

RESPONSIBILITY

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The omnipresence of the term responsibility in ethics and popular speech is both an advantage and a disadvantage. The term responsibility is constantly used as if everyone knows what it is, and that the only problem is that we do not have enough of it. I think one has to dig down into the historical and philosophical roots of responsibility before deciding how helpful the term can be.

The term responsible originated from a mixture of Jewish, Christian and Roman elements about two thousand years ago. The word has a Latin origin and did not have an exact equivalent in Greek. "Responsibility" gets attributed to Aristotle; however, Aristotle's visual imagery clashes with responsibility as an oral/aural metaphor. The Greeks also lacked the idea of psychological freedom or a freedom of the will which is closely related to responsibility.

Responsibility originated in connection with the emergence of the individual - the child of a heavenly father - in pharisaic Judaism. The other necessary element for the originating of the term was the sense of judgment; that is, the belief that the individual must answer for his or her life's actions. The legal thinking that blossomed in both Latin Christianity and Rabbinic Judaism joined with the Hebrew Bible to produce a description of the human being as responsible.

It is important to allow in every voice to the exploring of responsibility's meaning. I do not presume that responsibility is exclusively the concern of ethicists or people who are said to be ethical. Much of contemporary discussion assumes that some people are responsible and other people are not. I do not wish to exclude people who for whatever reason have already been classified as not responsible. Being responsible is widely praised, especially by rich, powerful, successful and upright people who confidently assume that they have "taken responsibility for their lives."

I would first argue that responsibility is a characteristic of all human beings and at least some nonhuman beings. The root meaning of responsible is "able to answer a word that has been spoken." This spoken word can be human speech or a metaphorical extension of it. And the answering can be performed by every human being, including infants, people who are called mentally retarded, hardened criminals, people dying of old age. The answer might take a form other

than the words of human language. Some physical or mental act could be the acknowledgment of the word that has been spoken and heard.

Some nonhuman animals clearly fall within this meaning of responsible. Anyone who spends time with a dog, a cat, a horse, a dolphin, a chimp knows that at least some animals are able to respond to a word that has been spoken. One of Descartes' strange doctrines was that (nonhuman) animals are mechanisms.ⁱ From Descartes' era until Darwin's revolution, the "beast" did not fare well; it was an object for disposal by rational man. Darwin's work began a restoration of continuity between human and nonhuman animals.

A horse or a dog can be disciplined (taught) by a trainer to respond in some ways and not in other ways.ⁱⁱ Sometimes we even hold something close to a criminal trial. If a pit bull attacks a child, it is likely to be restrained or killed. Words such as vicious, savage or criminal are used to describe the animal. We stop short of imputing guilt to the dog but we do hold it responsible for bad behavior.

Is an elephant responding to another elephant an instance of responsible activity? The choice is ours as to how far we extend the metaphor of answering a word that has been spoken. I see no problem in extending "responsible" to the entire living world so long as human responsibility is not de-emphasized. The inclusion of nonhuman animals can in fact throw light on key distinctions within human responsibility. However, the use of "responsible" as a synonym for an impersonal cause can obscure the distinctive character that the term responsible had at its origin and still most often has.

Responsibility has always been more important than simply one of the virtues. There are no classical accounts of a virtue of responsibility and no medieval treatises on the subject. The word itself lay mostly hidden until the eighteenth century but it underlies the Jewish and Christian sense of what a human being is: the being who listens and responds to the one who is creator of the universe and its ultimate judge.

The line between moral and non-moral is very often unclear and the line can move during the course of one's life. The context for understanding morality is lost if responsibility is equated to moral responsibility. It is important to recognize that we often do not know if a person is morally responsible for a bad action (deserving of blame), even when we judge that the behavior is unacceptable. Courts have to judge whether a defendant is legally responsible, that is, guilty or innocent before the law. Fortunately for all of us, the judgment of

moral guilt is reserved for God.

