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# *An Empirical Investigation of the Dynamics of PAC Contributions\**

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We study the extent to which PACs target the members and chairs of particular congressional committees, by estimating the effects of *changes* in a representative's committee and leadership assignments on *changes* in the pattern of PAC contributions received by the representative. We find strong evidence that ties exist between certain types of PACs and congressional committees. In addition, the analysis reveals interesting asymmetries in the propensity of PACs to add or drop members who change their committee assignments.

## **Introduction**

For nearly two decades, scholars have worked to explain the pattern of campaign contributions by political action committees (PACs) in U.S. congressional elections. The earlier studies in this literature tended to focus on the effects of candidates' party affiliations, incumbency status, and competitiveness on the allocation of PAC contributions (e.g., Welch 1979, 1980; Jacobson 1980; Malbin 1980; Herndon 1982). More recent studies have gone on to examine the relative importance of more detailed characteristics of representatives, especially their committee and subcommittee assignments, party and committee leadership positions, seniority, and roll call voting records (e.g., Gopoian 1984; Poole and Romer 1985; Wright 1985; Grier and Munger 1986, 1991, 1993; Poole, Romer, and Rosenthal 1987; Grenzke 1989a; Munger 1989; Grier, Munger, and Torrent 1990; Theilmann and Wilhite 1991). One goal of the latter group of studies is to determine the extent to which PACs contribute disproportionately to members and chairs of the committees and subcommittees whose policy jurisdictions are of most concern to the PACs.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>The logic underlying the hypothesis that PAC contributions should be influenced by committee assignments relies on three key premises. First, it is assumed that special interest

The work on PAC-committee relationships has established that links appear to exist in some cases, but the full extent and overall importance of these relationships is still unclear. For example, Gopoian (1984) found significant, positive correlations between the contributions of nine selected defense industry PACs and membership on particular committees hypothesized to be relevant to the defense industry (the Armed Services Committee and the Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense). On the other hand, he found that the hypothesized correlations between contributions and committee membership were insignificant for three out of six selected labor PACs, three out of three automobile manufacturers' PACs, and 13 out of 14 oil industry PACs. Similarly, Grenzke (1989a) found significant relationships between contributions and her "agenda power index" for four PACs, but insignificant relationships for five others. Grier and Munger's (1991, 1993) results are more supportive, but even they found several unexpected results. And in his study of five PACs, Wright (1985) concludes that except for two cases, "there is little clear evidence that committee and leadership positions elicited large contributions."<sup>2</sup>

In this paper, we take a dynamic approach to the problem of identifying PAC-committee relationships. More specifically, we examine the effects of *changes* in a representative's committee and leadership assignments on *changes* in the pattern of PAC contributions received by the representative. Assuming that different PACs tend to favor different committees, we should expect that if a representative switches committees or moves into a committee leadership position, then the pattern of his or

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groups typically have more influence in the earlier stages of congressional decision making than in later stages. Scholars have long argued that this is the case and, in particular, that most special interest groups are more effective in placing items on the agenda and shaping legislative details than they are in influencing voting on the House or Senate floor. Second, it is assumed that the jurisdictional division of labor that is a key feature of the congressional committee systems implies that the issues of most concern to most special interest groups are handled by only a few committees. Treating PACs as the financial arm of special interest groups, these two assumptions imply that PACs should concentrate their contributions on members of the committees that deal with the policies of most concern to their parent organization. The third assumption is that PACs act as rational agents striving to maximize the influence of some special interest group and, therefore, concentrate their contributions on the members of particular committees.

<sup>2</sup>Munger (1989) conducted chi-square tests for a number of industries and in most cases rejected the hypothesis that the industry's PAC contributions were unrelated to committee assignments. However, the chi-square tests treat all PAC-representative pairs as independent observations. This assumption is very strong (since there are many "similar" representatives and many "similar" PACs within each industry) and biases the results toward rejecting the null hypothesis that PACs do not target committees.

her contributions will tend to change more than the pattern for a representative who does not change committee positions.<sup>3</sup>

To measure changes in the pattern of contributions, we first define each representative's PAC contribution vector for a given election. Each element of this vector gives the total contributions the representative receives from a particular PAC. After choosing an appropriate metric, we can measure the change in a representative's contribution pattern between two elections simply as the distance between his or her PAC contribution vectors in the two elections. For example, if we treat a positive contribution as one and zero contribution as zero, then the distance between the representative's two PAC contribution vectors is simply the number of elements of the two vectors that differ.

This dynamic approach has several advantages. First, we avoid having to make specific assumptions about which committees are relevant to which PACs or types of PACs. In all previous studies, researchers were required to postulate a priori the committees that are relevant to a particular PAC or set of PACs. In some cases, the choices are fairly straightforward; for example, PACs representing agricultural producer groups should probably be drawn to the agriculture committees and the agriculture subcommittees of the appropriations committees. In many cases, however, the choices are not so obvious. For example, to define the relevant committees for the PACs in his study, Gopojan (1984) solicited the advice of "five nationally recognized congressional scholars." Munger (1989) and Grier and Munger (1991) used the *Congressional Directory* and the Rules of the House of Representatives to match PACs and committees, but admit that "documents are vague and general in their description. . . . As a result, this matching must necessarily contain some subjective judgment" (Munger 1989, 185).<sup>4</sup> The difficulties inherent

<sup>3</sup>Some previous studies have examined other dynamic aspects of PAC contribution patterns. For example, Grier and Munger (1991, 1993) estimate equations for different time periods and discuss how certain committees appear to have become more important to certain types of PACs over time.

<sup>4</sup>Labor PACs provide an example of the difficulty in making matches. Gopojan (1984) decided that the relevant House committees for labor PACs were the Ways and Means Committee, the Post Office and Civil Service Committee, the Appropriations Subcommittee on Labor-HEW, and six subcommittees of the Education and Labor Committee that deal with labor matters. In contrast, Grier and Munger (1991) hypothesized that the relevant committees for labor PACs were the Education and Labor Committee and the Post Office and Civil Service Committee. They also hypothesized that contributions from labor PACs would be *lower* to members of the Ways and Means committee, the Energy and Commerce Committee, and the Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs Committee, under the assumption that these committees are designed to serve corporations and trade associations. Thus, not

in matching PACs and committees may be one reason for the somewhat mixed results of previous studies.<sup>5</sup>

Another advantage of the dynamic approach is that we can distinguish between adding and dropping PACs. For example, if committee seniority is important, then representatives who switch committees and thereby move from the middle of one ladder to the bottom of another may lose contributions more quickly than they gain them. Alternatively, if it is important for PACs to develop and maintain long-term relationships with representatives to achieve their goals, then there may be a tendency for PACs to continue contributing to representatives to whom they have contributed in the past, even those who move off the committees that the PACs consider to be most relevant.<sup>6</sup>

A third advantage of studying changes rather than levels is that it helps solve the problem of controlling for other factors. If there are unmeasured or poorly measured factors that affect the value of different PAC-candidate matches and are also correlated with included variables, then cross-sectional regressions will produce biased estimates. However, if these factors are relatively fixed over time, then regressions involving differences will not be biased. One potentially important factor in the context of PAC contributions is constituency preference. It is likely that the preferences of a representative's constituents influence both the representative's optimal committee portfolio and also the representative's propensity to serve various special interests (i.e., the costs associated with serving various special interests; see Denzau and Munger 1986 and Grier and Munger 1991, 1993). However, it is difficult to obtain reliable and accurate measures of constituency preferences, especially over specific policy areas. By contrast, it is probably safe to take these preferences as fixed, at least over periods of two years.

