The Immigrant Enclave: Theory and Empirical Examples

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1. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this chapter is to review existing theories about the process of immigrant adaptation to a new society and to recapitulate the empirical findings that have led to an emerging perspective on the topic. This emerging view revolves around the concepts of different modes of structural incorporation and of the immigrant enclave as one of them. These concepts are set in explicit opposition to two previous viewpoints on the adaptation process, generally identified as assimilation theory and the segmented labor markets approach.

The study of immigrant groups in the United States has produced a copious historical and sociological literature, written mostly from the assimilation perspective. Although the experiences of particular groups varied, the common theme of these writings is the unrelenting efforts of immigrant minorities to surmount obstacles impeding their entry into the "mainstream" of American society (Handlin, 1941, 1951; Wittke, 1952; Child, 1943; Vecoli, 1977). From this perspective, the adaptation process of particular immigrant groups followed a sequential path from initial economic hardship and discrimination to eventual socioeconomic mobility arising from increasing knowledge of American culture and acceptance by the host society (Warner and Srole, 1945; Gordon, 1964; Sowell, 1981). The focus on a "core" culture, the emphasis on consensus-building, and the assumption of a basic patterned sequence of adaptation represent central elements of assimilation theory.
From this perspective, the failure of individual immigrants or entire ethnic groups to move up through the social hierarchies is linked either to their reluctance to shed traditional values or to the resistance of the native majority to accept them because of racial, religious, or other shortcomings. Hence, successful adaptation depends, first of all, on the willingness of immigrants to relinquish a "backward" way of life and, second, on their acquisition of characteristics making them acceptable to the host society (Eisenstadt, 1970). Throughout, the emphasis is placed on the social psychological processes of motivation, learning, and interaction and on the cultural values and perceptions of the immigrants themselves and those who surround them.

The second general perspective takes issue with this psychosocial and culturalist orientation as well as with the assumption of a single basic assimilation path. This alternative view begins by noting that immigrants and their descendants do not necessarily "melt" into the mainstream and that many groups seem not to want to do so, preferring instead to preserve their distinct ethnic identities (Greeley, 1971; Glazer and Moynihan, 1970). A number of writers have focused on the resilience of these communities and described their functions as sources of mutual support and collective political power (Suttles, 1968; Alba and Chamlin, 1983; Parenti, 1967). Others have gone beyond descriptive accounts and attempted to establish the causes of the persistence of ethnicity. Without exception, these writers have identified the roots of the phenomenon in the economic sphere and, more specifically, in the labor-market roles that immigrants have been called on to play.

Within this general perspective, several specific theoretical approaches exist. The first focuses on the situation of the so-called unmeltable ethnics—blacks, Chicanos, and American Indians—and finds the source of their plight in a history of internal colonialism during which these groups have been confined to specific areas and made to work under uniquely unfavorable conditions. In a sense, the role of colonized minorities has been to bypass the free labor market, yielding in the process distinct benefits both to direct employers of their labor and, indirectly, to other members of the dominant racial group (Blauner, 1972; Geschwender, 1978). The continuation of colonialist practices to our day explains, according to this view, the spatial isolation and occupational disadvantages of these minorities (Barrera, 1980).

A second approach attempts to explain the persistence of ethnic politics and ethnic mobilization on the basis of the organization of subordinate groups to combat a "cultural division of labor." The latter confined members of specific minorities to a quasi-permanent situation of exploitation and social inferiority. Unlike the first view, this second approach does not envision the persistence of ethnicity as a consequence of continuing exploitation, but rather as a "reactive formation" on the part of the minority to reaffirm its identity and its interests (Hechter, 1977; Despres, 1975). For this reason, ethnic mobilizations are often most common among groups who have already abandoned the bottom of the
social ladder and started to compete for positions of advantage with members of the majority (Nagel and Olzak, 1982).

A final variant focuses on the situation of contemporary immigrants to the United States. Drawing on the dual labor market literature, this approach views recent immigrants as the latest entrants into the lower tier of a segmented labor market where women and other minorities already predominate. Relative to the latter, immigrants possess the advantages of their lack of experience in the new country, their legal vulnerability, and their greater initial motivation. All of these traits translate into higher productivity and lower labor costs for the firms that employ them (Sassen-Koob, 1980). Jobs in the secondary labor market are poorly paid, require few skills, and offer limited mobility opportunities. Hence, confinement of immigrants to this sector insures that those who do not return home are relegated to a quasi-permanent status as disadvantaged and discriminated minorities (Piore, 1975, 1979).

What these various structural theories have in common is the view of resilient ethnic communities formed as the result of a consistently disadvantageous economic position and the consequent absence of a smooth path of assimilation. These situations, ranging from slave labor to permanent confinement to the secondary labor market, are not altered easily. They have given rise, in time, either to hopeless communities of "unmeltable" ethnics or to militant minorities, conscious of a common identity and willing to support a collective strategy of self-defense rather than rely on individual assimilation.

These structural theories have provided an effective critique of the excessively benign image of the adaptation process presented by earlier writings. However, while undermining the former, the new structural perspective may have erred in the opposite direction. The basic hypothesis advanced in this chapter is that several identifiable modes of labor-market incorporation exist and that not all of them relegate newcomers to a permanent situation of exploitation and inferiority. Thus, while agreeing with the basic thrust of structural theories, we propose several modifications that are necessary for an adequate understanding of the different types of immigrant flows and their distinct processes of adaptation.