RESPONSIBLE TO AND RESPONSIBLE FOR

Responsibility in the life of the human being has two elements: listening and answering, or being responsible to and responsible for. The process of acting responsibly is a dialectical play between these elements. The first moment of responsibility is listening, that is, being responsible to someone or something. The second moment is replying: one is responsible for the action that follows upon listening. This dialectical exchange then issues in a third moment, namely, responding to what one has been responsible for. This interplay continues throughout a person's lifetime. At any moment, I can only be responsible for what I am responsible to. But what I am responsible to is dependent on what I have previously been responsible for.ⁱⁱⁱ

This interdependence of responsible to and responsible for may seem to doom the human being to a closed cycle of determined behavior. Can there be any moral progress if I am responsible for my actions only insofar as I am aware of responsibility, an awareness which is itself dependent on how moral I am? Human beings are, indeed, strongly conditioned by genetic makeup, early experiences and the physical/social environment. It is easy to show that human beings are not free in the way they often think they are. Much of evolutionary biology today seems ready to close the circle and exclude freedom.^{iv}

The human being would indeed be left to fate if the sense of responsible to is omitted or if it is underdeveloped. Freedom depends on attentiveness to what is happening and on a capacity to reflect upon previous actions in a way that gradually widens the cycle of responsible to and responsible for.^v A failing in responsibility often lies in what is not done because we are unaware that it should be done. The failure to attend - to be responsible to - is often at the base of moral fault. Ignorance can be culpable (morally even if not legally) when we could have known and should have known but we are selectively unaware.

Until the late nineteenth century, the word responsible was nearly always followed by to. The action of a person depended on to whom or to what it was a response. The first use in the Oxford English Dictionary refers to a legislature being responsible to the people.^{vi} Of course, it was assumed that responsibility for particular actions would follow, but the basic meaning of the word was answering to someone or something.

Responsible To

The first question of responsibility is to whom and to what should one listen. The short but comprehensive answer is: one should listen to everyone and everything. Obviously that is not an efficient strategy. We need help to sort out the many voices in our heads and to interpret what we are summoned to. Nonetheless, the important word at a particular moment might be spoken by friend or stranger, young or old, living or dead, brilliant or slow witted, human or nonhuman. Responsible human listening cannot in principle be closed to wisdom coming from any source.

In practice, all of us adopt guides and guidelines in which we trust. A parent or a friend may be the chief guide when we are young. A scholar or a school of thought may later gain our trust. A religious tradition is such a guide for how to interpret the whole of reality. Jewish and Christian traditions say that God is more likely to speak here rather than there, but listen carefully because it could be just the opposite. Those who demand a premature certainty are likely to become attached to one set of ideas that increasingly filter out much of the beauty and meaning in life. The alternative to a system of fixed certainties is a gradual growth in certainty as one's life is lived in response to the best lights that one has at any moment.

The first step in a life of moral responsibility is the receptive phase. Morality begins not with right, duty, law or decision but with the readiness to receive. Giving and receiving are opposite ends of a single relation; there is no giver without a receiver. In human exchanges, receiving is a form of giving oneself; the giver therefore receives in giving.^{vii} Human gifts keep moving until they return to the giver. If the circle is too small, the sense of gift may get replaced by the calculation of self-interest. But if one passes on the gift without calculating the return, the circle keeps expanding.

The test of who is my neighbor was already conveyed in the Hebrew Bible by the question: What will you do for the stranger who is in need? This understanding of the love of neighbor was beautifully illustrated in many of Jesus' parables, such as the story of the Good Samaritan. The person who is my neighbor is not always the person closest to me. The neighbor may be the one who is farthest from me.^{viii}

In summary, the meaning of "responsible to" should be as broad and as deep as is possible. In practice, breadth and depth stand in some tension. We have to look for the best combination of them. One friend's advice may be too little, but the advice of ten colleagues may be too much, especially if none of the

advice comes from the depths of friendship. Ten historical documents are not more revealing than one document that speaks to the heart of the matter. There are no clear rules for how each of us combines a broad-based response and a response from the depths of the self. We are not certain of the best way to respond in a given situation, but we can surely be aware that a narrow and shallow response is the wrong way.