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only was there disagreement between Gopoian and Grier and Munger about which committees are relevant to labor PACs, but for one key committee, Ways and Means, their hypotheses were antithetical.

<sup>5</sup>Grenzke (1989a, 1989b) used an arguably more objective criterion. She calculated her agenda power indices only for PACs whose parent interest groups published ratings based on roll call votes, and she used the number of bills included in the PACs' ratings handled by each committee to determine how relevant various committees were to a PAC. While this approach has obvious merits, its scope is limited because few groups publish ratings.

<sup>6</sup>Grenzke noted that several PAC officials she interviewed mentioned the importance of establishing early contacts with representatives, and one official stated that "it could take more than eight years of contributions [to a member] before the member becomes favorably predisposed toward the PAC" (1989b, 12). Snyder (1992) found patterns in PAC contributions suggesting that long-term relationships may be important for a large number of PACs.

In our empirical analysis, we apply the dynamic framework to data on U.S. House races over the period 1980–88. This analysis reveals two important findings. First, we find strong support for the hypothesis that significant PAC-committee ties exist, especially for corporate and trade association PACs. Our second finding, however, is that underlying these ties are more complex intertemporal relationships. Moves to certain committees appear to cause new PACs to begin contributing to a representative and also to cause currently contributing PACs to continue contributing. Moves to most other committees, however, appear to cause PACs to abandon representatives, and these lost contributions are not replaced at an equal rate by new PAC contributors. This suggests that many PACs value committee seniority or committee expertise, not simply committee assignments. A member who switches committees loses the seniority earned on his or her previous assignment, and it may take several years to acquire expertise in the details of policy in the new committee's jurisdiction.

Before proceeding, we must point out that our dynamic approach is not without its own limitations. Some judgment is involved in deciding how to measure the change in a PAC's contribution to a candidate. For example, is there an important difference between a PAC that changes its contribution from \$0 to \$500 and a PAC that changes its contribution from \$2,000 to \$2,500? Both changes involve an increase of \$500, but it is arguable that the former is more significant because of the existence of a barrier at \$0 that is difficult to cross, while the latter involves an easier, marginal adjustment. (Poole, Romer, and Rosenthal 1987 found it much easier to explain a PAC's decisions to contribute or not to contribute to a candidate than to explain the amount of the contribution, which suggests that such a barrier exists.) Also, we must decide what attributes constitute important and unimportant changes in a representative's portfolio of committee assignments. These are not insurmountable problems, however, and are probably easier than matching PACs and committee jurisdictions.

### **Measuring Changes in the Pattern of Contributions**

In this section, we briefly describe how we measure changes in contribution patterns. Consider a sequence of election cycles (each two years long; e.g., 1981–82 or 1985–86), dated  $t = 1, 2, \dots, T$ . We are interested in measuring changes from one election cycle to the next and therefore define variables in terms of observations on consecutive pairs of election cycles.

Let  $j = 1, \dots, J$  index the candidates who run for election in both elections of a given pair of cycles (e.g., a candidate who runs in both the

1982 and 1984 elections), and let  $k = 1, \dots, K$  index PACs. Let  $C_{jkt}$  be a measure of the contribution by PAC  $k$  to candidate  $j$  in election cycle  $t$ . We define the contribution change variable  $\Delta_{jkt}$  as follows:

$$\Delta_{jkt} = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } |C_{jk,t+1} - C_{jkt}| \geq D \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \quad (1)$$

where  $D > 0$  is a constant.

Similarly, we define the contribution increase and decrease variables,  $\Delta_{jkt}^+$  and  $\Delta_{jkt}^-$ , as follows:

$$\Delta_{jkt}^+ = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } C_{jk,t+1} - C_{jkt} \geq D \\ 0 & \text{otherwise,} \end{cases} \quad (2)$$

and

$$\Delta_{jkt}^- = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } C_{jk,t+1} - C_{jkt} \leq -D \\ 0 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases} \quad (3)$$

We then define measures of the overall contribution changes for each candidate from cycle  $t$  to cycle  $t + 1$  by:

$$\Delta_{jt} = \sum_{k=1}^K \Delta_{jkt}, \quad \Delta_{jt}^+ = \sum_{k=1}^K \Delta_{jkt}^+, \quad \Delta_{jt}^- = \sum_{k=1}^K \Delta_{jkt}^-. \quad (4)$$

We refer to  $\Delta_{jt}$ ,  $\Delta_{jt}^+$ , and  $\Delta_{jt}^-$  as the *change index*, *add index*, and *drop index*, respectively. Note that  $\Delta_{jt} = \Delta_{jt}^+ + \Delta_{jt}^-$ . Where there is no ambiguity, we shall drop the subscripts and refer simply to  $\Delta$ ,  $\Delta^+$ , or  $\Delta^-$ .

The interpretation of the change indices can be varied by changing the definition of the contribution measure  $C_{jkt}$ . As we noted earlier, Poole, Romer, and Rosenthal (1987) found it much easier to explain PACs' decisions to contribute or not to contribute to various candidates than to explain contribution amounts. This suggests that for many PACs the criteria used to choose which candidates to support are different from, and perhaps more straightforward than, the criteria used to choose contribution levels. It may therefore be useful to define  $C_{jkt}$  as a dichotomous variable equal to one if PAC  $k$  contributed to candidate  $j$  in cycle  $t$  (regardless of the dollar amount contributed), and zero otherwise.<sup>7</sup> Then, setting  $D = 1$ ,  $\Delta_{jt}$  counts the number of PACs that switched from contributing to candidate  $j$  in election cycle  $t$  to not contributing in cycle  $t + 1$ , or

<sup>7</sup>One might also wish to ignore "trivial" contributions and define  $C_{jkt}$  as a dummy variable that takes on a value of one if and only if  $k$  made a contribution to  $j$  of more than, say, \$100.

vice versa. The add index in this case counts the number of PACs that switched from not giving to giving, and the drop index counts the number of PACs that switched from giving to not giving. When using this definition of  $C_{jkt}$ , we shall write the change indices as  $\Delta(01)$ ,  $\Delta^+(01)$ , and  $\Delta^-(01)$ .