II. MODES OF INCORPORATION

In the four decades since the end of World War II, immigration to the United States has experienced a vigorous surge reaching levels comparable only to those at the beginning of the century (National Research Council, 1985, chapter 2). Even if one restricts attention to this movement, disregarding multiple other migrations elsewhere in the world, it is not the case that the inflow has been of a homogeneous character. Low-wage labor immigration itself has taken different forms, including temporary contract flows, undocumented entries, and legal immigration. More importantly, it is not the case that all immigrants have been
directed to the secondary labor market. For example, since the promulgation of the Immigration Act of 1965, thousands of professionals, technicians, and craftsmen have come to the United States, availing themselves of the occupational preference categories of the law. This type of inflow, dubbed "brain drain" in the sending nations, encompasses today sizable contingents of immigrants from such countries as India, South Korea, the Philippines, and Taiwan, each an important contributor to U.S. annual immigration.

The characteristics of this type of migration have been described in detail elsewhere (Portes, 1976, 1981). Two such traits deserve mention, however. First, occupationally skilled immigrants—including doctors, nurses, engineers, technicians, and craftsmen—generally enter the "primary" labor market; they contribute to alleviate domestic shortages in specific occupations and gain access, after a period of time, to the mobility ladders available to native workers. Second, immigration of this type does not generally give rise to spatially concentrated communities; instead, immigrants are dispersed throughout many cities and regions, following different career paths.

Another sizable contingent of entrants whose occupational future is not easily characterized a priori are political refugees. Large groups of refugees, primarily from Communist-controlled countries, have come to the United States, first after the occupation of Eastern Europe by the Soviet Army, then after the advent of Fidel Castro to power in Cuba, and finally in the aftermath of the Vietnam War. Unlike purely "economic" immigrants, refugees have often received resettlement assistance from various governmental agencies (Zolberg, 1983; Keely, 1981). The economic adaptation process of one of these groups, the Cubans, will be discussed in detail in this chapter. For the moment, it suffices to note that all the available evidence runs contrary to the notion of a uniform entry of political refugees into low-wage secondary occupations; on the contrary, there are indications of their employment in many different lines of work.

A third mode of incorporation has gained the attention of a number of scholars in recent years. It consists of small groups of immigrants who are inserted or insert themselves as commercial intermediaries in a particular country or region. These "middleman minorities" are distinct in nationality, culture, and sometimes race from both the superordinate and subordinate groups to which they relate (Bonacich, 1973; Light, 1972). They can be used by dominant elites as a buffer to deflect mass frustration and also as an instrument to conduct commercial activities in impoverished areas. Middlemen accept these risks in exchange for the opportunity to share in the commercial and financial benefits gained through such instruments as taxation, higher retail prices, and usury. Jews in feudal and early modern Europe represent the classic instance of a middleman minority. Other examples include Indian merchants in East Africa, and Chinese entrepreneurs in Southeast Asia and throughout the Pacific Basin (Bonacich and Modell, 1980, chapter 1). Contemporary examples in the United States include...
Jewish, Korean, and other Oriental merchants in inner-city ghetto areas and Cubans in Puerto Rico (Kim, 1981; Cobas, 1984).

Primary labor immigration and middleman entrepreneurship represent two modes of incorporation that differ from the image of an homogeneous flow into low-wage employment. Political refugees, in turn, have followed a variety of paths, including both of the above as well as insertion into an ethnic enclave economy. The latter represents a fourth distinct mode. Although frequently confused with middleman minorities, the emergence and structure of an immigrant enclave possess distinct characteristics. The latter have significant theoretical and practical implications, for they set apart groups adopting this entry mode from those following alternative paths. We turn now to several historical and contemporary examples of immigrant enclaves to clarify their internal dynamics and causes of their emergence.

III. IMMIGRANT ENCLAVES

Immigration to the United States before World War I was, overwhelmingly, an unskilled labor movement. Impoverished peasants from southern Italy, Poland, and the eastern reaches of the Austro-Hungarian Empire settled in dilapidated and crowded areas, often immediately adjacent to their points of debarcation, and took any menial jobs available. From these harsh beginnings, immigrants commenced a slow and often painful process of acculturation and economic mobility. Theirs was the saga captured by innumerable subsequent volumes written from both the assimilation and the structural perspectives.

Two sizable immigrant groups did not follow this pattern, however. Their most apparent characteristic was the economic success of the first generation, even in the absence of extensive acculturation. On the contrary, both groups struggled fiercely to preserve their cultural identity and internal solidarity. Their approach to adaptation thus directly contradicted subsequent assimilation predictions concerning the causal priority of acculturation to economic mobility. Economic success and "clannishness" also earned for each minority the hostility of the surrounding population. These two immigrant groups did not have a language, religion, or even race in common and they never overlapped in significant numbers in any part of the United States. Yet, arriving at opposite ends of the continent, Jews and Japanese pursued patterns of economic adaptation that were quite similar both in content and in their eventual consequences.

A. Jews in Manhattan

The first major wave of Jewish immigration to the United States consisted of approximately 50,000 newcomers of German origin, arriving between 1840 and
1870. These immigrants went primarily into commerce and achieved, in the course of a few decades, remarkable success. By 1900, the average income of German-Jewish immigrants surpassed that of the American population (Rischin, 1962). Many individuals who started as street peddlers and small merchants had become, by that time, heads of major industrial, retail, and financial enterprises.

