I: DISCERNING THE ACTORS
The purpose of this section of the handbook is to enable policymakers to discern all the actors who take part in, have an effect on or a stake in the provision of culture. (Culture is understood here in all its acceptations: artistic, folk, anthropological, ethnic, national, industrial, developmental, etc.) Only thus will policymakers better foresee the outcome of their efforts. Cultural policy can be understood both as the action of government agencies and other authorized institutional bodies (e.g., academies and educational institutions, associations of artists and museum personnel) and as the de facto outcome of the operations of unofficial entities, most often without public sanction: culture industries and their distribution circuits, banks and corporations, national and international foundations and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), social movements, tourism enterprises, multilateral development institutions, and other governmental agencies that apparently have little to do with culture (e.g., municipal economic development divisions). This dual structure has become even more complex as the processes identified with globalization have reconfigured the boundaries that made it possible for nation-states and localities to maintain a stable sense of what culture is, what purposes it serves, who produces and consumes it, and how it is distributed.

A list of actors and stakeholders would look something like the following: officials of: national, local and supranational ministries/secretariats of culture and/or communications and information departments; professional practitioners: directors and managers of museums and cultural organizations, artists (painters, dancers, architects, costume designers, tattoo artists, etc.), teletechnological workers (web designers and webmasters, telecoms, managers, etc.), officials in charge of relations with publics, conservators; community groups (from “ladies” museum-visiting associations to minority advocacy organizations); heritage institutions; private philanthropic funders; corporate funders; foundations and nongovernmental organizations; educators in arts and cultural administration training programs; cultural journalists; cultural attachés; copyright lawyers; tax lawyers; trade negotiators; arts and cultural service/trade organizations and lobbyists; arts and cultural unions; entertainment corporation executives; think tanks (Hoover, Brookings, Rand, Institute for Policy Studies); marketers; censors; film exhibitors; ombudsmen; economic statistics research centers; and so on.

However, what follows does not endeavor to elucidate such a list; instead, a range of scenarios is offered in which actors, some not always visible to the policy-maker, can be seen in operation. We begin with a historical account of cultural policy that will enable us to discern how globalization has altered the circumstances of supporting and accounting for culture, bringing new actors onto the stage and having others exit.

II: HISTORY  
a. NATIONAL CULTURAL POLICIES  
While states have almost always implemented cultural policies (e.g., Castile imposed language
policy on other Iberian kingdoms and in the colonies as of 1492; artists and writers received the royal patronage in the city states of the Renaissance and emergent European nations as early as the 16th century), international awareness of the reliance of sovereignty on a national culture was a consequence of the first wave of decolonization from Europe in the late 18th and early 19th centuries. Educational policy occupied the role of cultural policy in this early period. For example, Andrés Bello (1781-1865), architect of Chile's (and, by extension, many other Latin American countries') educational systems, argued that the newly decolonized countries would not be truly independent until they consolidated independent cultures, based on local practices, not on European models. Bello, moreover, was a linguist who catalogued and analyzed local expressions and designed a totally original grammar that broke with the custom of patterning linguistic structure after the classical languages. Bello also designed new systems of historiography, natural history and law that would provide the moral—i.e., cultural—environment in which the various classes and races would be acculturated.

It might be said that the first cultural policies correspond to the practices put in place by 19th century Europe states to consolidate the nation by forming proper citizens. As a custodian of nationalism, the state endeavored to form cultural citizens as virtuous political participants through self-scrutiny and self-improvement. A second wave of cultural policies ensued from early 20th century communist and fascist revolutions, which required “reengineering” citizens. The result were the “command cultures” instituted in the 1920s and 1930s in the Soviet Union, Germany and Italy. In Mexico and Brazil in the 1920s and 1930s, where cultural policy was a crucial ingredient of national consolidation in a time of increasing popular mobilization, cultural commissariats and ministries were put under the charge of high-profile intellectuals (Vasconcelos and Mário de Andrade, respectively). It was thought, in this era of melting pots, that culture would give rise to a “new man,” a popular citizen in the European cases and, additionally, an ethnically hybridized one (a mestizo) in Latin American countries. Something similar took place in the 1930s and early 1940s in the United States as the compromise welfare state—the New Deal—was crafted, enabling the fusion of immigrant ethnicities linked to organized labor with American nationalism, which required a governmental system of cultural administration to “empower” and manage popular activism (Denning 76).