Responsible For

If we are responsible to in the best way that we know how, we will get a more precise understanding of what we are responsible for. A vague, narrow or shallow understanding of what we are responsible to will lead to a distortion in what our responsibility is for. One such distortion takes the form of an aggressive seizing upon some activity as a quick resolution of life's problems. People "make decisions" to change careers, choose a marriage partner, lose fifty pounds or quit school, without attending to important voices outside themselves and without lining up support within their own bodies.

The extreme case of this distortion is the terrorist who "takes responsibility" for a bombing. All the terrorists in the world seem to speak the language of responsibility. I suspect that having been hectored to take responsibility for his life, the terrorist says: "You want me to take responsibility. Here it is."

The distortion of responsibility by a terrorist is easy to recognize but there are many subtle distortions in relation to what we are responsible for. In this section, I look at how we are often mistaken in understanding our responsibility : 1) for other people 2) for our own life 3) for things.

1. I am not responsible for other people, except when they cannot perform some needed act. We are regularly urged to take responsibility for others. So widespread is the belief that we should be responsible for other people that the opposite is often judged to be morally reprehensible. The favorite phrase here is that I should be "my brother's keeper."^x The assumption which accompanies the phrase is that the answer to Cain's question in Genesis "Am I my brother's keeper?" is obviously yes. But in the Bible God does not answer the question. If God had answered, I think the reply might have been: "No, I did not ask you to be your brother's keeper. Brothers are neither for keeping nor for killing. I asked you to be your brother's brother"

My first responsibility for actions in regard to others is to be responsible to them. Then the action will be in the best interest of what relates us: if a brother,

love; if an enemy, reconciliation; if a stranger, care for needs. When one assumes a world of isolated individuals, then the question is: Should I be responsible for myself alone or should I also be responsible for other people. But in a relational world, the question is: Should I be responsible for other people or to other people. The latter is the way that my responsibility respects the freedom of other people.

Professional people, such as politicians, physicians or priests, need to be regularly reminded that responsibility should not creep over into paternalistic usurpation of the other's freedom. The exception in taking responsibility for other people is that each human being does have times when he or she cannot decide things for himself or herself. That is the case for all of us when we are very young; a one-year-old cannot prepare its dinner. The same case may be true for people who are very old and near death. The situation of an old person not able to decide for himself or herself has become increasingly the case. And throughout the life of each person, events may temporarily prevent a person from acting on his or her own behalf.

If a person's incapacity to act is temporary, someone else has to supply actions for as long as and to the extent that the person is incapacitated. Toward the end of life this incapacitated condition may be permanent, and someone may have to decide to discontinue mechanical means that are being used to keep a patient alive. Continuing to use a respirator or a feeding tube is a human decision just as much as is terminating its use.^x

When someone else has to be responsible for our actions, we hope it will be a close family member or a friend who has our best interests in mind. Lacking that, we can hope for an ethics committee in a hospital to defend our interests. Any of us may become responsible for acting on behalf of a stranger. If I come upon a crime or an accident and a person needs medical help, I can be morally responsible for getting that assistance. The United States does not have a "good samaritan law" that would hold the bystander legally responsible. Nevertheless, if I am the person on the scene, some action is morally called for, if only to dial 911.

2) I am responsible for those actions over which I have sufficient control; I am not responsible for my life. Each of us is the product of heredity, environment and early nurturing that leave some of our behavior beyond a direct or immediate control. Some people have truly severe addictions that make their lives a mess. Each of us has impulses, drives and attachments that are incomprehensible to ourselves. But except for extreme cases, people retain the ability to reflect on their behavior and to take a step away from their worst behavior.