The second wave of Jewish immigration exhibited quite different characteristics. Between 1870 and 1914, over two million Jews left the Pale of Settlement and other Russian-dominated regions, escaping Czarist persecution. Major pogroms occurred before and during this exodus (Dinnerstein, 1977). Thus, unlike most immigrants of the period, the migration of Russian and Eastern Europe Jews was politically motivated and their move was much more permanent. In contrast to German Jews, who were relatively well educated, the Yiddish-speaking newcomers came, for the most part, from modest origins and had only a rudimentary education. Although they viewed the new Russian wave with great apprehension, German Jews promptly realized that their future as an ethnic minority depended on the successful integration of the newcomers (Rischin, 1962). Charitable societies were established to provide food, shelter, and other necessities, and private schools were set up to teach immigrants English, civics, and the customs of the new country (Howe and Libo, 1979).

Aside from its size and rapidity of arrival, turn-of-the-century Jewish immigration had two other distinct characteristics. First was its strong propensity toward commerce and self-employment in general in preference to wage labor; as German Jews before them, many Russian immigrants moved directly into street peddling and other commercial activities of the most modest sort. Second was its concentration into a single, densely populated urban area—the lower East Side of Manhattan. Within this area, those who did not become storekeepers and peddlers from the start found employment in factories owned by German Jews, learning the necessary rudiments for future self-employment (Sowell, 1981, chapter 4).

The economic activities of this population created, in the course of two decades, a dense network of industrial, commercial, and financial enterprises. Close physical proximity facilitated exchanges of information and access to credit and raw materials. Characteristic of this emerging Jewish enclave is that production and marketing of goods was not restricted to the ethnic community, but went well beyond it into the general economy. Jews entered the printing, metal, and building trades; they became increasingly prominent in jewelry and cigar-making; above all, the garment industry became the primary domain of Jewish entrepreneurship, with hundreds of firms of all sizes engaged in the trade (Rischin, 1962; Howe and Libo, 1979).

The economic success of many of these ventures did not require and did not entail rapid acculturation. Immigrants learned English and those instrumental aspects of the new culture required for economic advancement. For the rest, they preferred to remain with their own and maintained, for the most part, close
adherence to their original religion, language, and values (Wirth, 1956; Howe, 1976). Jewish enclave capitalism depended, for its emergence and advancement, precisely on those resources made available by a solidaristic ethnic community: protected access to labor and markets, informal sources of credit, and business information. It was through these resources that upstart immigrant enterprises could survive and eventually compete effectively with better-established firms in the general economy.

The emergence of a Jewish enclave in East Manhattan helped this group bypass the conventional assimilation path and achieve significant economic mobility in the course of the first generation, well ahead of complete acculturation. Subsequent generations also pursued this path, but the resources accumulated through early immigrant entrepreneurship were dedicated primarily to further the education of children and their entry into the professions. It was at this point that outside hostility became most patent, as one university after another established quotas to prevent the onrush of Jewish students. The last of these quotas did not come to an end until after World War II (Dinnerstein, 1977).

Despite these and other obstacles, the movement of Jews into higher education continued. Building on the economic success of the first generation, subsequent ones achieved levels of education, occupation, and income that significantly exceed the national average (Featherman, 1971; Sowell, 1981, chapter 4). The original enclave is now only a memory, but it provided in its time the necessary platform for furthering the rapid social and economic mobility of the minority. Jews did enter the mainstream of American society, but they did not do so starting uniformly at the bottom, as most immigrant groups had done; instead, they translated resources made available by early ethnic entrepreneurship into rapid access to positions of social prestige and economic advantage.

B. Japanese on the West Coast

The specific features of Japanese immigration differ significantly from the movement of European Jews, but their subsequent adaptation and mobility patterns are similar. Beginning in 1890 and ending with the enactment of the Gentlemen's Agreement of 1908, approximately 150,000 Japanese men immigrated to the West Coast. They were followed primarily by their spouses until the Immigration Act of 1924 banned any further Asiatic immigration. Although nearly 300,000 Japanese immigrants are documented in this period (Daniels, 1977), less than half of this total remained in the United States (Petersen, 1971). This is due, in contrast to the case of the Jews, to the sojourner character of Japanese immigrants: the intention of many was to accumulate sufficient capital for purchasing farm land or settling debts in Japan. Hence this population movement included commercial and other members of the Japanese middle class who, not incidentally, were explicitly sponsored by their national government.

The residential patterns of Japanese immigrants were not as concentrated as
those of Jews in Manhattan, but they were geographically clustered. Almost two-thirds of the 111,010 Japanese reported in the U.S. Census of 1920 lived in California. Further, one-third of California's Japanese residents lived in Los Angeles County in 1940, while another one-third lived in six nearby counties (Daniels, 1977). However, it was not the residential segregation of Japanese immigrants but rather their occupational patterns that eventually mobilized the hostility of the local population.