Alternatively, we may be interested in contribution changes larger than some minimum dollar amount. This makes sense, for example, if decision-making costs cause PACs to make small, automatic changes in the amounts contributed to various candidates as their budgets change. We can treat such cases by defining  $C_{jkt}$  as the dollar amount contributed by  $k$  to  $j$  in cycle  $t$ , and picking  $D > 0$  to be the minimum change. The change index  $\Delta$  then gives the number of PACs whose contribution to a candidate rose or fell by at least  $D$  dollars from one cycle to the next. We use the notation  $\Delta(D)$ ,  $\Delta^+(D)$ , and  $\Delta^-(D)$  for this type of case.

### Data and Variables

Our data cover races for seats to the U.S. House of Representatives for the election cycles of 1979–80 through 1987–88.<sup>8</sup> These five election cycles provide change variables for four successive election pairs: 1980–82, 1982–84, 1984–86, and 1986–88. In each election pair, we include all representatives who ran as incumbents in both general elections of the pair; we omit representatives who were involved in special elections in the first cycle of the pair. This leaves 297 incumbents for 1980–82, 314 for 1982–84, 341 for 1984–86, and 351 for 1986–88. The pooled sample thus has 1,303 observations.

Our dependent variables measure changes in PAC contribution patterns as described above. For each election pair, we include all PACs that contributed at least \$5,000 to House races in *both* election cycles in the pair. Also, we distinguish between large and small PACs and between different types of PACs as defined by the Federal Election Commission (FEC): corporation, labor, trade association, cooperative, and nonconnected. We define large PACs as those that contributed at least \$100,000 to House races in each cycle of a pair and small PACs as those that contributed less than \$100,000 in each cycle.<sup>9</sup>

For each representative in our sample, we tracked changes in

<sup>8</sup>Data on campaign contributions and expenditures are from the Federal Election Commission, *FEC Reports on Financial Activity*. Data on vote percentages are from *The Congressional Quarterly Almanac* and *The Almanac of American Politics*. Data on committee assignments are from *Congressional Quarterly Almanac*, various *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Reports*, and *The Commerce Clearing House*.

<sup>9</sup>PACs that contributed at least \$100,000 in one cycle of a pair, and less than \$100,000 in the other cycle, are neither large nor small.

committee assignments and committee leadership positions from the 96th through the 100th Congresses. Using this information, we define several dummy variables indicating moves to and from committees or groups of committees. Given the relative prestige and jurisdictional scope of the exclusive committees, it is natural to begin by distinguishing them from other committees. Therefore, we define:

- $EXCLUS_{jt}$  = 1 if member  $j$  moved to or from an exclusive committee (Appropriations, Rules, Ways and Means) between  $t$  and  $t + 1$ .
- $OTHER1_{jt}$  = 1 if member  $j$  moved from one nonexclusive committee to another (except House Administration, District of Columbia, and Standards of Official Conduct) between  $t$  and  $t + 1$ .

In addition, conventional wisdom among congressional scholars about the special importance of Ways and Means and Energy and Commerce during the period of our study suggests that these two committees may deserve special treatment. Evidence from previous research that members of Ways and Means and Energy and Commerce receive greater PAC contributions (e.g., Grier and Munger 1991, 1993) also leads us to single out these two committees. Therefore, we define:<sup>10</sup>

- $W\&M_{jt}$  = 1 if member  $j$  moved to Ways and Means between  $t$  and  $t + 1$ ;
- $E\&C_{jt}$  = 1 if member  $j$  moved to Energy and Commerce between  $t$  and  $t + 1$ ;
- $APPRUL_{jt}$  = 1 if member  $j$  moved to Appropriations or Rules between  $t$  and  $t + 1$ ;
- $OTHER2_{jt}$  = 1 if member  $j$  moved from one nonexclusive committee to another, not including Energy and Commerce, between  $t$  and  $t + 1$ .

We also define the following dummy variable:<sup>11</sup>

- $LEADER_{jt}$  = 1 if member  $j$  moved to a committee leadership post (chair or ranking member) between  $t$  and  $t + 1$ .

<sup>10</sup>Two representatives moved from Energy and Commerce to Appropriations; one moved from Energy and Commerce to Ways and Means; and one moved from Appropriations to Ways and Means. We counted each of these cases as a single move and coded it according to the committee to which the member moved.

<sup>11</sup>We also defined a dummy variable indicating members who moved to a party leadership position. There were so few moves of this sort, however, that we dropped this variable from the analysis.

It is rare for a representative to leave an exclusive committee or a committee leadership post except to take another powerful and prestigious assignment, such as a party leadership post or a different committee leadership position. Thus, virtually all of the *EXCLUS* and *LEADER* moves in our data are promotions. On the other hand, most *OTHER* changes are more like lateral moves.

Nearly 15% of our observations involve moves of one sort or another (see Table 1). Not surprisingly, *OTHER* and *EXCLUS* moves are made primarily by junior representatives. For example, about 53% of the moves between nonexclusive committees were made by representatives during their second term, and nearly 90% of all such moves were made sometime during the first four terms. Leadership changes, naturally, were concentrated among more senior members.

Virtually all studies of House elections have indicated that total contributions (from PACs and other contributors) are significantly higher in closer races. To control for this source of variation in an incumbent's PAC receipts, we use the following variables:

$$dvs_{jt} = -(V_{j,t+1} - V_{jt})(1 - \min\{V_{jt}, V_{j,t+1}\})$$

$$|dvs_{jt}| = |V_{j,t+1} - V_{jt}|(1 - \min\{V_{jt}, V_{j,t+1}\}),$$

where  $V_{jt} \in [0, 1]$  is the incumbent's share of the two-party vote in election  $t$ , and  $|\cdot|$  denotes absolute value. When there is no change in the vote share, *dvs* is zero. If the election at  $t + 1$  is closer than at  $t$ , then *dvs* is positive, and in the opposite case, it is negative. The second term in *dvs* and  $|dvs|$  weights the change in vote share by the closeness of the race. An election in which the incumbent received close to 50% of the vote is weighted more heavily than one where both elections were lopsided in the incumbent's favor.

We use *dvs* when studying the add and drop indices,  $\Delta^+$  and  $\Delta^-$ . We expect that if a representative faces a closer race in election  $t + 1$  than in election  $t$ , then the representative will receive more total PAC contributions in cycle  $t + 1$ , and therefore  $\Delta^+$  will be higher and  $\Delta^-$  will be lower. The variable  $|dvs|$  is similar to *dvs*, but treats increases and decreases in incumbents' vote shares symmetrically. We use  $|dvs|$  when studying the change index  $\Delta$ . The presumption is that the change in total PAC contributions, and therefore  $\Delta$ , will be higher both for representatives facing a close race in election  $t$  and a lopsided race in election  $t + 1$ , and for representatives facing a lopsided race in election  $t$  and a close race in election  $t + 1$ .