Freedom consists mainly in the ability to say no. At times (in a prison, within an unhappy family, on a needed job), one cannot do any more than say no, but that ability can be the difference between retaining the dignity of a human being and sinking into an inhuman state. By repeatedly saying no and doing what is possible at any moment, a person may gradually widen the area of behavior over which he or she has moral responsibility.^{xi}

In acknowledging moral responsibility for actions over which I have sufficient control, the qualifier, “sufficient,” is necessarily ambiguous. Sometimes I am certain of being morally responsible for an action; the action is thoroughly mine.^{xii} Sometimes I am uncertain if I am morally responsible because of external or internal pressures. If I sometimes cannot judge my own responsibility, all the more is it true that I cannot judge other people’s moral responsibility.

While I should take responsibility for some actions, I think one should avoid the claim that “I take full responsibility.” The person who makes that claim is usually caught within a complex set of circumstances. The person may have done some horrible deed and cannot understand his or her own motives. Or the person is a member of an organization that is involved in some serious wrong doing. In both cases, the individual cannot take full responsibility because it is not there for the taking. If the person is famous, the news media demand that he or she come forth and take full responsibility. Then the ritual of the person saying that he or she does so is applauded.

The person who has a realistic understanding of responsibility has a grasp of the seriousness of his or her moral failing and is determined that it will not happen again. He or she is likely to say: I accept responsibility for my part in this wrong doing. I do not fully understand how this happened. I am taking steps a, b, c or d to prevent a recurrence. For example, I am going to a therapist, I am joining a support group, I am resigning from my job, I am reassigning a worker.

Throughout the course of life, responsibility is for an action. My life as a whole is not available. Telling someone to “take responsibility for your life” is not helpful and can be depressing. The person who receives such advice cannot get control of his or her life by a decision. What a person can do is accept some responsibility for the action that he or she is about to perform. In taking that one responsible step the person might begin to reorient his or her life.

3. I am responsible for creatures who cannot decide things for themselves. Human beings are responsible for the things of creation that are not responsible

for themselves. Ironically, we often reverse these principles and assume that we are responsible for people but not for things. It is things that we are clearly responsible for. The things sometimes includes nonhuman animals but the ability of animals to decide many things for themselves should be respected. Vegetative life and non-living things, as far as we can determine, cannot decide anything. Human beings need to accept responsibility for protecting the environment and caring for individual elements within the environment. Sometimes that means aggressive action on behalf of a river, a forest, or an ocean front. Sometimes human responsibility is exercised by non-interference, leaving intact the cycle of living things.

RESPONSIBILITY AS PERSONAL/CORPORATE

One of the distinctions that most hampers a discussion of responsibility is the assumed contrast between individual responsibility and social responsibility. The contrast is deeply ingrained in modern politics, economics and ethics. The language of individual/social is not up to the task for which it is invoked. It does little to control the rapacious aspects of the economic system. Social responsibility cannot encompass the complicated organizations of today nor the human relation to the physical environment.

If responsibility is to everyone and everything; if responsibility is for things rather than other people, there is no reason why moral responsibility should exclude impersonal relations. For that to happen, however, one must start with a distinction that relates personal and impersonal, rather than with the dichotomy of social and individual. Responsibility is always personal/corporate, that is, every act of responsibility is both a personal action and within a corporate structure. At the center of response is the understanding and freedom of a personal being. And the context of every moral decision is corporate or bodily existence. The corporate begins with the physical organism and extends into innumerable bodily organizations.