Japanese immigrants were initially welcomed and recruited as a form of cheap agricultural labor. Their reputation as thrifty and diligent workers made them preferable to other labor sources. Nativist hostilities crystallized, however, when Japanese immigrants shifted from wage labor to independent ownership and small-scale farming. This action not only reduced the supply of laborers but it also increased competition for domestic growers in the fresh-produce market. In 1900, only about 40 Japanese farmers in the entire United States leased or owned a total of 5000 acres of farmland. By 1909, the number of Japanese farmers had risen to 6000 and their collective holdings exceeded 210,000 acres (Petersen, 1971). Faced with such "unfair" competition, California growers turned to the political means at their disposal. In 1913, the state legislature passed the first Alien Land Law, which restricted land ownership by foreigners. This legislation did not prove sufficient, however, and, in subsequent years, the ever-accommodating legislature passed a series of acts closing other legal loopholes to Japanese farming (Petersen, 1971).

These proscriptions, which barred most of the Japanese from the lands, accelerated their entry into urban enterprise. In 1909, Japanese entrepreneurs owned almost 3000 small shops in several Western cities. Forty percent of Japanese men in Los Angeles were self-employed. They operated businesses such as dry-cleaning establishments, fisheries, lunch counters, and produce stands that marketed the production of Japanese farms (Light, 1972).

The ability of the first-generation *Issei* to escape the status of stoop labor in agriculture was based on the social cohesion of their community. Rotating credit associations offered scarce venture capital, while mutual-aid organizations provided assistance in operating farms and urban businesses. Light (1972) reports that capitalizations as high as $100,000 were financed through ethnic credit networks. Economic success was again accompanied by limited instrumental acculturation and by careful preservation of national identity and values. It was the availability of investment capital, cooperative business associations, and marketing practices (forward and backward economic linkages) within the ethnic enclave that enabled Japanese entrepreneurs to expand beyond its boundaries and compete effectively in the general economy. This is illustrated by the production and marketing of fresh produce. In 1920, the value of Japanese crops was about 10% of the total for California, when the Japanese comprised less than 1% of the state's population; many retail outlets traded exclusively with a non-Japanese clientele (Light, 1972; Petersen, 1971).
During the early 1940s, the Japanese ethnic economy was seriously disrupted but not eliminated by the property confiscations and camp internments accompanying World War II. After the war, economic prosperity and other factors combined to reduce local hostility toward the Japanese. Older Issei and many of their children returned to small business, while other second-generation Nisei, like their Jewish predecessors, pursued higher education and entered the white-collar occupations en masse. This mobility path was completed by the third or Sansei generation, with 88% of their members attending college. Other third-generation Japanese have continued, however, the entrepreneurial tradition of their parents (Bonacich and Modell, 1980). Like Jews before them, Japanese-Americans have made use of the resources made available by early immigrant entrepreneurship to enter the mainstream of society in positions of relative advantage. The mean educational and occupational attainment of the group's 600,000 members surpasses at present all other ethnic and native groups, while its average family income is exceeded among American ethnic groups only by the Jews (Sowell, 1981).

IV. CONTEMPORARY EXAMPLES

As a mode of incorporation, the immigrant enclave is not only of historical interest since there are also several contemporary examples. Enclaves continue to be, however, the exception in the post—World War II period, standing in sharp contrast to the more typical pattern of secondary labor immigration. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that the emergence and development of contemporary ethnic enclaves will have the same consequences for their members that they had among turn-of-the-century immigrants.

A. Koreans in Los Angeles

The Korean community of Los Angeles is a recent product of liberalized U.S. immigration laws and strengthened political and economic ties between the two nations. Since 1965-1968, South Korean immigration to the United States has increased sixfold, swelling the Korean population of Los Angeles from less than 9000 in 1970 to over 65,000 in 1975. Approximately 60% of Korean immigrants settle in Los Angeles. In addition to increasing the size of this population flow, U.S. immigration law has altered its class composition. Korean immigrants come predominantly from the highly educated, Westernized, Christian strata of urban Korea. Their median educational attainment of 16 years is equivalent to an undergraduate education in the United States (Kim, 1981; Pones and Mozo, 1985).

Light (1979, 1980) attributes the business impulse of Korean immigrants to their "disadvantage" in the general U.S. labor market. It derives, he argues,
from their inability to speak English rather than from discrimination by American employers. Bonacich (1978; Bonacich, Light, and Wong, 1977), in comparison, describes Korean entrepreneurship as a situational response to the growing commercial vacuum arising from the consolidation of monopoly capitalism and the subsequent decline of small business. In this view, ethnic enterprise constitutes a disguised form of cheap labor that provides inexpensive goods and services for the center economy.

The origins of Korean enterprise may be uncertain but its existence is indisputable. Bonacich estimates that 4000 or one-fourth of all Korean families in Los Angeles County owned their business in 1976. The propensity for self-employment among this minority is three times greater than among the total urban labor force of Los Angeles (Bonacich, 1978). Light consulted published Korean business directories, which are biased against firms with nonethnic clients, and arrived at a conservative estimate of 1142 Korean businesses in the Los Angeles Metropolitan Area.

Korean entrepreneurs, like Jewish and Japanese immigrants before them, are highly dependent on the social and economic resources of their ethnic community. Some immigrants managed to smuggle capital out of Korea, but most rely on individual thrift and ethnic credit systems. For instance, a Korean husband and wife may save their wages from several service and factory jobs until enough capital is accumulated to purchase a small business. This process usually takes 2 or 3 years. Rotating credit systems (gae), which are based on mutual trust and honor, offer another common source of venture capital. This economic institution could not exist without a high degree of social solidarity within the ethnic community. There are more than 500 community social and business associations in Los Angeles, and nearly every Korean is an active member of one or more of them. In addition, Korean businessmen have utilized public resources from the U.S. Small Business Administration as well as loans and training programs sponsored by the South Korean government (Light, 1980; Bonacich et al., 1977).