b. INTERNATIONAL CULTURAL POLICY

On the international front, Good Neighbor cultural policies sought to woo Latin American sympathies away from the Axis ideologies and trade arrangements. Various government offices were created as an adjunct of foreign policy; several Offices for the Coordinator of Inter American Affairs (from 1940-41) and the Office of War Information (1942) established what one commentator called a “shot-gun wedding of scholarship and war information [that] begot some dubious progeny: the mongrel mixture of culture and propaganda” (Wythe 171). These offices were the precedent for the Cold War cultural war institutions (Marshall Plan, USIA, and the covertly CIA-sponsored Congress for Cultural Freedom) that aimed at winning over the “non-Stalinist left” (Saunders). In the USSR and France, national cultural policy had direct links to foreign policy too, especially in response to the use of culture by the US during the Cold War. UNESCO, created just after World War II, had as its mission to “advanc[e] the mutual knowledge and understanding of peoples” (Article I, UNESCO Constitution, qtd in Sewell, 140), but it was also the site of intense international rivalry (Joyce 1999).
c. DECOLONIZATION, DEVELOPMENT AND THE PURSUIT OF SOVEREIGNTY

In the context of European reconstruction and US-USSR rivalry, accompanied by a cultural Cold War, Europe’s colonies launched independence movements throughout the 1950s and 1960s. The nonaligned movement (NAM), established in 1961, sought a “positive position” beyond being “pro-communist or anti-communist,” as Nehru said at the Bandung Conference in 1955. NAM helped realize the 1960 UN Declaration of the “speedy and unconditional end [to] colonialism in all its forms and manifestations” (United Nations). This entailed cultural decolonization within national frameworks. For many, cultural redefinition was crucial for changing the system of power relations between what came to be seen as the North and the South (Elmandjra). Such redefinition also entailed transforming the global flow of communications and information, especially since these were seen as necessary not only for sovereignty but also for economic development. We might ask if this is still not the case when more than 80% of global communications, information and entertainment distribution is in the hands of four or five conglomerates located in the North, notwithstanding their transnational web of administration. As García Canclini explains, the emergence of national media enterprises in Latin American countries promoted “modernization through import substitution and the upgrading of industry in each country [and] even the most internationalized agents at this point in time [1940s-60s]--like TV and advertising--beckoned us to buy national products and encouraged the dissemination of local knowledge” (93). Now even Latin American media conglomerates like Televisa (Mexico) and Rede Globo (Brazil), not to speak of transnational cable and satellite companies, promote a global culture of consumption.

García Canclini has written that Latin Americans may be underdeveloped as producers of media, but they are overdeveloped as consumers. This statement should lead to a reconsideration of the connection that had been made between culture and development. Not only has developmentalism not led to an improvement in distribution, it has worsened it. Despite the enormous increase in trade and wealth creation, globalization has widened the income gap in comparison to the 1960s (“Nafta Widens”). Despite several decades of developmentalism, “there persist marked ethnic, regional and national differences among Latin American countries. And we no longer believe that modernization will do away with them” (García Canclini, 141).

The incorporation of newly independent states in the 1960s shifted the emphasis from using culture to foster cooperation in the postwar period to enabling development, conceived exclusively in national terms. In 1969, UNESCO commissioned a series of Studies and Documents on Cultural Policies, with a focus on development, on a mandate from member states at a conference in 1967. While stating that UNESCO should not assume the role of “defining the cultural policy of States,” it did establish “cultural development” as the framework for cultural policy, along four lines: (1) to integrate cultural policy into general planning; (2) to emphasize the duty of the State to replace private initiative in the public sphere; (3) to decentralize and delegate, nevertheless, the administration of culture to relatively autonomous cultural institutions; (4) to “strengthen awareness of nationhood,” especially in developing countries (UNESCO, “Cultural Policy,” 11).

Cultural policy was and is still largely conceived as centered in institutions of the nation-state as well as more local institutions such as municipal arts councils. Its actors have been generally circumscribed to officials within ministries and secretariats dealing with education and culture.
and sometimes sport and foreign or interior ministries for promotion abroad. Depending on the
country, cultural policy has also been affected by professional associations of writers, musicians,
artists, and museum personnel.

d. GLOBALIZATION
Globalization, however, has had a profound impact on this national framework: the instantaneous
circling of the globe by financial transactions, facilitated by communication and technological
innovation, now including the internet, and the back and forth movement of populations (e.g.,
immigrants and tourists) across borders, have made it more difficult to manage culture from a
strictly national framework. This does not mean that the previously mentioned actors have
disappeared but rather that a host of other actors are now considered crucial for the formulation
and implementation of cultural policy. These new actors include: officials of supranational arts
and culture councils, corporate funders and other private investors, international foundations and
NGOs, trade ministries and bodies (General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs [GATT], World
Trade Organization [WTO]), international financial institutions (World Bank [WB], Inter-
American Development Bank [IADB]), entertainment conglomerates, intellectual property
lawyers, communities that use tourism, often in partnership with NGOs and private enterprise, as
a means to sustain heritage.