The term personal carries connotations that "individual" lacks. A person is an actor, one who plays a role in the drama of life. The word person means to speak through a mask; the person is always partly hidden but is present through speaking. While playing many scenes, the actor in life's drama may be unclear as to how that scene fits into the overall plot. The actor has to trust that, by playing each scene to the best of his or her ability, a unity of personal existence will emerge. The actor in life always has conflicts in reaching a coalescence of character.^{xiii} No one is transparent to himself or herself; one's own motives are never entirely clear. Why did I do that? Should I have acted differently? Hannah

Arendt wrote that only bad people have clear consciences. The rest of us live with moral ambiguity, aware of our failures and the need for forgiveness.^{xiv}

The term “individual,” in contrast, does not suggest a dialogue that is internal to the self. The individual is a unit in actuarial tables, economic forecasts and scientific studies. The responsible person, however, is an actor who has to negotiate a decision with his or her bodily self, past as well as present. The lack of unity in a person is not best described as a conflict of body and spirit or as an opposition of reason and passion. In a negotiation of speaking and listening, the choice is between a superficial reason and a deeper reason that includes passion.^{xv}

A corporation is any organization or institution, any body that is visible in space and time. A human body is a corporation, as is the Boston Celtics, the United States Senate, the city of Rome, the American Medical Association or Exxon Oil. It may seem quixotic to attempt retrieving the term corporation from its nearly exclusive control by the business corporation. In support of such a project, I offer three points of evidence: First, there is no etymological reason why the business world has any more right to the term corporation than any other body. Second, other corporations have been recognized as legal persons for over a thousand years.^{xvi} Third, many religious, political and educational organizations today retain a share of the term corporation as non-profit organizations. Exploring responsibility requires preserving and shoring up “corporation” as the name for dozens of settings in which people act each day.

There is not one set of ethical rules for business and a different set for actions elsewhere. The business corporation is continuous with other corporateness in human life. This fact does not preclude distinguishing between persons, whether natural or artificial, in legal rulings. The 2010 Supreme Court decision allowing large business corporations to spend unlimited amounts of money in political campaigns is obtuse in not acknowledging the size and economic power of some artificial persons.

The business corporation has points of similarity with other organizations (families, schools, political parties, sports teams) in the need to devise ways for the exercise of its power that recognize the responsibility of the corporation. It also has to give protection and support to the exercise of responsibility by “natural persons” within the organization. The structure *for* responsibility in a business or another kind of corporation must have a responsibility *to* its own members.

Max Weber is correct in saying that modern capitalism makes it difficult to

say who is responsible for what. The problem should not be exacerbated by a radical individualism that regards institutions as completely impersonal, that is, other than us. Personal/corporate responsibility means to listen and respond to the main corporate structures that are extensions of myself. On extreme occasions responsibility can involve a total refusal to cooperate with one of the formative institutions of one's life. For example, one might responsibly resist if asked to fight in an immoral war or to sell a deadly product. One may have to leave the country, go to jail, quit one's job, or blow the whistle on one's employer.

No such steps should be taken precipitously without exploring other possibilities and without measuring one's ability to bear the burden of heavy responsibility. Most of the time, less dramatic action is called for. In most jobs, one can exercise responsibility by responding to one's boss, letting him or her know if something is wrong. If that does not work, there should be other means available to handle such problems (and if there are no other means available, one's responsibility may include trying to develop them). Going to the local television reporter or to Sixty Minutes is a last resort and not a career-enhancing move.

No one has the luxury of thinking that he or she is uncontaminated by the ethical problems of today's business world. We are all responsible to that world and, depending on our roles, responsible for some part of that world. Our responsibility varies in an organization according to the position we occupy: customer, neighbor, employee, member, director, owner.^{xvii} If I am a neighbor I usually have no responsibility for the company, although it probably has some responsibility for actions affecting my well-being. If I buy a product, I share responsibility - if only in a minuscule way - for the corporation's policies. If I am a member or employee I associate myself and my reputation with the ethics of the corporation. If I am a member of the governing board or executive council, I share a direct responsibility for the corporate decisions. I can be held legally responsible for crimes committed by the corporation.

It should be noted, however, that an employee or even an owner does not invest the whole of his or her personhood in the corporation. People invest themselves to varying degrees, according to the nature of the organization, as well as their personal inclinations. One would expect deeper investment in being a father, a citizen or a church member than in following a business career or belonging to a club. The distinctions here are more complicated than is generally assumed and we lack an adequate language to formulate questions.