The ability of the Korean community to generate a self-sustaining entrepreneurial class has had a profound impact on intraethnic labor relations and patterns of ethnic property transfers. For example, labor relations are enmeshed in extended kinship and friendship networks. In this context of "labor paternalism," working in the ethnic economy frequently entails the obligation of accepting low pay and long hours in exchange for on-the-job training and possible future assistance in establishing a small business. Hence, employment in the ethnic economy possesses a potential for advancement entirely absent from comparable low-wage labor in the secondary labor market.

Along the same lines, business practices are fundamentally influenced by cultural patterns. Koreans patronize coethnic businesses and frequently rely on referrals from members of their social networks. Korean-owned businesses, moreover, tend to remain in the community through intraethnic transactions.
This is because economic mobility typically proceeds through the rapid turnover of immigrant-owned enterprises. A common pattern of succession, for instance, may begin with a business requiring a relatively small investment, such as a wig shop, and continue with the acquisition of enterprises requiring progressively larger capitalizations: grocery stores, restaurants, gas stations, liquor stores, and finally real estate. This circulation of businesses within the ethnic economy provides a continuous source of economic mobility for aspiring immigrant entrepreneurs. Table 1 presents data illustrating both the significant presence of Koreans in the liquor business in the Los Angeles area and the pattern of intraethnic business transfers among Koreans and other Oriental minorities.

The Korean economy is clearly thriving in Los Angeles. Its emerging entrepreneurial class and accumulating assets have created new employment opportunities for an expanding immigrant community. As in the previous historical examples, the principal characteristic of this structure is a dense network of diversified enterprises that provide goods and services both for the ethnic community and for the general market. It is this characteristic that most clearly differentiates an immigrant enclave from the assortment of restaurants and small shops commonly established by other immigrant minorities to cater to their particular cultural needs.

In 1975, Korean enterprises were overrepresented in retail trade and to a minor extent in wholesale trade (Light, 1980). This sectoral concentration no doubt reflects the recent arrival of most immigrant entrepreneurs and thus the fact that many of them are still in an early phase of business succession. Over time, however, successful Korean enterprises should be able to penetrate more highly capitalized sectors of industry and commerce. The initiation of this trend is already apparent in the presence of immigrant-owned firms in intermediate industries such as construction, manufacturing, and transportation and public utilities. Although underrepresented in these sectors due to large capital requirements and stiff outside competition, the emergence of these firms points to the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Buyers</th>
<th>Korean (%)</th>
<th>Chinese (%)</th>
<th>Japanese (%)</th>
<th>Buyers as percent of all buyers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Korean</td>
<td>79.0</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>70.4</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All other</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>74.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (%)</td>
<td>100.1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>641</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

growing diversity of the ethnic economy. With continuing capital accumulation and continuing immigration from Korea, it is unlikely that this process will lose momentum in the near future.

B. Cubans in Miami

Over the past 20 years, nearly 900,000 Cubans or about 10% of the island's population have emigrated, mostly to the United States. The overwhelming proportion of the Cuban population in America, estimated at roughly 800,000, resides in the metropolitan areas of south Florida and New York (Diaz-Briquets and Perez, 1981). This movement of Cuban emigres has not been a continuous or socially homogeneous flow. Instead, it is more accurately described as a series of "waves," marked by abrupt shifts and sudden discontinuities. This pattern has supported the emergence of an enclave economy through such features as spatial concentration, the initial arrival of a moneyed, entrepreneurial class, and subsequent replenishments of the labor pool with refugees coming from more modest class origins.

In 1959, when Fidel Castro overthrew the regime of Fulgencio Batista, the Cuban community in the United States numbered probably less than 30,000 (Jorge and Moncarz, 1982). The political upheavals of the Revolution, however, precipitated a massive emigration from the island. Not surprisingly, the Cuban propertied class, including landowners, industrialists, and former Cuban managers of U.S.-owned corporations, were the first to leave, following close in the heels of leaders of the deposed regime. In the first year of the exodus, approximately 37,000 emigres settled in the United States; most were well-to-do and brought considerable assets with them (Thomas and Huyck, 1967). After the defeat of the exile force in the Bay of Pigs, in April 1961, Cuban emigration accelerated and its social base expanded to include the middle and urban working classes (Clark, 1977). By the end of 1962, the first phase of Cuban emigration had concluded and over 215,000 refugees had been admitted to the United States. The emerging Cuban community in south Florida, unlike earlier Japanese and contemporary Korean settlements, was thus fundamentally conditioned by political forces (Portes and Bach, 1985; Pedraza-Bailey, 1981).

Political factors continued to shape the ups and downs of Cuban emigration as well as its reception by American society over the next two decades. In this period, three additional phases can be distinguished: November 1962 to November 1965, December 1965 to April 1973, and May 1973 to November 1980, including 74,000 in the second phase, 340,000 in the third, and 124,769 in the last (Portes and Bach, 1985, chapter 3). This massive influx of refugees to south Florida generated local complaints about the social and economic strains placed in the area. Accordingly, the policy of the Cuban Refugee Program originally established by the Kennedy Administration, was oriented from the start to resettle Cubans away from Miami. Assistance to the refugees was often made con-
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Tingent on their willingness to relocate. Although over 469,000 Cubans elected to move by 1978, many subsequently returned to metropolitan Miami (Clark, 1977; Boswell, 1984). There is evidence that many of these "returnees" made use of their employment in relatively high-wage Northern areas to accumulate savings with which to start new business ventures in Miami. By 1980, the Cuban-born population of the city, composed to a large extent of returnees from the North, was six times greater than the second largest Cuban concentration in New Jersey (Boswell, 1984).