The following sections elaborate on the ways in which actors and stakeholders in cultural policy-
making operate within the

III: NEW CIRCUMSTANCES WROUGHT BY GLOBALIZATION

(1) MANAGERS OF DIVERSITY: When in the late 1970s, the Sandinistas traveled to all the
corners of the newly liberated Nicaragua, enthusiastically seeking to empower all inhabitants
through educational and cultural integration, they found to their chagrin that certain linguistic
and cultural minorities such as the Miskitos considered this integration an imposition. The
experience of the Sandinistas repeats that of other postdictatorial and postcolonial states from the
1950s to the 1980s, where national integration chafed against the desire for local cultural
autonomy. If cultural ministries were created to bring about national integration, it was soon
discovered that subministries and other offices had to be created to deal with minorities, many of
which had organized as insurgents, social movements, NGOs and sought national and
international recognition. Cultural diversity is probably the most salient issue in the current
period, in which the questioning of national identities has proliferated. This questioning does not
ensue, however, only from minority perspectives, it is also spurred by the market and the media,
which traverse all territories.

The mediation of this diversity, increasingly located in governmental and nongovernmental
institutions, is known as multiculturalism. Whether by design (Canada and Australia) or default
(US and Britain), multiculturalism is the mode in which cultural diversity plays itself out in
postindustrial liberal democracies. Multiculturalism has also been adopted in some of the
developing democracies of Latin America, going against the grain of the normative
mestizo melting pots projected by governments and social scientists from the 1930s to 1960s.
Democratization after the fall of the dictatorships (particularly in the Southern Cone) and
authoritarian democracies (Mexico, Peru) of the 1960s to 1980s was characterized by sundry
social movements that translated the concept of human rights into civil and cultural rights, seeking the recognition of full citizen status for women, indigenous and other ethnoracial groups (Afro Latin Americans).

All Latin American countries now characterize themselves as multicultural and have implemented policies to recognize their diversity. Chile, for example, recently revamped its cultural policies along three axes: decentralization, giving due recognition to all cultural and territorial identities that have contributed to national heritage; the integration of the arts and traditional and new media cultures into the curriculum at all levels, on the premise that cultural knowledge and practice enhances perceptive and critical faculties as well as reinforces citizenship; and special attention to the marginal and disadvantaged, which can find inclusion through cultural citizenship (di Girólamo, 8-16). To this end, the Ministry has designed a program for the training of cultural catalysts (managers, administrators, fundraisers, planners, educators) of community creativity (24).

Catalyzing cultural citizenship is of crucial importance in a country like Colombia, which is racked by violent divisions. In 1991, a new constitution was drafted that replaced the traditional twentieth century imagined melting pot with the vision of society comprised of a pluriethnic and multicultural citizenry. Aside from designating special rights for indigenous peoples, which also have been implemented in other Latin American countries (the most recent of which is Mexico, in April 2001), the new Colombian constitution laid the foundations for Afro-Colombian communities to mobilize as a social movement for recognition of their identity, their claims to territorial rights, political autonomy and the defense of their environment and control of natural resources within their territory (Grueso et al. 202). The claim to a particular culture and identity was the major legitimizing feature of this movement. While this expansion of cultural rights, and other rights on that basis, proceeded more or less smoothly, Colombia’s unique cultural policy for the establishment of peace has had a more fraught history.

It is well known that aside from regional diversity and the claims of indigenous and black groups, Colombia is also riven by armed conflict among guerrillas, paramilitary groups, narcotraffickers, and the military, which also has a US-financed war on drugs. Mediating diversity is thus a life and death issue here, and to this end the government shifted its understanding of cultural policy from a traditional system of provision to a “communicative process that permits the transformation of social relations through a new politics of identity and recognition” (Ochoa, “Cultural Policy”). CREA: An Expedition Through Colombian Culture, a series of festivals or “cultural encounters” that brought together creative artists and artistic products (oral poets, written literary forms, rock and folk musicians, video productions, food) from every locality and ultimately converged in the capital, made it possible for Colombians of many different walks, including the above mentioned contending groups, to get to know each other, under the only peaceful circumstances that some have ever known (Ochoa, “CREA”).