RESPONSIBILITY AND TIME

Responsibility as always both personal and corporate helps to fill in how the relation of past and present is constituted. A responsibility to everyone and everything includes a responsibility to the past. At least in principle, this responsibility to the past is clear. It means responsibility includes my listening to the voices of the past for guidance in the present. The hazier issue is whether and how someone is responsible for the past. Can a person today be held responsible for actions committed in the past?

The moral responsibility for my own past goes back as far as my childhood. Can it go back further? Is a Christian born in the twentieth century responsible for the persecution of Jews in fifteenth-century Toledo? Is a German born in 1947 responsible for Nazi atrocities? Is a white citizen in today's United States responsible for the horrors of slavery? To all these questions an answer other than no seems grossly unfair. Yet such questions do not go away. In discussions of these issues, someone typically says "of course I don't believe in collective guilt..." and then goes on to attribute a kind of collective guilt spreading back into the past.

. "Germany," "Christian church" or "United States" are not fictions, nor are they (social) collections of individuals. They are corporate realities or artificial persons that are responsible for some actions. A member of one of these organizations shares in the corporate act to the degree he or she decides, praises, approves, accepts, silently rejects, quietly opposes or publicly protests the actions of the body.

As a member of one of these organizations in the present, I am morally responsible for protesting against an immoral act. As a member of the organization at a later time in history, I am still responsible for protesting - in the form of present actions - something clearly immoral in the past. Adult voices in the United States were needed in 1945 to protest the progressively immoral bombings of Tokyo, Hiroshima and Nagasaki; few voices were heard. There is still a need for protest, although it obviously takes a different form more than half a century later.

As a United States citizen I am not responsible for those actions in the past but I am responsible to those past actions, which will lead to being responsible for present actions. Nothing is gained by having people feel vaguely guilty for crimes they did not commit. The rest of the world does not expect the United States and its citizens to wallow in guilt for past transgressions. But other countries would

like assurance that the United States is responsible to its past, the bad memories as well as the good, so as to learn some lessons. Responsible action in the present has to be grounded in such knowledge.

Acceptance of the past in the present is connected to how we view the future. In a strange way, the past (the meaning of our past) depends upon the future (our present projection of a future). The common image of time as a series of points creates a false symmetry of past and future. The past exists in a way that the future does not. Our responsibility to the future is fundamentally different from our listening to the voices of the past because one cannot be responsible to voices not yet spoken. We also cannot be responsible for future actions because those actions have not yet been performed. Nevertheless, we still sense a responsibility that we have in regard to the future, even though individual and social responsibility leave any connection to the future inexplicable.

A personal/corporate responsibility reveals two definite connections to the future: corporations and children. As a member of a corporation my present actions can influence the future. One of the main differences between natural and artificial persons is that the former die but the latter can be chartered in perpetuity. My present responsibility is mediated to the future by political, religious, environmental and business corporations. I am responsible to the future and for the future insofar as I act within a corporation that will outlive me.

There is some irony in this fact. In the thinking of liberal theoreticians, progress has been measured by the individual's freedom from control by institutions. And yet, our contribution to a better world depends upon the extension of our corporate selves into the corporate structures of large organizations. Peter French writes: "The endurance of corporate persons, a prospect that terrorized the Enlightenment liberals, insures the projection of moral and cultural responsibilities in both temporal directions."^{xviii}

The other link to the future, to a future that has already begun, is children. One can be responsible to and for the future by caring for children. Adults have a responsibility for children - to the degree that a child cannot be responsible for its own actions. Parents have a special responsibility for their own children's actions. But the parent has to be careful to slowly relinquish responsibility as the child gets older.

The danger of well-meaning adults is that they substitute their decisions for the child's own responsibility. A child is responsible from the moment of birth, if not earlier. Adults have to provide a safe haven during the time that infants and

young children try out their responsibility to their environment and their responsibility for what they can do by their own physical and mental powers. A child's moral responsibility is not something that arrives all at once or even in one year. Modern studies have not significantly changed the traditional view that children can exercise a moral sense by age five or six, but that a developed moral responsibility for one's actions is not present until the teenage years.