Although a number of Cuban businesses appeared in Miami in the 1960s, they were mostly restaurants and ethnic shops catering to a small exile clientele. An enclave economy only emerged in the 1970s as a result of a combination of factors, including capital availability, access to low-wage labor provided by new refugee cohorts, and the increasingly tenuous hope of returning to Cuba. Cuban-owned firms in Dade County increased from 919 in 1967 to about 8000 in 1976 and approximately 12,000 in 1982. Most of these firms are small, averaging 8.1 employees in 1977, but they also include factories employing several hundred workers (Diaz-Briquets, 1985; Portes and Bach, 1985, chapter 6). Cuban firms in such sectors as light manufacturing, including apparel, footwear, beverages, cigars, and furniture, construction, agriculture (sugar), and finance and insurance have ceased supplying an exclusively ethnic clientele to become integrated into the broader local economy. Although the Cuban market in south Florida has also grown in size, the key for success among the larger immigrant-owned firms has been to make use of community resources—labor, credit, and information—to compete with better-established outside enterprises (Wilson and Martin, 1982).

This strategy seems to have paid off: between 1969 and 1977, the number of Cuban-owned manufacturing firms almost doubled and construction enterprises virtually tripled. In terms of average gross annual receipts, Cuban manufacturing firms went from a very modest $59,633 in 1969 to $639,817 in 1977, a 1067% increase. By 1972, average gross receipts of Cuban-owned enterprises in Miami exceeded that of Hispanic businesses in other cities, including Los Angeles, which has the largest concentration of such firms (Boswell, 1984; Jorge and Moncarz, 1982). With the exception of banks and other large companies, Cuban service firms continue to depend on an ethnic clientele. The latter, however, has expanded with the growth of both Cuban and other Hispanic populations in the city; service firms have become accordingly larger and more diversified, including restaurants, supermarkets, private clinics, realty offices, legal firms, funeral parlors, and private schools.

The Cuban enclave has been the subject of intense study in recent years. Jorge and Moncarz (1981, 1982) and Diaz-Briquets (1985) have reported on the size and composition of refugee-owned firms in Miami and compared them both with others in the same metropolitan area and with Hispanic enterprises elsewhere. Table 2 presents data drawn from one of these studies on the number of Cuban-
TABLE 2. Firm ownership among Cubans, other Hispanics, and Blacks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ownership</th>
<th>Number of firms</th>
<th>Firms per 100,000 population</th>
<th>Gross receipts per firm ($1000)</th>
<th>Number of firms</th>
<th>Firms per 100,000 population</th>
<th>Employees per firm</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cuban</td>
<td>30,336</td>
<td>3650.5</td>
<td>61.6</td>
<td>5888</td>
<td>672.4</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexican</td>
<td>116,419</td>
<td>1467.7</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>22,718</td>
<td>286.4</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puerto Rican South Central or South American</td>
<td>13,491</td>
<td>740.0</td>
<td>43.9</td>
<td>1767</td>
<td>96.9</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Spanish origin (except other Spanish)</td>
<td>26,301</td>
<td>2573.5</td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td>4900</td>
<td>479.4</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>219,355</td>
<td>1889.7</td>
<td>47.5</td>
<td>41,298</td>
<td>355.8</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>231,203</td>
<td>872.9</td>
<td>37.4</td>
<td>39,968</td>
<td>150.9</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*From Diaz-Briquets (1985).*

owned firms and their relative size in comparison with those owned by other Hispanic groups and black Americans. Although Cuban enterprises are not the most numerous in absolute terms, they are larger on the average and more numerous relative to the respective population. Keeping in mind that sizable Cuban exile immigration started only in 1959 and that the first signs of a Cuban business community did not appear until the late 1960s, the data provide a vivid illustration of the dynamism of the process.

Along similar lines, Wilson and Martin (1982) conducted a sophisticated input—output analysis of business relationships among refugee-owned firms in south Florida and compared them with the predominant pattern among black-owned enterprises in the area. In relation to the latter, Cuban firms were shown to have a high degree of interdependence, with substantial internal "sourcing" among manufacturing and construction firms as well as heavy use of commercial and financial services. This analysis provided the first solid quantitative evidence of a dense network of enterprises at the core of the enclave economy.

These and other studies of immigrant businesses in Miami have been conducted on the basis of secondary data. Paralleling them, other research sought to examine the consequences of these activities for individual mobility through primary data collection. A longitudinal study, initiated in 1973, provided data for an extensive series of statistical analyses on the topic. By 1973 most of the Cuban upper and middle classes had left the country; thus, the 590 adult males interviewed originally in this study came overwhelmingly from lower occupational strata, mostly petty services and industrial blue collar work (Portes, Clark, and Bach, 1977). Despite these modest origins, a sizable number of sample
members managed to move out of wage work and into self-employment after only a few years in the country. Between 1973 and 1976, 8% acquired their own businesses, and by 1979, 21.2% had done so. Adding the self-employed to those working in other Cuban-owned firms, almost half of the sample was found to participate in the enclave labor market in 1979 (Portes and Bach, 1985).