Ochoa points out that despite the rhetoric of decentralization, for a country to “encounter” itself, at least in the Colombian case, this entailed a certain centrality, beginning with the hub of cultural policy in the capital and ending in the public sphere that also culminated in capital. As important as this program has been, it raises the need for a monitoring function open to representatives—especially local artists and/or cultural promoters—from the various localities, to
mitigate the centralized character of policy-making.

(2) SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND PUBLIC-PRIVATE-NONPROFIT PARTNERSHIPS:
A more fluid model of cultural citizenship is provided by the Cultural Groups that practice civic activism in several cities of Brazil. Many of these are ethnoracial groups, like Olodum in Bahia and AfroReggae in Rio de Janeiro, both of which are Afro-Brazilian. They combine musical performance and recording with cultural activism and community entrepreneurialism, facilitated by the partnerships they have established with municipal development agencies and cultural secretariats, multilateral development banks, international foundations and nongovernmental organizations like the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations and Médecins sans Frontières, and broad-based citizen action initiatives. In reaction to a massacre of 21 residents of the favela Vigário Geral, various initiatives emerged, among them the transformation of the house in which a family of evangelists died into a House of Peace, the use of pop music to woo youth away from narcotrafficking and other criminal activities that provides “jobs” in poor communities, and a citizen action initiative named Viva Rio to keep both the need to combat violence and eradicate poverty visible at all moments (Yúdice, “Promoting”).

Both Olodum and AfroReggae also engage in commercial entrepreneurialism, not only via their music (both have lucrative recording contracts, respectively with Warner and Universal), but also through a line of accessories that, at least in Olodum’s case, can be bought in their chain of boutiques. Both groups take 30% of the proceeds of their commercial activities to supplement the funds raised from public and nonprofit sources to finance their civic and educational projects, which are premised on the concept of cultural citizenship. What is unique about these cultural groups is that they manage to combine the conventional tasks of the manager and administrator with the activities of the community, giving greater agency to the participants.

3. POLYGLOTS OF SOCIABILITY: The members of Olodum and AfroReggae are what Rubem César, director of Viva Rio, has called polyglots of sociability, experts in working with the “fluid language of values,” developing the “art of translation” of those values “beyond cosmopolitan circuits” where rights and other conceptual categories can be too abstract. Communication is the medium for this cultural activism, by which they develop the ability to bring the “individualistic language of rights” into contact with “other principles that regulate social life.” These groups bridge traditional intellectual and/or administrative roles with those of social movements (grassroots or otherwise), reformers, and revolutionaries. The former seek to generate views of the world, the latter to change social structures. Olodum, AfroReggae and Viva Rio, led by Rubem César, include all of these initiatives in their agendas, but they do not attempt to achieve these world views and changes directly. Rather, their strategy is to bring people together so that they can negotiate their difference and find common ground, that is, set the parameters for coordinating social change. “Such coordination, to have effective receptivity in plural societies, must have the ability to engage with a multiplicity of languages, symbolic codes, and social and cultural forms.” The trick is to relate citizenship to “hierarchies based on kinship, to different upbringing and ethnic backgrounds, to respect for one’s elders, to the protection one expects from one’s superiors, to informal networks of mutual aid, to motherhood, to the cult of saints, to witchcraft, to mediumship, to charismatic gifts” (Fernandes 1994, 171).
4. ENTREPRENEURS: CULTURE AS GOOD BUSINESS:

a: Tourism: The network structure adopted by these groups disseminates the phenomenon of agency, the capacity to effect change. It is not rooted inherently in any one actor but is layered across differently positioned actors: the activist cultural groups, the community in whose name the activism is carried out, funding sources that range from local government agencies and foundations to transnational corporations and NGOs, and local business enterprises. Entrepreneurialism is at the heart of the practice of groups like Olodum, some of its partners, and the recent turn in Brazil to partnerships with business. The renovation of the Pelourinho, Bahia’s highly symbolic colonial site for trading and punishing slaves (the name Pelourinho derives from the Brazilian cognate for “pillory”), was conceived in partnership with the IADB, UNESCO and local community activist and corporate groups. This renovation was supposed to enhance tourism as well as make life better for the largely poor black residents of the area. Tourism was indeed enhanced, but the local residents were displaced by the project (Gomes 1999: 13), which resembles classic gentrification programs were artists (in this case Afro-Brazilian music-cultural groups) serve as (usually) unwitting pioneers for real estate and other business interests who capitalize on the value-added provided by culture.