Another measure of the competitiveness of a race is the amount of money (from all sources) received by the challenger. Changes in PAC

**Table 1. Summary Statistics**

Variable	All PACs		Large PACs		Small PACs	
	Mean (SD)	[Min, Max]	Mean (SD)	[Min, Max]	Mean (SD)	[Min, Max]
$\Delta(01)$	90.459	(41.318)	17.417	(8.612)	62.930	(34.462)
	[1, 313]		[0, 65]		[0, 246]	
$\Delta^+(01)$	50.466	(30.760)	9.356	(6.165)	34.733	(24.391)
	[0, 260]		[0, 50]		[0, 198]	
$\Delta^-(01)$	39.993	(24.859)	8.061	(5.958)	28.197	(19.457)
	[0, 243]		[0, 62]		[0, 165]	
$\Delta(500)$	80.361	(50.812)	30.113	(16.817)	40.434	(33.455)
	[0, 347]		[0, 99]		[0, 252]	
$\Delta^+(500)$	49.843	(36.062)	17.979	(11.752)	25.012	(23.336)
	[0, 312]		[0, 77]		[0, 225]	
$\Delta^-(500)$	30.519	(26.994)	12.134	(9.857)	15.422	(16.943)
	[0, 255]		[0, 73]		[0, 186]	
EXCLUS	0.0345	(0.183)	Same as for all PACs from here down			
	[0, 1]					
W&M	0.015	(0.120)				
	[0, 1]					
APPRUL	0.020	(0.140)				
	[0, 1]					
ENERGY	0.010	(0.099)				
	[0, 1]					
OTHER 1	0.0790	(0.270)				
	[0, 1]					
OTHER 2	0.065	(0.247)				
	[0, 1]					
LEADER	0.030	(0.170)				
	[0, 1]					
DVS	-0.0018	(0.052)				
	[-0.235, 0.79]					
DVS	0.032	(0.040)				
	[0, 0.79]					
DCREC	0.025	(2.043)				
	[-23.38, 23.38]					
DCREC	0.979	(1.793)				
	[0, 23.38]					

contributions to the incumbent may respond to changes in the challenger's receipts, rather than to changes in the incumbent's committee assignments or status. Accordingly, we define

$$DCREC_{jt} = CR_{j,t+1} - CR_{jt}$$

$$|DCREC_{jt}| = |CR_{j,t+1} - CR_{jt}|,$$

where  $CR_{jt}$  is total challenger receipts in election cycle  $t$ , measured in hundreds of thousands of dollars. As with  $DVS$  and  $|DVS|$ , we use  $DCREC$  when studying the add and drop indices,  $\Delta^+$  and  $\Delta^-$ , and  $|DCREC|$  when studying the change index,  $\Delta$ .

We also include in our analysis two types of variables that control for unexplained but evidently significant factors. First, there seem to be important differences in representatives' propensities to accept PAC contributions that cannot be explained in terms of the measures we and others have ordinarily used. Some representatives receive a large number of PAC contributions year after year, while other representatives in seemingly similar positions receive few contributions. Since representatives who receive contributions from a large number of PACs tend to incur a larger amount of "normal" PAC turnover, there is a scale effect on our change indices. To control for this, we include as an independent variable the total number of PACs that contributed to a candidate in one or both elections of a cycle pair,  $NPAC_{jt}$ .

Second, we include three *YEAR* dummies,  $Y82-84$ ,  $Y84-86$ , and  $Y86-88$ . These are intended to control for changes in the number of PACs over time and changes in nominal and real PAC budgets, as well as for year-specific factors affecting PAC contributions that might not be captured by the variables  $DVS$  and  $DCREC$ . One such factor is redistricting, which is probably important for many districts in the 1980-82 election pair and may also be important for some districts in the 1982-84 election pair.

### Empirical Results

Summarizing the discussion above, we estimate the following equations:

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta = & \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 EXCLUS + \alpha_2 OTHER1 + \alpha_3 LEADER \\ & + \alpha_4 |DVS| + \alpha_5 |DCREC| + \alpha_6 NPAC \\ & + \alpha_7 Y82-84 + \alpha_8 Y84-86 + \alpha_9 Y86-88 \end{aligned} \quad (5)$$

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta^+ \text{ (or } \Delta^-) = & \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 EXCLUS + \alpha_2 OTHER1 + \alpha_3 LEADER \\ & + \alpha_4 DVS + \alpha_5 DCREC + \alpha_6 NPAC \\ & + \alpha_7 Y82-84 + \alpha_8 Y84-86 + \alpha_9 Y86-88 \end{aligned} \quad (6)$$

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta = & \beta_0 + \beta_1 W\&M + \beta_2 APPRUL + \beta_3 E\&C + \beta_4 OTHER2 \\ & + \beta_5 LEADER + \beta_6 |DVS| + \beta_7 |DCREC| + \beta_8 NPAC \\ & + \beta_9 Y82-84 + \beta_{10} Y84-86 + \beta_{11} Y86-88 \end{aligned} \quad (7)$$

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta^+ \text{ (or } \Delta^-) = & \beta_0 + \beta_1 W\&M + \beta_2 APPRUL + \beta_3 E\&C + \beta_4 OTHER2 \\ & + \beta_5 LEADER + \beta_6 DVS + \beta_7 DCREC + \beta_8 NPAC \\ & + \beta_9 Y82-84 + \beta_{10} Y84-86 + \beta_{11} Y86-88 \end{aligned} \quad (8)$$

In each of these specifications, coefficients on the independent variables relating to committee or leadership changes measure the impact of such changes on PAC contribution patterns *relative* to a representative who did not switch committees or acquire leadership status.

We estimate equations (5)–(8) for a number of different dependent variables. Because these variables are bounded below by zero, and several of them frequently take on the limit value of zero, we estimated all equations using the Tobit procedure (see, e.g., Maddala 1983).

We define the contribution change variables using data on all PACs in our sample and also define them for various subsets of PACs. We distinguish between large and small PACs and among different categories of PACs as defined by the FEC. As we discussed earlier, we also consider two different definitions of the contribution change variables: one that simply indicates changes from positive to zero contributions or vice versa and one that indicates changes of more than \$500.

Table 1 shows summary statistics of the data, and Tables 2–6 present the main results. In Tables 2 and 3, the dependent variables are defined using all PACs. Table 2 shows the estimates of equations (5) and (6), while Table 3 gives results based on equations (7) and (8). In all specifications, the coefficients on the control variables *DVS*,  $|DVS|$ , *DCREC*,  $|DCREC|$ , and *NPAC* are all highly significant and of the expected signs.