A discriminant analysis conducted on the basis of the 1976 follow-up survey clearly differentiated between refugees employed in enclave firms and those working in either segment of the general labor market. In addition, the analysis found a distinct and significant payoff for human capital brought from Cuba among refugees in the enclave economy (Wilson and Portes, 1980). This analysis was replicated with data from a second follow-up, conducted in 1979, yielding essentially identical results (Portes and Bach, 1985). The positive consequences of the enclave mode of incorporation for individual mobility are also reflected in other findings from the same study, three of which may be cited for illustration:

1. Years of education in Cuba, which have little or no payoff for occupational attainment in either the primary or the secondary labor markets, have the strongest positive effect in the enclave. The same pattern holds true for the effect of occupational aspirations.

2. Refugees employed in the enclave are not at a disadvantage with respect to those in the primary labor market either in terms of average income or rewards for human capital. The situation of both groups is far more advantageous than that of refugees employed in the secondary sector.

3. Self-employment in the enclave is the most remunerative occupation on the average. In 1979, the median monthly earnings of employees in this sample was $974, in comparison with $1194 for the self-employed without workers, and $1924 for the self-employed with at least one salaried worker. Although the number of the latter is small, there is every indication that it is likely to increase in the future.

V. CONCLUSION: A TYPOLOGY OF THE PROCESS OF INCORPORATION

Having reviewed several historical and contemporary examples, we can now attempt a summary description of the characteristics of immigrant enclaves and how they differ from other paths. The emergence of an ethnic enclave economy has three prerequisites: first, the presence of a substantial number of immigrants, with business experience acquired in the sending country; second, the availability of sources of capital; and third, the availability of sources of labor. The latter two conditions are not too difficult to meet. The requisite labor can usually be drawn from family members and, more commonly, from recent arrivals. Surpris-
ingly perhaps, capital is not a major impediment either since the sums initially required are usually small. When immigrants did not bring them from abroad, they could be accumulated through individual savings or pooled resources in the community. It is the first condition that appears critical. The presence of a number of immigrants skilled in what Franklin Frazier (1949) called the art of "buying and selling" is common to all four cases reviewed above. Such an entrepreneurial—commercial class among early immigrant cohorts can usually overcome other obstacles; conversely, its absence within an immigrant community will confine the community to wage employment even if sufficient resources of capital and labor are available.

Enclave businesses typically start small and cater exclusively to an ethnic clientele. Their expansion and entry into the broader market requires, as seen above, an effective mobilization of community resources. The social mechanism at work here seems to be a strong sense of reciprocity supported by collective solidarity that transcends the purely contractual character of business transactions. For example, receipt of a loan from a rotating credit association entails the duty of continuing to make contributions so that others can have access to the same source of capital. Although, in principle, it would make sense for the individual to withdraw once his loan is received, such action would cut him off from the very sources of community support on which his future business success depends (Light, 1972).

Similarly, relations between enclave employers and employees generally transcend a contractual wage bond. It is understood by both parties that the wage paid is inferior to the value of labor contributed. This is willingly accepted by many immigrant workers because the wage is only one form of compensation. Use of their labor represents often the key advantage making poorly capitalized enclave firms competitive. In reciprocity, employers are expected to respond to emergency needs of their workers and to promote their advancement through such means as on-the-job training, advancement to supervisory positions, and aid when they move into self-employment. These opportunities represent the other part of the "wage" received by enclave workers. The informal mobility ladders thus created are, of course, absent in the secondary labor market where there is no primary bond between owners and workers or no common ethnic community to enforce the norm of reciprocity.

Paternalistic labor relations and strong community solidarity are also characteristic of middleman minorities. Although both modes of incorporation are similar and are thus frequently confused, there are three major structural differences between them. First, immigrant enclaves are not exclusively commercial. Unlike middleman minorities, whose economic role is to mediate commercial and financial transactions between elites and masses, enclave firms include in addition a sizable productive sector. The latter may comprise agriculture, light manufacturing, and construction enterprises; their production, marketed often by
nic intermediaries, is directed toward the general economy and not exclusively to the immigrant community.

Second, relationships between enclave businesses and established native ones are problematic. Middleman groups tend to occupy positions complementary and subordinate to the local owning class; they fill economic niches either disdained or feared by the latter. Unlike them, enclave enterprises often enter in direct competition with existing domestic firms. There is no evidence, for example, that domestic elites deliberately established or supported the emergence of the Jewish, Japanese, Korean, or Cuban business communities as means to further their own economic interests. There is every indication, on the other hand, that this mode of incorporation was largely self-created by the immigrants, often in opposition to powerful domestic interests. Although it is true that enclave entrepreneurs have been frequently employed as subcontractors by outside firms in such activities as garment and construction (Bonacich, 1978), it is incorrect to characterize this role as the exclusive or dominant one among these enterprises.

Third, the enclave is concentrated and spatially identifiable. By the very nature of their activities, middleman minorities must often be dispersed among the mass of the population. Although the immigrants may live in certain limited areas, their businesses require proximity to their mass clientele and a measure of physical dispersion within it. It is true that middleman activities such as moneylending have been associated in several historical instances with certain streets and neighborhoods, but this is not a necessary or typical pattern. Street peddling and other forms of petty commerce require merchants to go into the areas where demand exists and avoid excessive concentration of the goods and services they offer. This is the typical pattern found today among middleman minorities in American cities (Cobas, 1984; Kim, 1981).