b: Creative Economies: Such entrepreneurship needs to be tempered by regulation, which is built into the institutionalization of new tax incentive laws (Ottman). Brazilian cultural officials are seeking to encourage a version of what Michael Volkerling (2001) calls “creative economies.” The premise is that cultural creativity is the spawning ground of innovation and in a global economy, it is innovation rather than material resources or manufactures that drive accumulation. On this premise, Blair’s “Cool Britannia,” a cultural-economic project including multicultural artists as well as new media entrepreneurs, were to transform London into the creative hub for trends in music, fashion, art and design, thus constituting the foundation for the so-called new economy based on “content provision.” Britain’s Creative Industries Task Force focused on “those activities which have their origin in individual creativity, skill and talent and which have a potential for wealth and job creation through the generation and exploitation of intellectual property” (CITF, 1998: 2). Volkerling examines similar projects in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, and the model is being explored throughout the world (Yúdice, “A New”).

There are at least two creative economic models. On the one hand, cities like Buenos Aires, São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, and Mexico easily fit the model briefly mentioned above. Cultural ministries and secretariats there have created or fused with economic development programs in which support for culture is part of an integrated strategy to woo tourism, new media, and cutting edge service industries.

c. Heritage Tourism: In most other Latin American cities and in rural areas, however, it is traditional culture (and often [re]invented traditions) that form part, in the best of cases, of integrated sustainable development projects, such as the Ecuadorean OMAERE project that seeks to strengthen Andean indigenous cultures through educational-touristic activities that produce knowledge as well as resources. In the worst cases, tourism transforms indigenous peoples into performers of themselves for pay (Yúdice, “La globalización”). Since transportation, hotel, restaurant, and even photography and video industries form part of these enterprises, many national and local governments have instituted a tax, for example, on hotel
rooms, in order to pay for some of the infrastructure required to keep tourism going.

d. Urban Development: In more developed countries, cultural tourism and arts development are making possible the transformation of postindustrial cities. The most sensational example is the Guggenheim Museum in Bilbao, which is serving as a model for the franchising of museums in other parts of the world, such as Rio de Janeiro and Lyons (Iturribarria, Rojas). Local political and business leaders, concerned about Bilbao’s fraying postindustrial infrastructure as well as the city’s reputation for terrorism, sought to revitalize it by investing in cultural infrastructure that would attract tourists and lay the foundation for an economic complex of service, information and culture industries. By investing in a museum stamped by Frank Gehry’s stylistic grandiosity, city leaders provided the magnet that would attract those activities that “give life,” to use Manuel Castells’ phrase: “alongside technological innovation there has mushroomed an extraordinary urban activity . . . fortifying the social fabric of bars, restaurants, chance encounters on the street, etc. that give life to a place.” Enhancing the quality of life in this way enables a city to attract and retain the innovators indispensable to the new “creative economy.” (Castells). “Knowledge, culture, art . . . will help catapult Bilbao to the short list of world capitals,” according to Alfonso Martínez Cearra, head of Bilbao Metrópoli 30, a network of government officials, businessmen, educators, nonprofit directors and media executives spearheading the city’s development (Jacobs, 14). Another postindustrial city that turned to culture to revive the economy is Peekskill, New York. Reasoning that “artists are a kind of pilot fish for gentrification,” the city council created an Arts District and offered incentives, like cheap loft space, so that artists would relocate there from New York City (Peterson).

e. Downside of Cultural Development: These initiatives also have a downside, as in the case of the Pelourinho’s displaced residents. The turn to the “creative economy” evidently favors the professional-managerial class, even as it trades on rhetoric of multicultural inclusion. Subordinate or minoritized groups have a place in this scheme as low-level service workers and as providers of “life-giving” ethnic and other cultural experiences, which according to Rifkin “represent the new stage of capitalist development” (265). Economic development thus necessarily entails cultural management of populations, to decrease the risk of violence in the buying and selling of experiences. The Bilbao metro system installed surveillance cameras in every station to keep track of travelers’ activities (Jacobs, 13-14); Peekskill officials installed them on street corners in an effort to control the drug trade. Many residents, however, interpreted this as a way of reining in black residents, many of whom were left unemployed by industrial flight to the third world. City leaders were accused of interpreting urban development in racial terms, seeking to attract white professionals and limiting the mobility of minorities (Peterson).