The coefficients on *LEADER* show that moving to a committee leadership position enhances a member's PAC portfolio in several ways. It increases the number of PACs that switch from not contributing to contributing, and also increases the number of PACs that raise their contributions by at least \$500 (cols. 2 and 5 of Tables 2 and 3). Moreover, a promotion to leadership reduces the number of PACs that stop contributing or that lower their contributions (cols. 3 and 6). These results are robust with respect to disaggregating by PAC type and PAC size, as Tables 4 and 5 show.

Table 2 indicates that a move to an exclusive committee produces significant changes in a representative's PAC contribution vector, primarily by increasing the number of PACs that switch from not contributing to contributing. The same appears to be true for moves from one nonexclusive committee to another. As shown in Table 3, however, the former

**Table 2. Tobit Estimation Results: All PACs**

Independent Variable	Dependent Variable					
	$\Delta(01)$	$\Delta^+(01)$	$\Delta^-(01)$	$\Delta(500)$	$\Delta^+(500)$	$\Delta^-(500)$
EXCLUS	12.06** (2.39)	16.63** (2.92)	-4.14 (2.33)	-0.35 (3.51)	5.00 (3.22)	-4.85* (2.40)
OTHER1	6.77** (1.61)	5.63** (1.97)	1.14 (1.57)	-5.46* (2.36)	-3.73 (2.18)	-1.54 (1.62)
LEADER	0.59 (2.57)	8.53** (3.14)	-7.36** (2.50)	2.96 (3.76)	12.35** (3.45)	-9.36** (2.59)
DVS	25.82* (10.99)			38.50* (16.11)		
DVS		73.18** (11.13)	-47.22** (8.86)		83.72** (12.25)	-54.41** (9.15)
DCREC	0.62* (0.25)			1.64** (0.37)		
DCREC		2.52** (0.28)	-1.99** (0.22)		3.31** (0.31)	-2.82** (0.23)
NPAC	0.48** (0.01)	0.28** (0.01)	0.20** (0.01)	0.53** (0.01)	0.34** (0.01)	0.19** (0.01)
Y82-84	-1.84 (1.29)	-1.27 (1.58)	-0.01 (1.26)	4.13* (1.89)	2.46 (1.75)	1.99 (1.31)
Y84-86	-3.12* (1.30)	-5.28** (1.59)	2.55* (1.27)	13.49** (1.90)	4.42* (1.75)	8.91** (1.31)
Y86-88	-7.51** (1.31)	-11.18** (1.60)	3.78** (1.28)	20.16** (1.92)	5.28** (1.76)	14.24** (1.32)
Constant	6.50** (1.25)	5.40** (1.49)	3.96** (1.18)	-24.77** (1.84)	-13.06** (1.64)	-9.40** (1.23)
Log-likelihood	-5,422	-5,733	-5,457	-5,910	-5,803	-5,428

Note: Estimated standard errors are in parentheses.

\*coefficient different from zero at  $p \leq .05$  (two-tailed test); \*\*coefficient different from zero at  $p \leq .01$  (two-tailed test).

effects are driven almost entirely by moves involving Ways and Means, while the latter are driven by moves involving Energy and Commerce. These findings convince us to focus our attention on estimates based on equations (7) and (8) in the remaining tables.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>12</sup>Restricting the sample to relatively junior representatives, defined as those who have served five or fewer terms, we obtain results that are similar to or stronger than those reported in Tables 2-6. Thus, our findings are not simply measuring differences between junior and senior representatives.

**Table 3. Tobit Estimation Results: All PACs**

Independent Variable	Dependent Variable					
	$\Delta(01)$	$\Delta^+(01)$	$\Delta^-(01)$	$\Delta(500)$	$\Delta^+(500)$	$\Delta^-(500)$
W&M	29.14** (3.59)	46.12** (4.36)	-17.20** (3.48)	9.88 (5.31)	26.64** (4.67)	-17.07** (3.59)
APPRUL	-0.51 (3.08)	-4.87 (3.74)	5.10 (2.99)	-7.70 (4.56)	-10.58** (4.01)	3.99 (3.08)
E&C	17.96** (4.34)	35.41** (5.28)	-16.49** (4.21)	-9.81 (6.42)	5.19 (5.66)	-13.29** (4.35)
OTHER2	4.29* (1.74)	-0.06 (2.12)	4.43** (1.69)	-3.85 (2.58)	-4.88* (2.27)	1.16 (1.74)
LEADER	0.54 (2.54)	8.53** (3.08)	-7.62** (2.46)	3.02 (3.75)	12.38** (3.30)	-9.46** (2.55)
DVS	25.73* (10.86)			38.98* (16.08)		
DVS		70.26** (10.93)	-45.74** (8.72)		81.58** (11.72)	-53.26** (9.00)
DCREC	0.65** (0.25)			1.67** (0.36)		
DCREC		2.60** (0.28)	-2.06** (0.22)		3.32** (0.30)	-2.88** (0.23)
NPAC	0.48** (0.01)	0.27** (0.01)	0.21** (0.01)	0.53** (0.01)	0.33** (0.01)	0.20** (0.01)
Y82-84	-2.02 (1.28)	-1.45 (1.56)	0.13 (1.24)	3.89* (1.89)	2.21 (1.67)	2.28 (1.29)
Y84-86	-3.08* (1.28)	-5.14** (1.57)	2.44 (1.25)	13.19** (1.90)	4.23* (1.68)	9.04** (1.30)
Y86-88	-7.71** (1.29)	-11.52** (1.57)	3.83** (1.25)	20.02** (1.92)	5.13** (1.69)	14.57** (1.30)
Constant	6.97** (1.24)	5.87** (1.47)	1.62 (1.17)	-24.64** (1.84)	-12.17** (1.58)	-11.13** (1.22)
Log-likelihood	-5,420	-5,675	-5,438	-5,907	-5,783	-5,415

Note: Estimated standard errors are in parentheses.

\*coefficient different from zero at  $p \leq .05$  (two-tailed test); \*\*coefficient different from zero at  $p \leq .01$  (two-tailed test).