Enclave businesses, on the other hand, are spatially concentrated, especially in their early stages. This is so for three reasons: first, the need for proximity to the ethnic market which they initially serve; second, proximity to each other which facilitates exchange of information, access to credit, and other supportive activities; third, proximity to ethnic labor supplies on which they crucially depend. Of the four immigrant groups discussed above, only the Japanese partially departs from the pattern of high physical concentration. This can be attributed to the political persecution to which this group was subjected. Originally, Japanese concentration was a rural phenomenon based on small farms linked together by informal bonds and cooperative associations. Forced removal of this minority from the land compelled their entry into urban businesses and their partial dispersal into multiple activities.

Physical concentration of enclaves underlies their final characteristic. Once an enclave economy has fully developed, it is possible for a newcomer to live his life entirely within the confines of the community. Work, education, and access to health care, recreation, and a variety of other services can be found without
leaving the bounds of the ethnic economy. This institutional completeness is what enables new immigrants to move ahead economically, despite very limited knowledge of the host culture and language. Supporting empirical evidence comes from studies showing low levels of English knowledge among enclave minorities and the absence of a net effect of knowledge of English on their average income levels (Light, 1980; Portes and Bach, 1985).

Table 3 summarizes this discussion by presenting the different modes of incorporation and their principal characteristics. Two caveats are necessary. First, this typology is not exhaustive, since other forms of adaptation have existed and will undoubtedly emerge in the future. Second, political refugees are not included, since this entry label does not necessarily entail a unique adaptation path. Instead, refugees can select or be channelled in many different directions, including self-employment, access to primary labor markets, or confinement to secondary sector occupations.

Having discussed the characteristics of enclaves and middleman minorities, a final word must be said about the third alternative to employment in the lower tier of a dual labor market. As a mode of incorporation, primary sector immigration also has distinct advantages, although they are of a different order from those pursued by "entrepreneurial" minorities. Dispersal throughout the receiving country and career mobility based on standard promotion criteria makes it imperative for immigrants in this mode to become fluent in the new language and culture (Stevens, Goodman, and Mick, 1978). Without a supporting ethnic community, the second generation also becomes thoroughly steeped in the ways of the host society. Primary sector immigration thus tends to lead to very rapid social and cultural integration. It represents the path that approximates most closely the predictions of assimilation theory with regard to (1) the necessity of acculturation for social and economic progress and (2) the subsequent rewards received by immigrants and their descendants for shedding their ethnic identities.

Clearly, however, this mode of incorporation is open only to a minority of immigrant groups. In addition, acculturation of professionals and other primary sector immigrants is qualitatively different from that undergone by others. Regardless of their differences, immigrants in other modes tend to learn the new language and culture with a heavy "local" content. Although acculturation may be slow, especially in the case of enclave groups, it carries with it elements unique to the surrounding community—its language inflections, particular traditions, and loyalties (Greeley, 1971; Suttles, 1968). On the contrary, acculturation of primary sector immigrants is of a more cosmopolitan sort. Because career requirements often entail physical mobility, the new language and culture are learned more rapidly and more generally, without strong attachments to a particular community. Thus, while minorities entering menial labor, enclave, or middleman enterprise in the United States have eventually become identified with a certain city or region, the same is not true for immigrant professionals, who tend
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Primary sector immigration</th>
<th>Secondary sector immigration</th>
<th>Immigrant enclaves</th>
<th>Middleman minorities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Size of immigrant population</td>
<td>Small</td>
<td>Large</td>
<td>Large</td>
<td>Small</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spatial concentration, national</td>
<td>Dispersed</td>
<td>Dispersed</td>
<td>Concentrated</td>
<td>Concentrated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spatial concentration, local</td>
<td>Dispersed</td>
<td>Homogeneous: skilled workers and professionals</td>
<td>Concentrated</td>
<td>Dispersed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Original class composition</td>
<td>Homogeneous: manual laborers</td>
<td>High mean status/low variance</td>
<td>Mean status/high variance</td>
<td>Homogeneous: merchants and some professionals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present occupational status distribution</td>
<td>High: formal promotion ladders</td>
<td>Low mean status/low variance</td>
<td>Low: weak social institutions</td>
<td>Average: informal ethnic ladders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobility opportunities</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High: informal ethnic ladders</td>
<td>Medium: strong social and economic institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional diversification of ethnic community</td>
<td></td>
<td>Low: weak social institutions</td>
<td>High: institutional completeness</td>
<td>High: institutional completeness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in ethnic organizations</td>
<td>Little or none</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resilience of ethnic culture</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge of host country language</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Hostility</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge of host country institutions</td>
<td>Acceptance</td>
<td>Discrimination</td>
<td></td>
<td>Mixed: elite acceptance/mass hostility</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
to "disappear," in a cultural sense, soon after their arrival (Stevens et al., 1978; Cardona and Cruz, 1980).

Awareness of patterned differences among immigrant groups in their forms of entry and labor market incorporation represents a significant advance, in our view, from earlier undifferentiated descriptions of the adaptation process. This typology is, however, a provisional effort. Just as detailed research on the condition of particular minorities modified or replaced earlier broad generalizations, the propositions advanced here will require revision. New groups arriving in the United States at present and a revived interest in immigration should provide the required incentive for empirical studies and theoretical advances in the future.

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