5: COMMUNICATIONS: Culture as “good business” also requires publicity, and in all of the cases mentioned above, arrangements have been made with communications media. Most often, media executives are part of cultural development projects, such as Bilbao Metrópoli 30, “the organization dedicated to selling a vision of the Bilbao of the future to the city’s people and to the world” (Jacobs 14). In Miami, media professionals have taken a protagonist role in building up the museum and other cultural infrastructure of the city, which is part of promoting Miami as a media capital (Yúdice, “Miami”).

Communications and the media are, of course, not simply instruments of development projects
but have, perhaps, the largest stake in cultural policy negotiations at all levels. Their involvement in local cultural policy ensues from their need for infrastructure. In Miami, for example, communications and entertainment industry executives have helped organize high school and university curricula to maintain a steady supply of professionals and skilled workers (Yu dice, “Miami”). Communications and media corporations are also major players in international trade agreements (GATT, WTO), seeking to abolish subvention for local companies and setting the definition and terms of trade in intellectual property, which tends to absorb the moral rights in authorship to copyright, largely a commercial category (UNESCO, “Culture”). Their dominance has resulted in the disappearance or absorption (via disproportionate competition, merger or acquisition) of local production companies. But the global reach of communications and entertainment conglomerates does not necessarily mean that local music, film and cultural traditions disappear and that everyone listens only to the latest Madonna CD. Standardization is not the result of what is often mistakenly characterized as “Americanization,” “Coca Colonization,” or “McDonaldization.”

6. CONTENT PROVISION WITHIN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL DIVISION OF CULTURAL LABOR

While it is certainly true that transnational conglomerates dominate the dissemination of signs, images and sounds, taking the lion’s share of profits, it is not the case that these corporations are “American”; four of the five global entertainment conglomerates—BMG, EMI, SONY, Universal—, which could be thought of, respectively, as German, English, Japanese, and French (Universal was acquired in June 2000 with the purchase by Vivendi of the Canadian conglomerate Seagrams), are in fact transnational hybrids. Moreover, these corporations have learned that success comes from production for local audiences (Yu dice, “La industria”). Even that lynchpin of Americanization, Hollywood, has long internationalized its production offshore as well as tailored its films to what are perceived to be foreign tastes, with actors and settings chosen to achieve greater receptivity (Danan). At least 50% of profits are made in overseas markets, reflecting the decreasing importance of U.S. viewers as the ideal receivers of audiovisual texts (Wasser). Over the past 25 years, cultural provision has increasingly localized. In TV production, Grundy—originally an Australian TV production company relocated to Bermuda for tax benefits and recently bought by global media conglomerate Pearson, whose motto is “More than 20,000 people working in more than 50 countries”—has become a model of local customization for Hollywood, “with Sony, Warner, and Disney all producing thousands of hours of TV texts in foreign markets each year, designed for local audiences” (Miller et al.). Not only is there, presumably, greater audience uptake, but local production is cheaper, thus adding to profitability.

Attention to (some would say production of) the local is even manifesting itself in media corporate reorganization, as in the case of MTV Latin America. Programming and marketing were completely done in the Miami office when MTV Latin America got started with one signal for all of Spanish America in 1993 and another for MTV Brazil. In 1996 it took its first step toward regionalization by doubling the Spanish American signals, centering the northern one in Mexico City and the southern one in Buenos Aires. In 1999 it begin to produce programming in the regions, following the adage of “I want my own MTV.” Rather than homogenization, a global corporation like MTV wants local relevance, in every locality. The next step will establish full programming, production and marketing offices in each of 22 countries. Its center of
operations will remain in Miami, but direction of content provision will be much more flexible and nomadic as managers and producers move or communicate between Latin American localities and the Miami office (Zel).

The point here is not that the globalization of media and entertainment enterprise has in any way achieved the dreams of sovereignty of countries and cultures at a disadvantage. Instead there has emerged a new international division of cultural labor whereby production is globally multisited, administration circulates in a command and control network, and profits accrue overwhelmingly to stockholders in the North. Within this global reorganization, the local is highly significant, for that is where content provision is solicited. But this takes place within an accumulation system where what counts is who holds copyright and intellectual property rights. This is a crucial point for policymakers, for it is their charge not only to encourage cultural production in their countries and cities, but to make that a profitable enterprise at home. This is the major challenge.