**Table 4. Effects of Changes in Committee-Leadership Portfolio on Changes in the Pattern of PAC Contributions**

Variable	PAC Type			
	All	Corporation	Trade	Labor
PACs with Total Contributions $\geq$ \$100,000				
“Adds”				
$\Delta^+(01)$				
W&M	6.76** (1.16)	2.72** (0.60)	3.31** (0.53)	1.27 (0.71)
APPRUL	0.18 (1.00)	0.95 (0.52)	0.63 (0.46)	-1.32* (0.66)
E&C	4.48** (1.40)	3.35** (0.73)	1.17 (0.64)	-0.11 (0.88)
OTHER2	0.12 (0.57)	0.42 (0.30)	0.16 (0.26)	-0.59 (0.36)
LEADER	1.90* (0.82)	1.17** (0.43)	0.12 (0.38)	1.23* (0.50)
“Drops”				
$\Delta^-(01)$				
W&M	-1.83 (0.97)	-1.51* (0.65)	-1.26* (0.50)	-0.20 (0.64)
APPRUL	-0.64 (0.84)	0.19 (0.53)	-0.67 (0.43)	-0.49 (0.57)
E&C	-1.30 (1.18)	-0.45 (0.70)	-0.61 (0.59)	-0.23 (0.78)
OTHER2	0.38 (0.48)	0.65* (0.29)	0.21 (0.23)	-0.30 (0.32)
LEADER	-1.30 (0.69)	-0.79 (0.46)	-0.16 (0.34)	-0.60 (0.46)
PACs with Total Contributions < \$100,000				
“Adds”				
$\Delta^+(01)$				
W&M	34.19** (3.21)	19.55** (2.28)	10.26** (0.96)	0.32 (0.56)
APPRUL	-4.56 (2.75)	-4.19* (1.96)	-0.85 (0.82)	0.72 (0.47)
E&C	27.53** (3.88)	18.63** (2.77)	8.27** (1.15)	0.72 (0.66)
OTHER2	-0.46 (1.56)	-1.02 (1.11)	0.25 (0.47)	-0.24 (0.29)
LEADER	5.08* (2.27)	2.71 (1.62)	2.08** (0.67)	0.35 (0.39)

**Table 4 (continued)**

Variable	PAC Type			
	All	Corporation	Trade	Labor
“Drops”				
$\Delta^-(01)$				
W&M	-13.90** (2.66)	-9.06** (1.86)	-3.16** (0.87)	-0.14 (0.51)
APPRUL	5.52* (2.28)	3.78* (1.60)	1.73* (0.74)	-0.65 (0.45)
E&C	-15.45** (3.22)	-12.92** (2.26)	-1.84 (1.04)	-0.84 (0.67)
OTHER2	3.26* (1.29)	2.18* (0.91)	1.02* (0.42)	-0.08 (0.25)
LEADER	-6.35** (1.88)	-4.19** (1.32)	-1.65** (0.61)	-0.64 (0.35)

*Note:* Contribution change defined as change from zero to positive or vice versa.

Tobit estimates. Estimated standard errors are in parentheses.

\*coefficient different from zero at  $p \leq .05$  (two-tailed test); \*\*coefficient different from zero at  $p \leq .01$  (two-tailed test).

**Table 5. Effects of Changes in Committee-Leadership Portfolio on Changes in the Pattern of PAC Contributions**

Variable	PAC Type			
	All	Corporation	Trade	Labor
	PACs with Total Contributions $\geq$ \$100,000			
“Adds”				
$\Delta^+(500)$				
W&M	6.75** (1.57)	2.25** (0.70)	4.59** (0.66)	0.92 (0.87)
APPRUL	-2.49 (1.35)	-0.17 (0.62)	-0.79 (0.56)	-1.12 (0.82)
E&C	1.05 (1.90)	1.95* (0.86)	0.72 (0.79)	-0.42 (1.08)
OTHER2	-1.38 (0.77)	1.02** (0.36)	-0.39 (0.32)	-0.58 (0.45)
LEADER	4.48** (1.11)	1.92** (0.50)	1.41** (0.47)	1.93** (0.62)

Table 5 (continued)

Variable	PAC Type			
	All	Corporation	Trade	Labor
"Drops"				
$\Delta^-(500)$				
W&M	-4.02** (1.48)	-2.34** (0.73)	-2.00** (0.59)	-0.14 (0.97)
APPRUL	0.64 (1.27)	0.09 (0.59)	0.29 (0.51)	0.19 (0.86)
E&C	-1.95 (1.78)	-2.06* (0.90)	-0.81 (0.73)	-0.64 (1.25)
OTHER2	0.80 (0.72)	0.33 (0.32)	0.37 (0.28)	0.38 (0.49)
LEADER	-2.78** (1.05)	-1.54** (0.54)	-0.82 (0.42)	-0.59 (0.68)
PACs with Total Contributions < \$100,000				
"Adds"				
$\Delta^+(500)$				
W&M	17.41** (2.98)	9.33** (2.02)	5.44** (0.96)	0.11 (0.57)
APPRUL	-6.86** (2.56)	-5.52** (1.75)	-1.80* (0.83)	0.57 (0.49)
E&C	4.28 (3.60)	3.74 (2.44)	1.40 (1.17)	0.45 (0.68)
OTHER2	-2.79 (1.45)	-2.33* (0.99)	-0.70 (0.47)	-0.35 (0.30)
LEADER	7.53** (2.11)	5.08** (1.42)	2.22** (0.67)	1.02** (0.37)
"Drops"				
$\Delta^-(500)$				
W&M	-10.80** (2.17)	-6.68** (1.59)	-2.88** (0.71)	-0.02 (0.54)
APPRUL	2.33 (1.88)	2.89* (1.38)	-0.08 (0.60)	-1.44* (0.58)
E&C	-10.41** (2.66)	-7.61** (1.94)	-3.13** (0.89)	-0.36 (0.75)
OTHER2	0.58 (1.06)	0.98 (0.78)	-0.36 (0.34)	0.10 (0.27)
LEADER	-4.71** (1.54)	-3.03** (1.14)	-1.35** (0.50)	-0.26 (0.38)

Note: Contributions change defined as change of \$500 or more.

Tobit estimates. Estimated standard errors are in parentheses.

\*coefficient different from zero at  $p \leq .05$  (two-tailed test); \*\*coefficient different from zero at  $p \leq .01$  (two-tailed test).

Tables 4 and 5 show results by PAC type and size. To conserve space, in these tables, we report only the results for the add and drop indices and show only the estimated coefficients and standard errors for the committee and leadership change variables.<sup>13</sup> Table 4 reveals interesting similarities and differences among the various types of PACs. Small corporate PACs and small trade association PACs behave quite similarly. Contribution decisions by both types of PACs are strongly influenced by moves to Ways and Means and Energy and Commerce and to a lesser degree by moves to Appropriations or Rules or moves measured by OTHER2. In contrast, contribution decisions by large corporate PACs seem to be influenced mainly by moves to Ways and Means or Energy and Commerce, while large trade association PACs seem to be influenced only by moves to Ways and Means.<sup>14</sup> Labor PACs, if anything, appear to focus extra attention on committee leaders.

Even more interesting, Table 4 reveals important differences between adds and drops. If representatives' committee assignments were the primary determinants of their value to various PACs, and if committee jurisdictions were fairly narrow, then changes in committee assignments should increase both the add index and the drop index. That is, when a representative moves from one committee to another, PACs who target the new committee but did not target the old committee should begin contributing to the representative, and PACs who target the old committee but do not target the new one should stop contributing to the representative.

