7.48

¹T-tests for differences in means across groups are performed. Variables marked with * (**) [***] denote differences in mean values that are significant at the 10 (5) [1] percent level

Parents' letters***	Number of letters received by the parents in the last four weeks.	0.67	1.10	0.37	0.77
English spoken at home (older)***	Dummy variable taking value one if English is the language normally spoken at home by the respondent to members of the family who are older.	0.03	0.18	0.08	0.27
English spoken at home (younger)**	Dummy variable taking value one if English is the language normally spoken at home by the respondent to members of the family who are younger.	0.20	0.40	0.25	0.43
English spoken with friends**	Dummy variable taking value one if English is the language normally spoken with friends (outside work) by the respondent.	0.22	0.42	0.27	0.44
English spoken at work***	Dummy variable taking value one if English is the language normally spoken at work by the respondent.	0.19	0.40	0.27	0.44
Household income***	Respondent's household total income from all sources, before tax (divided in sixteen classes, mean value taken for each class).	200.74	135.31	330.26	207.72
Discrimination of own ethnicity*	Percentage of own ethnic group individuals that have experienced racial discrimination.	21.16	17.09	18.08	16.90
Ward density of own ethnicity**	Percentage of residents of the respondent's ethnic group in the ward	15.20	11.20	11.63	9.96
Ward unemployment rate**	Ward unemployment rate	16.67	4.46	12.60	5.07

Table 2: The development of an identity²

Dependent variable: (1) Importance of religion, (2) Attitude towards inter-marriage, (3) Importance of racial composition in schools

Variable	(1)		(2)		(3)	
	Muslim	Non-Muslim	Muslim	Non-Muslim	Muslim	Non-Muslim
	Marginal effect	Marginal effect	Marginal effect	Marginal effect	Marginal effect	Marginal effect
	(p-value)	(p-value)	(p-value)	(p-value)	(p-value)	(p-value)
Age at arrival	-0.0069 (0.1754)	0.0081 (0.3302)	-0.0046 (0.2317)	0.0058 (0.3993)	-0.0106 (0.2175)	0.0098 (0.3630)
Female	0.0177 (0.2155)	-0.0191 (0.3144)	0.0217 (0.2015)	0.0112 (0.3011)	0.0451 (0.2661)	-0.0319 (0.3331)
Born in the UK	-0.0089** (0.0151)	-0.0189** (0.0188)	-0.0133** (0.0120)	-0.0389*** (0.0085)	-0.0210** (0.0251)	-0.0418** (0.0388)
Arranged marriage	0.0119** (0.0153)	0.0236 (0.1221)	0.0311** (0.0103)	0.0523 (0.0666)	0.0541** (0.0111)	0.1023 (0.1002)
Discrimination	0.0672** (0.0450)	0.0405** (0.0379)	0.0650** (0.0451)	0.0398** (0.0307)	0.0965*** (0.0074)	0.0554*** (0.0037)
Children	0.0759** (0.0120)	0.0605** (0.0295)	0.0799** (0.0115)	0.0669** (0.0209)	0.1575** (0.0120)	0.1306** (0.0129)
Years since arrival	-0.0070* (0.0722)	-0.0212** (0.0190)	-0.0079 (0.1022)	-0.0259** (0.0112)	-0.0107 (0.1001)	-0.0475** (0.0201)
No British education	0.0210 (0.4039)	0.0599 (0.2997)	0.0249 (0.4153)	0.0665 (0.2655)	0.1024 (0.3970)	0.1575 (0.2876)

²Marginal effects at the sample means; results weighted for population proportions; a constant and regional dummies are included; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

British basic education	0.0002 (0.3645)	0.0015 (0.2370)	0.0001 (0.3224)	0.0010 (0.2095)	0.0100 (0.2465)	0.0201 (0.1720)
British high education	-0.0513 (0.3457)	-0.0807*** (0.0010)	-0.0533 (0.3045)	-0.0888*** (0.0007)	-0.0633 (0.4335)	-0.1070*** (0.0026)
Foreign education	0.0346 (0.2425)	0.0501*** (0.0032)	0.0366 (0.2624)	0.0601** (0.0123)	0.0469 (0.2825)	0.0580** (0.0223)
Unemployed	-0.0542 (0.2190)	0.1003 (0.3971)	-0.0492 (0.1990)	0.0985 (0.3884)	-0.0742 (0.2905)	0.1440 (0.4559)
Self-employed	0.0105 (0.2219)	0.0048 (0.2950)	0.0118 (0.3192)	-0.0085 (0.3504)	0.0105 (0.1870)	-0.0034 (0.2512)
Manager	0.0651** (0.0235)	-0.0499* (0.0813)	0.0617** (0.0204)	-0.0485** (0.0487)	0.0717** (0.0211)	-0.0928*** (0.0078)
Employee	0.0672 (0.5020)	0.0605 (0.6042)	0.0702 (0.5332)	0.0635 (0.6217)	0.1720 (0.5920)	0.1663 (0.6817)
No parents	0.0508** (0.0144)	0.0122 (0.1121)	0.0598** (0.0164)	0.0169 (0.1320)	0.0435** (0.0105)	0.0115 (0.1066)
Parents' physical contacts	0.0464** (0.0130)	0.0158 (0.1765)	0.0699*** (0.0099)	0.0300 (0.1585)	0.0434** (0.0333)	0.0113* (0.0918)
Parents' telephone calls	0.0349** (0.0405)	0.0070 (0.3345)	0.0432** (0.0345)	0.0175 (0.4053)	0.0243** (0.0459)	0.0037 (0.3445)
Parents' letters	0.0708*** (0.0076)	0.0205** (0.0302)	0.0678** (0.0162)	0.0211** (0.0212)	0.0978*** (0.0062)	0.0520*** (0.0012)
English spoken at home (older)	-0.0999** (0.0177)	-0.0755** (0.0209)	-0.1091** (0.0195)	-0.0555** (0.0225)	-0.1901*** (0.0003)	-0.1555** (0.0129)
English spoken at home (younger)	-0.0458** (0.0117)	-0.0321 (0.1436)	-0.0576** (0.0312)	-0.0389 (0.1036)	-0.0596** (0.0412)	-0.0369 (0.1553)
English spoken at work	0.0707* (0.0762)	0.0198* (0.0798)	0.0697* (0.0902)	0.0210* (0.0989)	0.0509* (0.0602)	0.0102* (0.0799)
English spoken with friends	-0.0672** (0.0306)	-0.0340** (0.0478)	-0.0671*** (0.0077)	-0.0414** (0.0500)	-0.0772*** (0.0076)	-0.0540** (0.0482)
Household income	0.0009** (0.0201)	-0.0005 (0.4557)	0.0017** (0.0253)	-0.0010 (0.4253)	0.0019** (0.0121)	-0.0015 (0.4075)
Discrimination of own ethnicity	0.0801*** (0.0066)	0.0500** (0.0135)	0.0880*** (0.0026)	0.0560*** (0.0093)	0.1400*** (0.0026)	0.1131*** (0.0035)
Ward density of own ethnic group	-0.0193** (0.0128)	-0.0098** (0.0345)	-0.0173** (0.0180)	-0.0086** (0.0359)	-0.0201** (0.0185)	-0.0058** (0.0450)
Ward unemployment rate	-0.0280** (0.0413)	0.0199 (0.3269)	-0.0289** (0.0430)	0.0189 (0.3355)	-0.0442** (0.0370)	0.0192 (0.3009)