7. CULTURAL POLICIES AND TRADE AGREEMENTS
Policy makers in developing countries are up against huge odds, for those countries that have spearheaded the so-called new economy, especially the United States, are doing what is necessary to hold onto their advantage. For example, the Report on Intellectual Property and the National Information Infrastructure of the White House Information Infrastructure Task Force (IITF), which recommended bolstering copyright regimes so that content provision would ensure US competitiveness, is a blueprint not only for upgrading domestic infrastructure but also for trade negotiations. “All the computers, telephones, scanners, printers, switches, routers, wires, cables, networks and satellites in the world,” the task force argues, “will not create a successful national information infrastructure (NII) if there is no content. What will drive the NII is the content moving through it. And this includes cultural content: “information and entertainment resources, delivered . . . [instantaneously] anywhere in the world; [strengthening and diversifying U.S. arts and humanities with] access to rich cultural resources around the world; support for our education and library systems; [job creation in] processing, organizing, packaging and dissemination of information, education and entertainment products” (United States). Jack Valenti, Chairman of the Motion Picture Association of America, implements these recommendations in his activities as a de facto trade negotiator for the U.S., making the case that “industries that use copyright–movies, television, home video, music, publishing, computer software–collect more international revenues than automobiles . . . aircraft and . . . agriculture. At a time when this country is bleeding from trade deficits, the copyright industries have a surplus balance of trade with every country where copyrighted works are sold or licensed. These businesses are a national treasure, one that every other nation views with envy” (Valenti).

From the U.S. vantage point, film and television are regarded as commodities; the Europeans, however, insist that they be understood as cultural constituents of civil society, and in so far as they would safeguard local cultures from foreign monopoly or total commercialization, they should be exempted from trade agreements (Cohen 1993a; Friedman 1994). U.S. advocates of free trade retort that they would accept the idea of exempting high culture but note that it is hypocritical to "put a quota on an American cop show so that French studios can crank out their own car chases" (Passell 1994; Friedman 1994). Both positions might be seen, ultimately, as "the outcome of contingent moralisms," for they both offer problematic justifications for the putative
subject that they are protecting: the "fabled sovereign consumer," on the one hand, and the
"fabled sovereign citizen," on the other (Miller 1994: 12).

A second strategy devised by European negotiators, especially the French, is the protection of
 cultural diversity. But as Beale (forthcoming) argues, this goal conflicts with European priority
for information and communication technologies (ICTs) and domestic culture and television
industries that are "linked to ICTs via cross-ownership and investment, and technological
convergence (i.e., AOL-Time Warner, Time Warner-EMI)." Those activities that most take into
consideration concern for minorities, diversity, and cultural rights, such as the arts and heritage,
come last in the order of priority. This situation has placed an enormous onus on cultural
ministries and secretariats in developing countries. On the one hand, they cannot allow
themselves to fall even further behind in the development of a “creative economy.” On the other,
given the accelerating depth of poverty and the increasing disaffection of the majority
involvement in public and political issues since the adoption of neoliberal policies in the 1980s,
cultural policies must address social justice issues, in order to contain anomie and ensure citizen
participation.

8. BEYOND(?) TRADE AND TOWARD REGIONAL CULTURAL INTEGRATION
An interesting development in Latin American countries is the spate of initiatives to formulate
supranational cultural integration, modeled in part after the European Union. According to
Octavio Getino, who has done the most encompassing research on Latin American cinema and
television, their current crisis of these industries has less to do with the production of these media
than with their traditional modes of circulation and reception, which have largely been neglected
by state policy. Without a clear policy framework for the introduction and dissemination of the
new audiovisual technologies they have been left to languish in a state of dependency,
relinquishing a sense of public responsibility to market criteria most often designed by
transnational enterprises which have succeeded over national television networks in producing a
fit between the increasing diversification of Latin American urban societies and the proliferation
of channels on cable and satellite. Once accused of homogenizing their publics, transnational
media conglomerates now promote niche publics. Regional and local broadcasting, on the other
hand, have succeeded in producing programs—e.g., “live” shows and serials made from a local
point of view—that cannot be replaced by those of the transnational conglomerates. But these
unsubstitutable programs grounded in local realities (yet with the potential to continental and
sometimes even transcontinental export) are at best complementary. In order to enhance their
chances of survival, Getino advocates investment in and development of knowledge of the most
advanced technologies and of local creativity, reinforced by a humanistic and democratic
ethos. (Getino 226-28 & 257-63). The institutional vehicles may be transnational Latin American
training centers and Latin American networks for the production and dissemination of national,
regional, and local cultures.