For moves involving Ways and Means or Energy and Commerce, changing committees increases the add index, but *decreases* the drop index. This asymmetry between adds and drops is probably due to the wide and important jurisdictions of the two committees. These committees are relevant for most corporate and trade association PACs. Thus, a representative who moves from the Judiciary Committee or Science and Technology to Ways and Means becomes more attractive to a large number of new PACs, but probably does not become less attractive to many PACs.

For "lateral" moves from one nonexclusive committee to another (except Energy and Commerce), and even for moves to Appropriations

<sup>13</sup>Again, the coefficients of DVS, |DVS|, DCREC, |DCREC|, and NPAC are always significant and of the expected signs. In the specifications on which Tables 4 and 5 are based, NPAC corresponds to the type of PAC in question. So, for example, when the dependent variable is contribution changes by corporate PACs, then NPAC measures the total number of corporate PACs from which the representative received contributions.

<sup>14</sup>This may reflect the propensity for many of the largest trade PACs, such as those affiliated with the National Association of Realtors and various transportation groups, to contribute in somewhat of a "shotgun" fashion (Makinson 1990).

or Rules, the asymmetry between adds and drops is different. Such moves have no significant effect on the add indices, but they produce a significant *increase* in the drop indices of small corporate and trade association PACs. That is, such moves appear to cause more small corporate and trade association PACs to *stop* contributing to representatives.

These patterns suggest that PACs care not only about representatives' committee assignments but also about representatives' committee experience. There are at least two reasons why this might be so. First, additional seniority on a committee may yield automatic benefits such as extra agenda power (e.g., via subcommittee chair positions) and increased effectiveness in performing casework. Second, with experience on a committee, representatives probably gain policy expertise, and this expertise might give the member additional influence over policy (Krehbiel 1991). When representatives switch committees, they lose the seniority earned in their previous assignment and almost always move to the bottom of the ladder on the new committee. Aside from this, it takes time to acquire new expertise in the details of the new committee's policy jurisdiction. Thus, more-senior committee members should be more valuable to interest groups than junior members are.<sup>15</sup>

The finding that OTHER2 moves do not increase the number of PACs that begin contributing to representatives is consistent with both of the considerations we have noted. On the other hand, the finding that OTHER2 moves increase the number of PACs that stop contributing to representatives is more consistent with the first effect. A representative loses his or her place in the queue for subcommittee chairs the moment he or she leaves a committee, but policy expertise does not depreciate so quickly. In any case, these results suggest it may be interesting to study the delayed effects of committee assignment changes on PAC contribution patterns, rather than just one-period changes. We need a longer time series to conduct a satisfactory study, however, and therefore leave it for future work.

Table 6 shows that the variables W&M, E&C, and OTHER2 also affect the *dollar amount* of PAC contributions.<sup>16</sup> Moving to Ways and Means or Energy and Commerce increases total contributions from corporate and trade PACs. By contrast, moves to other committees tend to decrease contributions from all types of PACs, especially corporate and labor PACs. These findings are consistent with Grier and Munger (1991,

<sup>15</sup>Nearly half of the OTHER2 moves were made by representatives with four or more years of House seniority.

<sup>16</sup>The results reported in Table 6 are from OLS estimates that include the following variables in addition to W&M, APPRUL, E&C, OTHER2, and LEADER: DVS, DCREC, and year dummies, as in Table 3. We also included total contributions in the first cycle of the pair as a control (similar to NPAC).

**Table 6. Effects of Changes in Committee/Leadership Portfolio on Changes in Total PAC Contributions**

Independent Variable	PAC Type			
	All	Corporation	Trade	Labor
W&M	55,120** (11,582)	23,205** (5,027)	27,540** (3,623)	-1,547 (4,478)
APPRUL	-14,344 (9,966)	-7,746 (4,326)	-4,353 (3,119)	-1,127 (3,852)
E&C	35,128* (13,985)	26,743** (6,075)	10,929* (4,378)	-2,723 (5,410)
OTHER2	-11,781* (5,635)	-5,315* (2,446)	-2,972 (1,764)	-4,676* (2,183)
LEADER	34,408** (8,176)	15,675** (3,553)	11,635** (2,560)	6,346* (3,163)
$\bar{R}^2$	.27	.14	.22	.18

Note: Dependent variable is increase in total contributions.

OLS estimates. Estimated standard errors are in parentheses.

\*coefficient different from zero at  $p \leq .05$  (two-tailed test); \*\*coefficient different from zero at  $p \leq .01$  (two-tailed test).

1993), who found that members of Ways and Means and Energy and Commerce received more contributions from corporate and trade PACs than other representatives received.

Comparing Tables 4 and 5 shows that the way one defines a change in contributions matters. The committee and leadership variables with the greatest effect on contribution changes of \$500 or more are w&M and LEADER. Moves to Energy and Commerce do not have as significant an effect on contribution increases of \$500 or more as they have on changes from zero to positive contributions.

Finally, although we do not report the results in the tables, we should note that the contribution vectors for cooperative PACs and nonconnected PACs are not much affected by any of the committee or leadership change variables. Of course, cooperative PACs are largely affiliated with agricultural producers; as we show in the next section, there is a specialized effect associated with moves to and from the Agriculture Committee. The findings for nonconnected PACs are consistent with the view held by many campaign finance experts, that most large nonconnected PACs represent groups with broad, ideological interests or groups interested in particular but highly salient issues, such as the National Abortion Rights

Action League. It is unlikely that PACs of either type would find it especially useful to target particular committees.

### A Closer Look at Two Committees

The results we have discussed so far describe overall changes in contribution patterns and changes for broadly defined PAC groups. One can also use the dynamic approach to test more detailed hypotheses about particular groups of contributors. For example, one may ask whether representatives who join the Interior and Insular Affairs Committee receive significantly more contributions from the PACs of oil and gas companies. These are dynamic versions of the static hypotheses tested in previous studies that we discussed in the introduction.