The aim of the adult ought to be to continuously increase the young person's own responsibility. If a young person commits crimes, the parents have to examine what went wrong. The parents quite possibly share some responsibility for the child's failure. However, recent efforts in the United States to make parents legally responsible for actions by their sixteen- or eighteen-year-old children are unfair.^{xix}

Children, it is often said, are the promise of the future. The statement is true in the most literal sense. For most religious groups, children are God's special representative. In Christian history from Augustine to the Puritans, children were cast as vessels of sin in need of harsh discipline. In modern times, children are more often sentimentalized as the model of human innocence. Neither attitude does justice to children as the embodying of possibility, promise and hope for the future.^{xx} In negotiations to end factional wars, no more important question can be asked than: What about the children?

i. Rene Descartes, *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*, Vol III (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 99-100, 302-04, 365-66; John Cottingham, "A Brute to the Brutes? Descartes Treatment of Animals," *Philosophy*, 53 (1978), 551-59.

ii. Vicki Hearne, *Adam's Task: Calling Animals by Name* (New York: Knopf, 1986).

iii. Martin Buber, "Education," in *Between Man and Man* (New York: Macmillan, 1965), 92: "We practice responsibility for that realm of life allotted and entrusted to us for which we are able to respond, that is, for which we have a relation of deeds which may count - in all our inadequacy - as a proper response."

iv. Edward Wilson, *On Human Nature* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978); G. Stent, *Morality as a Biological Phenomenon* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978); for a spirited criticism of today's Darwinism, see Marilynne Robinson, *The Death of Adam* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1998), 28-75

v. William Schweiker, *Responsibility and Christian Ethics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 146- 47.

vi. *Compact Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary*, II, 2514.

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- vii. Gabriel Marcel, Philosophy of Existentialism, (New York: Citadel, 1961), 99.
- viii. Dietrich Bonhoeffer, *Ethics*, 259; Frank Kermode, *Genesis of Secrecy* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979), 38.
- ix. Agnes Heller, “What is and What is not Practical Reason,” in *Universalism vs. Communitarianism*, ed. David Rasmussen (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1990), 166: “The ominous ‘Am I my brother’s keeper?’ Is the paragon of the wrong response (for it means the refusal to take responsibility).”
- x. Ira Byock, Dying Well (New York: Riverhead, 1997); Daniel Callahan, The Troubled Dream: Living with Mortality (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1993).
- xi. Anthony Giddens, *The Transformation of Intimacy* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), 107-08
- xii. Mary Midgley, *The Ethical Primate* (New York: Routledge, 1994), 82: “We are free - not if we do something unpredictable but - if our act is our own.”
- xiii. Elizabeth Wolgast, *Ethics of an Artificial Person* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), 9-10.
- xiv. Hannah Arendt, *The Life of the Mind: Vol I: Thinking* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1978), 5.
- xv. Friedrich von Hugel, *The Mystical Element of Religion* (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1923), I, 43.
- xvi. P.W. Duff, *Personality in Roman Private Law* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1938).
- xvii. James Coleman, *The Asymmetrical Society* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1982), 84.
66. Peter French, *Responsibility Matters*, 145.
- xix. On the ambiguity of the term “child” and the consequent confusion about children’s rights, see Michael Freeman and P. Veerman, eds., The Ideologies of Children’s Rights (Dordrecht: Martin Nijhof, 1992); Lawrence Houlgate, “Children, Paternalism and Rights to Liberty,” in Having Children, ed. Onora O’Neil and William Ruddick (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979).
- xx. Edmund Morgan, The Puritan Family (New York: Harper Torch, 1966), 91; Bernard Wishy, The Child and the Republic (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1968); Mary Cable, The Little Darlings (New York: Scribner, 1975).