These possibilities can be furthered by innovative public-private and local-international
partnerships. The International Association Arte Sem Fronteiras (Art Without Borders)—in
collaboration with UNESCO, the Inter-American Development Bank, the Convenio Andrés
Bello, the Organization of Iberoamerican States, the Latin American Parliament, the
MERCOSUR Cultural Parliament, and the cultural ministries or secretariats of Argentina, Brazil,
Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay—took its first steps at its Second Forum in November 2000 to
persuade governments and international organizations to politically, economically, and juridically facilitate the cultural integration of Latin American societies. Members convened the General Estates of Culture of the Americas to present to the UNESCO and IADB-sponsored World Meeting on Culture in Barcelona in 2004 a detailed integration plan focusing on: culture and democracy, culture and development, culture and creativity, culture and identity, and including three cultural clusters: (1) culture industries: film, TV, video, publishing, press, radio, multimedia, digital media, including internet; (2) the arts: art, music, theater, dance, architecture, design, photography, even advertising; (3) heritage: handicrafts, festivals, fairs, tourism and related activities.

In Arte Sem Fronteiras’s first major step to create a forum broader than the limited domain of national cultural policies, we see the opening up of cultural policy to international multilateral financial institutions, transnational corporations, and tourism concerns which almost by definition are international, and related to some NGOs that lobby on behalf of culture and development projects. While recognizing the necessity to form partnerships with the private sector, participants in the forum also seek to foster a form of internationalization of cultural policy that does not assume the equivalence of culture and an expedient economic or political resource. Moreover, establishing this initiative under the umbrella of a Latin American cultural space maintains the dynamism within a community that because of linguistic and historical kinships may eventually achieve greater success than European Union cultural integration.

9. RESEARCH AND CULTURAL ADMINISTRATION PROGRAMS
The cultural sector is one of the most refractory when it comes to generating hard data on economic impact, employment, and social benefits. To be sure, many claims are made in these regards, and just as many critiques. In most developing countries, these problems are multiplied. Cultural ministries generally have been more interested in supporting production, with little regard to distribution and reception. There are few institutions that gather information on cultural activity, including the culture industries like film, TV, and music recording. The problem is compounded by the lack of automated monitoring systems like Sound Scan, used in the US to determine number of sales. Moreover, business enterprises are reluctant to release their own data, which they hoard like state secrets. To make matters worse, there are almost no university programs specializing in cultural administration.

An important step that local cultural ministries and secretariats can take is to partner with universities to create programs in cultural administration. International organizations and foundations (UNESCO, Ford, Rockefeller) and regional integration projects like Arte Sem Fronteiras, specialized research centers (e.g., Interarts, in Barcelona), as well as the more developed cultural ministries of countries like France, Canada, and Australia and the Research Division of the U.S. National Endowment for the Arts can help by offering workshops, residencies and fellowships. A priority area is development of cultural indicators, which will presumably displace the overemphasis on the economic impact of cultural investment. Indicators research includes information on the diffusion or concentration of cultural practice and consumption; gauging security defined in terms of social cohesiveness, conviviality, voluntary work, aspects of spontaneous cultural initiatives, occupation of public space., with a focus on the degree to which people associate in public; cultural quality of life (not to be understood as exclusively quality of cultural life), measuring the extent of communication among people, the
existence of good cinemas, good heritage (memory), proximity to artists, enjoyment of public space; cultural rights, a factor not usually found in States’ charters and institutions, includes but is not limited to freedom of expression since there should also be a right to be listened to, a right to diversity of language and expressive modes, and even the negative right that one’s cultural space should not be used for publicity, which is a problem in tourism.

Ultimately, research must be located in the cities and regions that will carry out their own cultural planning. This is crucial, for few knowledge-generating paradigms do not come with the values of other societies. While globalization is integrating all parts of the world into its economic and media networks, localities must still devise ways of deriving benefits from their participation.

10. CRITIQUE

As political and economic schemes fail to solve the problems of development, inequality, and citizen participation, cultural administrators and personnel from all of the above mentioned sectors are asking culture do what other activities can’t. This demand upon culture should itself be open to critique. Indeed, critique is a notion that is almost always absent in discussions of cultural development, heritage, and the arts. The term has a distinguished pedigree, going back to the Enlightenment and forward to the Frankfurt School. But perhaps that is its very drawback, as the cognitive tools bequeathed by the Enlightenment have come under attack. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to remember that critique was a potent weapon against the instrumentalization of culture, which is what we see so much of nowadays, particularly in cultural policy.

Cultural policy should also be about challenging, and not only accommodating to authorized institutions. For example, the discernment that authority is constructed within power relations can lead to a contestation of the “authority which some people acquire to ‘write the culture’ of others” (Hall, 7).

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