In this section, we look at two groups in more detail, agricultural PACs and banking PACs.<sup>17</sup> We estimate models similar to equations (7) and (8), but assign one committee a special role. For agricultural PACs, the special committee is Agriculture, and for banking PACs, it is Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs. The specification allows us to test whether moving to or from the Banking Committee is associated with significant changes in the number of contributions from banking PACs, and similarly for moves to or from the Agriculture Committee. For banking PACs, the estimated equations are:

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta^+ \text{ (or } \Delta^-) = & \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 \text{ADDBANK} + \gamma_2 \text{DROPBANK1} + \gamma_3 \text{DROPBANK2} \\ & + \gamma_4 \text{W\&M}' + \gamma_5 \text{APPRUL}' + \gamma_6 \text{E\&C}' + \gamma_7 \text{OTHER2}' \\ & + \gamma_8 \text{LEADER}' + \gamma_9 \text{DVS} + \gamma_{10} \text{DCREC} + \gamma_{11} \text{NPAC} \\ & + \gamma_{12} \text{Y82-84} + \gamma_{13} \text{Y84-86} + \gamma_{14} \text{Y86-88}. \end{aligned} \quad (9)$$

ADDBANK is a dummy variable that is one for representatives who moved to the Banking Committee; DROPBANK1 is one for representatives who moved from the Banking Committee to a committee other than Ways and Means or Energy and Commerce; and DROPBANK2 is one for representatives who moved from the Banking Committee to either Ways and Means or Energy and Commerce. The variables W&M', APPRUL', E&C', OTHER2', and LEADER' are similar to W&M, APPRUL, E&C, OTHER2, and LEADER, respectively, except they exclude moves involving the Banking Committee. Thus, for example, OTHER2' is one for representatives who move to or

<sup>17</sup>We used Weinberger and Greevey (1982) and Roeder (1982) to identify PACs with interests related to agriculture or banking. For agriculture, this included SIC codes 01 (Agricultural Production: Crops), 02 (Agricultural Production: Livestock), 07 (Agricultural Services), 20 (Food and Kindred Products), and 21 (Tobacco Manufacturers). For banking, we selected SIC codes 60 (Banking), 61 (Credit Agencies Other Than Banks), 62 (Security, Commodity Brokers, and Services), 63 (Insurance Carriers), 64 (Insurance Agents, Brokers, and Service), and 67 (Holding and Other Investment Offices).

from any nonexclusive committee other than Energy and Commerce or Banking. The specifications for agricultural PACs are similar, with Agricultural Committee substituted for Banking Committee.

The estimates are in Table 7. The results for banking PACs (top) are particularly striking and indicate a strong relationship between banking

**Table 7. Effects of Changes in Committee-Leadership Portfolio on Changes in the Pattern of PAC Contributions**

Variable	$\Delta^+(01)$	$\Delta^-(01)$	$\Delta^+(500)$	$\Delta^+(500)$
Banking PACs				
ADDBANK	10.15** (1.43)	-3.98** (1.12)	4.38** (1.59)	-2.73* (1.22)
DROPBANK1	-5.76** (1.65)	8.48** (1.30)	-8.32** (1.83)	4.48** (1.43)
DROPBANK2	6.90** (2.21)	1.29 (1.73)	-2.36 (2.44)	-0.42 (1.89)
W&M'	15.48** (1.24)	-5.54** (0.99)	11.53** (1.37)	-5.32** (1.10)
E&C'	7.99** (1.49)	-3.98** (1.18)	4.13* (1.65)	-3.85** (1.38)
OTHER2'	-0.83 (0.54)	0.84* (0.42)	-1.47* (0.60)	0.38 (0.47)
LEADER'	1.36 (0.82)	-1.19 (0.65)	2.30* (0.91)	-2.05** (0.73)
Agricultural PACs				
ADDAG	3.46* (1.36)	-0.29 (1.12)	0.93 (1.39)	-2.69* (1.18)
DROPAG1	-0.87 (1.29)	0.10 (1.05)	-1.22 (1.33)	2.26* (1.08)
DROPAG2	9.40** (1.61)	0.10 (1.33)	3.87* (1.64)	0.29 (1.31)
W&M'	4.59** (0.93)	-1.77* (0.77)	3.50** (0.95)	-2.72** (0.80)
E&C'	4.49** (1.04)	-2.05* (0.86)	1.89 (1.10)	-1.46 (0.89)
OTHER2'	-0.19 (0.38)	0.73* (0.31)	-0.37 (0.39)	0.54 (0.32)
LEADER'	1.08 (0.61)	-1.05* (0.50)	1.51* (0.62)	-1.86** (0.54)

Note: Tobit estimates. Estimated standard errors are in parentheses.

\*coefficient different from zero at  $p \leq .05$  (two-tailed test); \*\*coefficient different from zero at  $p \leq .01$  (two-tailed test).

PAC contributions and membership on the Banking Committee. Representatives who join the Banking Committee receive significantly more new contributions from banking PACs than other representatives, and are also more likely to continue receiving contributions from those banking PACs already contributing. By contrast, representatives who leave the Banking Committee are significantly more likely to be abandoned by banking PACs than are other representatives. A similar pattern holds for changes in contribution levels of \$500 or more. These results differ from the findings on the variable *OTHER2* in the previous section. Recall that *OTHER2* moves produce an increase in the drop index but not in the add index. Not surprisingly, representatives who move to Ways and Means or Energy and Commerce from committees other than Banking receive contributions from more new banking PACs (as well as other types of PACs). Interestingly, this is also true for representatives who move to these committees from Banking.

The results for agricultural PACs also reveal a link between agricultural PACs and the Agriculture Committee. Representatives who join the Agriculture Committee receive contributions from significantly more new agricultural PACs than other representatives do and are less likely to see as many reductions of \$500 or more. On the other hand, representatives who leave the Agriculture Committee are more likely to see reductions of \$500 or more in agricultural PAC contribution levels. Surprisingly, however, it appears that the best way for representatives to increase the number of contributions from agricultural PACs is to move off the Agriculture Committee and join either Ways and Means or Energy and Commerce.

### **Concluding Remarks**

Our results demonstrate some of the benefits of studying PAC contributions as a dynamic process. In addition to providing strong evidence that ties exist between certain types of PACs and congressional committees, our analysis reveals an interesting difference in the propensity of PACs to add or drop members who change their committee assignments. We could not have detected this effect had we focused only on contributions at a single point in time.

A number of issues warrant further study. Detailed studies are needed to determine more precisely what types of PACs tend to continue contributing to representatives after they switch committees, and what types do not. For example, are PACs whose interests and support are geographically localized especially tied to a given set of representatives? Related to the career issue is the question of PAC foresight. For example, are there large differences in the patterns of PAC contributions received by incumbents and candidates running for Congress for the first time, or

does it appear that PACs are relatively good at predicting initial committee assignments?

Our results also have implications for the ongoing debate between the hypothesis that committees serve primarily to facilitate logrolls (Weingast and Marshall 1988) and the hypothesis that committees serve an information gathering and dissemination function, as committee members acquire policy expertise (Gilligan and Krehbiel 1987, 1989, 1990; Krehbiel 1990, 1991). On the one hand, finding that close PAC-committee ties exist provides indirect support for both hypotheses, since both are consistent with close PAC-committee ties. On the other hand, we also found that when representatives switch committees they do not pick up more new PAC contributions than other representatives, but they do lose more contributions from formerly contributing PACs. This suggests that PACs care not only about representatives' committee assignments but also about representatives' committee experience or seniority. Formal models of congressional committees have so far paid little attention to the dynamic aspects of representatives' careers. Theoretical work that incorporates time more explicitly would be useful in developing richer hypotheses about the links between interest groups and representatives.

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